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iNTRoDuCTioN:  
MoTivaTioNS FoR ReTuRNiNg To The CaSe oF 
huNgaRiaN gRaND eNTRePReNeuRS
This is our second study on the hungarian grand entrepreneurs. 
our earlier research about this important social group and its 
economic, social and cultural attainments was accomplished 
ten years ago. in that first wave, the main source of information 
was the collection of 48 in-depth interviews with the owner-
managers of large firms owned partly or fully by hungarians; 
this collection was complemented and its information content 
was controlled by the content analysis of documents and news-
paper articles on the subject. our interview partners – in other 
words, the heroes of our first book – were owner-managers of 
fast growing or efficiently consolidated large- and medium-size 
companies and businesses. Mainly due to their outstanding 
performance, these owner-managers were among the influential 
figures of the hungarian economy at the end of the first decade 
of the post-socialist transition.
in our current research project (and especially in our inter-
view instructions) we focused on micro- and macro-factors of 
the economy which could be supposed to provide the main 
preconditions of successful post-socialist entrepreneurship. We 
carefully analysed the decisive events and turning points of the 
life- and family-histories which related to this process. Based on 
the interviews, we tried to figure out the features which mobil-
ised and sped up the development of the enterprise and the ris-
ing position of its owner. Furthermore, the interviews revealed 
diverse patterns of the characteristic life stories, aspirations 
and  social roles of the group and they helped to disclose spe-
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cific structures in the accumulated knowledge and skills as well. 
These results gave us a chance to assess the development of this 
emerging social group and put it into the context of the revival 
and rebuilding of the social functions of the hungarian grand 
bourgeoisie.1 
We started our follow-up research about ten years later, in 2008.2 
The core of our research plan was the second round of in-depth 
interviews with our former partners. via these interviews we 
aimed to explore whether the promising upward mobility of 
our interviewees had proceeded or not. We asked: were they ca-
pable of stabilising and reinforcing their positions in the hun-
garian economy in the decade after the new Millennium? are 
there dominant practices of further expansion on the domestic 
markets which became controlled by foreign owned large com-
panies in the first years of the new century? among others we 
wanted to reconsider how our interview partners performed 
on their foreign markets. We planned to analyse their relation-
ship to the state administration and also in a broader sense, 
to the political system. Furthermore, we aimed to reveal: how 
did these not so young owner-managers transmit the roles and 
functions of management and ownership to their successors. 
Last but not least: how were these developments influenced by 
hungary’s accession to and membership of the european un-
ion since 2004? 
The majority of our old-new interview partners were more 
than 40 years old in the first years of post-socialist transition. 
Therefore, we assumed on good grounds that many of them 
would have retired by now or have begun the complex process 
of withdrawal in the period of our follow-up research. Further-
more, we expected that the methods and chances of company 
1 The main results of our research were summarised in Laki Mihály–Szalai 
Júlia (2004) and Mihály Laki–Júlia Szalai (2006). 
2 The research plan was completed in 2008; the fieldwork started in 2009 and 
the final version of the research report was published in 2012. our research 
was supported by the hungarian Scientific Research Fund (oTka) (Tíz évvel 
később: magyar nagyvállalkozások az európai unióban, oTka 77918).
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establishment would have changed remarkably after the end of 
the last wave of the hungarian privatisation in 1997–1998. 
These two developments indicated the setting and involve-
ment of a comparative group of younger hungarian entrepre-
neurs into our research. Based on our earlier applied detailed in-
terview plan (including its thematic blocks) we made interviews 
with 31 younger entrepreneurs (owner-managers of large or 
medium-size companies) in 2009–2012. Their common distinc-
tive feature was that their businesses had started not before, but 
after the year 2000.
in our present book we repeat the structure of the previous 
one. The discussion begins with the conditions and impacts 
of the macro-economy. Based on these developments the next 
chapters of the book deal with the personal-individual ‘econom-
ic histories’ of our grand entrepreneurs (including the members 
of the new group of interviewees). The discussion will be fol-
lowed by the chapters on the role of the micro-environment 
(including family, children, friends and the network capital in 
a broader sense) in the successes and later in the failures and 
marginalisation of our heroes (and of their companies). 
among the factors influencing the trajectories of post-Millen-
nium development we paid particular attention to the conse-
quences of hungary’s eu accession. how has the eu member-
ship of the country influenced the performance and the regula-
tory environment of the large companies/grand entrepreneurs? 
has it changed – and if so in what direction – their market condi-
tions (including the labour-market positions) and their business 
culture? has the remarkable change in the institutional envi-
ronment influenced the relationships of our interview partners 
with the local governments or with the business associations? 
The follow-up approach of the research gives us a chance to 
differentiate between certain characteristic periods and to com-
pare trends through generations. We may scrutinise the atti-
tudes of the older generation of owner-entrepreneurs – among 
others, their relationship to the foreign-owned companies. 
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Based on the follow-up context, we are also able to present and 
deconstruct the symptoms of their withdrawal from the political 
arena to private life. at a more general level, we hope that our 
current book helps to understand why a new grand bourgeoisie 
failed to emerge (in contrast to our earlier expectations) from 
the strata/group of the owner-managers of hungarian large and 
medium-size companies? Why have these social groups proven 
incapable of shaping a new culture with modern bourgeois val-
ues and rules and in this way become the respected elite of hun-
garian society (Bibó 1986a)? Finally, we trust that the compari-
son of values, business strategies and social roles of the ‘older’ 
and ‘younger’ generations would contribute to a better under-
standing and explanation of the negative developments (value 
crisis) of hungarian society.
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WhaT haPPeNeD To The huNgaRiaN  
gRaND eNTRePReNeuRS iN The CouRSe oF The 
PaST DeCaDe?
The methodology of the follow-up research
in our earlier research, we made attempts to answer two closely 
interconnected questions. on the one hand, we dealt with the 
conditions of inception and then the rise of the great entrepre-
neurs of the post-socialist transition. We asked: how and where 
did they start their careers and how did they reach influential 
positions in the emerging market economy. on the other hand, 
we tried to reconstruct how their career and life-path were 
embedded some ten years ago into a broader social context. This 
is why we focused on their old-new social, economic, cultural 
and political functions and searched for the values and expecta-
tions which related to these roles and activities. 
The above mentioned 48 interviews that embraced the per-
sonal life-histories and also the histories of the owned compa-
nies (made in 1999–2001) served as primary sources of our at-
tempts at addressing these questions. a careful surveying of the 
relevant macro-statistics and an analytical overview of the relat-
ing literature became important parts of the research as well.
For the most part, our invitation for a new round of inter-
viewing was successful among our earlier interview partners 
in the majority of cases. We made 35 follow-up interviews in 
2009–2011. in 33 cases we met our former interview partner. in 
two cases, when our interlocutor had died in the meantime, we 
consulted with the owner-managers of the (descendant) com-
pany. We tried to reconstruct the stories of those who refused to 
contact us or disappeared. in these cases we used internet and 
media sources and we communicated with their successors. 
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our new additional source of information is a collection of 
interviews which we managed to collect among a group of 
young owner-managers. Members of ‘the group of the new’ 
are successful people – it means that their business companies 
that had been established in 2000 or later grew fast. Statistics 
and registers containing data of business starts, growth po-
tential and conventional success indicators were not available, 
therefore we faced the problem of sampling like in our ear-
lier research. That is why we built up a broader collection of 
the names and firms of the ‘new’ partners first. We compiled 
a list of 290 entrepreneurs based on home pages and special 
issues of magazines and periodicals.3 The people on this list 
are 30–50 years old these days, they are much younger than 
our ‘old’ partners. another difference is that they started their 
businesses about one decade later than the heroes of our previ-
ous book (in 1998–2002). They (except for a few) became own-
er-managers of large- and/or medium-size companies or of so-
called gazelles (extremely fast growing small businesses) in the 
last decade. We specified and shortened the list of this group 
in several rounds. owner-managers with foreign citizenship 
and managers with marginal stock-share were excluded. af-
ter all, 39 owner-managers remained on the list. among them, 
31 were ready to become our partners for an interview. These 
owner-managers became the members of the ‘new’ group. The 
detailed presentation of some fundamental characteristics and 
information on the roles of the members of this group will help 
us to describe and assess the performance and behaviour dif-
ferences of the two generations. 
3 The list of the sources: FigyelőNet (2009), (2010), (2011), Haszon Magazin, 
Manager Magazin, Napi Gazdaság, A 100 leggazdagabb (2011), Origo Vállalkozói 
Negyed, Privátbankár, Spin-Off Club, Telkes.hu, Üzletasszonyok. We used the 
snowball method as well. We put on the list those who were acquaintances of 
those who handled the list and those who were suggested by our interview 
partners as potential partners.
 1 3
The topic of our book:  
unexpected developments and their consequences
as the title of our earlier book indicated, we focused on two 
attributes of the owner-managers’ stories.4, on the one hand, 
these people and their enterprises were regarded as actors with 
excellent economic performance, as idols of other market play-
ers, and as catalysts of the post-socialist economic transition. on 
the other hand, we understood these outstanding achievements 
in their historical context. in this regard, we strove to learn, 
whether the impacts of the suppressed but still functioning 
civilian traditions and the skills and knowledge that had been 
accumulated in the second economy under state-socialism had 
their contribution to the new leading positions on the private 
market and whether these earlier accumulated cultural assets 
have informed the shaping of the characteristics of a new bour-
geois elite. in the time of writing our earlier book we were 
confident that these owner-managers of medium-size and large 
companies would be the leading figures of the post- socialist 
transition in a lasting way. it seemed obvious that their values, 
social roles, life-styles and also their business ethos qualified 
them for becoming the role models of post-socialist hungarian 
society. 
on the last pages of our earlier book we stepped out – in a 
risky way – from the position of the descriptive-analytical re-
searcher and made an attempt to assess the hopefully positive 
impacts of this group of entrepreneurs on hungarian society: 
The strategy of adaptation again has been successful, as the 
earlier statistical data indicate, and domestic grand business 
has been able to maintain its share and its position. in light 
of such renewed success, the eu accession seems to promise 
easier conditions and moving forward rather than collapsing. 
obviously, it is a new phase with new challenges for adapta-
4 entrepreneurs or citoyens (in hungarian: vállalkozók és polgárok). 
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tion, but after all, this is the very capacity in which hun-
garian grand entrepreneurs have shown for decades their 
most outstanding performance. (Laki-Szalai 2004, p.228)
in our new book we concede that our earlier prognosis, dating 
from the first years of the 21st century, needs profound revision. 
The evolving new social positions and the success of the grand 
entrepreneurs in converting their old position to some advanta-
geous new one were not permanent, (as we assumed before) but 
only provisional. We will demonstrate in the following chapters 
that a remarkable part of this social group – members of which 
started businesses mostly in the first years of the post-socialist 
transition – lost its influence and economic power at the end of 
the first decade of the 21st century.
The majority of their formerly fast growing companies or the 
ones demonstrating above average performance stopped grow-
ing or lost their potential for speedy advancement in this decade. 
It is important to note that these unfavourable turns had taken place 
before 2008, that is, before the outbreak of the world economic reces-
sion. Close to half of our interview partners reported bankrupt-
cy and/or the forced sale of his or her company or companies. 
The consequences are obvious: these interview partners made 
a significant retreat and control and own only small businesses 
these days. There were several cases when foreign persons or 
foreign companies bought their companies or businesses. in 
other documented stories the capital (property) was distributed 
among family members, yet in other cases the companies had to 
be utterly reorganised or fell apart. The stories are different in 
many details but the unanimous tendency is clear: in the longer 
run, large and previously fast growing businesses were unable 
to stabilise their positions (market share or profitability).
The interviews repeatedly reveal the disappointment of the 
older owner-managers. Not only their property diminished or 
disappeared but a remarkable part of them also withdrew from 
public life and/or lost earlier social roles and influential posi-
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tions. it seems rather frequent that the ambitions of these, once 
excellently performing and skilled, owner-managers have pro-
foundly changed in the last decade. instead of aspiring to be-
come the idols of excellence they are withdrawing from public 
appearance. They consciously mingle with the crowd and stress 
their conformity. We have to emphasise the far-reaching impacts 
of this radical change in their attitudes. it shows the apparent 
decline of their once promising and feasible-looking social role 
and of their plans to act for the benefit of society. 
Below we will document and analyse the reasons and con-
sequences of their weaker than expected current performance. 
The first chapters focus on economic processes and deal with the 
market-based factors of recoiling. We begin with the documents 
and symptoms of the decline of the businesses of the ‘old’ entre-
preneurs. afterwards we will attempt to answer the question: 
how often have such negative turns occurred in the hungarian 
economy since 1997–1998? This macro-analysis will be followed 
by the description of the differences in the life-histories of the 
‘old’ and the ‘new’ groups. The subsequent chapters address 
the explanatory factors of the differences in the performance of 
the two groups along a set of important indicators: 1 the branch 
structure bias, 2 the differences in the density of innovative ac-
tivities, and 3 variances of the state’s involvement. 
Developments in the markets hosting their activities also 
deeply influenced the performance of the older entrepreneurs 
and their companies. We will document the ways in which 
they made efforts to counterbalance the negative impacts of the 
unexpected fall or slowdown of demand. We will show that in 
such cases their companies often entered the real estate market, 
which happened to be a specific and risky change of the com-
pany’s product or service (output) structure. 
in what follows we will demonstrate that considering the 
economic factors is necessary, but it is not sufficient to explain 
the performance differences of the two groups of the ‘old’ and 
the ‘new’ entrepreneurs. in the second part of the book we in-
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clude social-historical factors into the analysis. First, we give 
an overview of the controversial consequences of the heritage 
of state-socialism. Then we discuss the role of the family back-
ground and that of the family business. The destructive impacts 
of the hungarian society’s growing mistrust are also addressed 
in these chapters. Last but not least we turn to how the the re-
cent remarkable shifts in the ideological content of the dominant 
political discourse have influenced the self-perception and the 
social imagination of the two generations of the interviewed en-
trepreneurs.
Repetition is often unavoidable in follow-up studies, especial-
ly in the course of comparison of present and past tendencies. 
We begin the chapters with the presentation of the events and 
major tendencies of the past. The reader of our earlier book of 
2004 may skip these paragraphs without hesitation.
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LoST DRiveS oF The huNgaRiaN eCoNoMy 
The symptoms
in our earlier book we showed that “32 of our 48 interview partners 
remarkably increased the size of his/her company or companies”. The 
growth was truly impressive: 
These former small entrepreneurs of the early 1980s owned 
or controlled a dominant share of large and/or medium-size 
companies at the end of the 1990s. Their companies which were 
funded with a few hundred thousand forints of joint capital 
produce roughly one-billion forints of yearly turn-over and they 
employ several hundred workers. (Laki–Szalai 2004, p.222)
Table 1 
Performance measured by company development 1990–1999 
Start-up size of the 
company
Size of the company at the time of the 
interview Total
small medium large
small – 15 11 26
medium –  7  6 13
large – –  7  7
no data – –  2  2
Total – 22 26 48
Company growth which was enough for crossing the border 
between the distinct size categories was not measured or esti-
mated for a minority of our sample (these cases are located 
on the diagonal of Table 1). in this group one finds mainly 
privatised companies (apart from two cases). The managers 
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(more precisely, the owner-managers) of these earlier state-
owned companies faced liquidity problems which were due 
to their too optimistic business plans, or were generated by 
over-investment and the concurrent shrinking of demand. 
occasionally they had faced such problems already before the 
collapse of socialism, but a higher prevalence characterised the 
1990s. The performance based on their re-organisational skills 
and capaticies, of the old-new owner-managers was remarkable 
also in these cases. They stopped the decline in turnover and 
successfully brought the financial position of their companies 
into a stable balance. 
The performance of the ‘old’ grand entrepreneurs has fallen 
remarkably in the first decade of the new century. Based on our 
follow-up interviews, media news and information available on 
company home pages, we were able to assess the performance of 
43 companies out of 48 approached earlier. (Table 2)
Table 2 
Performance measured by company development 2000–2008
Start-up size of the 
company
Size of the company at the time of the 
interview Total
small medium large
small – – – –
medium 9 8 3 20
large 6 2 15 23 
Total 15 10 18 43
The change of size could be registered most frequently in the 
group of medium-size companies. The majority of them was 
profoundly changed and was reorganised as a small business.5 
only a few of them were developed into large companies dur-
ing the last decade. The majority of large companies remained 
large but shrinking turnover or the decline of the number of 
employees occurred in this group, too. 
5 as will be shown, mostly the children of owner-managers founded new 
small businesses on the ruins of their parents’ bankrupt companies.
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We observed similar tendencies with regard to the magnitude 
of the business as well. only eight of our 35 ‘old’ interview part-
ners reported company growth. We found two other cases in 
which the turnover or the number of employees increased in 
the group of those who disappeared, died or refused to partici-
pate in the follow-up research. in all other cases, our partners 
reported stagnation or the closure of their companies. These 
developments were not outcomes of conscious decisions or of 
deliberately elaborated business plans. on the contrary: in the 
vast majority of the interviews that were run ten years before, 
we read about a planned increase of the turnover or about the 
expansion of capacities.6 our partners usually did not intend to 
sell their companies and there were cases when they success-
fully upset the buy-out actions of other companies or private 
persons. Their attitudes and values inspired them to mobilise 
reverse activities and escape the risks by ambitious interven-
tions towards growth and increasing influence. in other words: 
conscious modification of their business path, or the turning to 
some strategies of withdrawal could not be the reasons for the 
decline of their companies or of their social-economic status. 
Turn at the Millennium: slowdown of the Hungarian 
economy after 2001–2002
What was the probability by developments bringing about a slow-
down in the hungarian business life? how often has the develop-
mental curve of the hungarian medium-size and large companies 
turned into slowdown or decline during the last decade? 
in an earlier study of one of us (Laki 2011) a distinction was 
made between the usual-conventional and the exceptional incen-
6 There were exceptions when our interview partners gave up their ambitions. 
as one of our interview partners put it ten years ago: “We recognised that we prefer 
to work cosily. We refused to be involved in hard competitions. We consciously figured out 
how to preserve our position. That’s why we balanced our market position at a stagnant 
level. We refused to grow. We avoided following such a strategy.”[14]
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tives of economic activity, the latter comprising those that are in 
effect only amid the condition of the post-socialist transition.
The conventional incentives are:
– taxes7
– loans
– rates of interest
– business environment influenced by economic growth8 
The exceptional incentives are:
 – regulation that intentionally supports the development of 
the market economy
 – additional and exceptional demand (market niches) generat-
ed by the vanishing and the collapse of privatised companies.
in this earlier study we demonstrated that entrepreneurial incli-
nation increased in the first years of the post-socialist transition.9 
Several hundred thousand new enterprises were established 
in spite of the high taxes, the expensive loans and of the long-
term economic recession. in other words: such a blossoming of 
entrepreneurship took place despite the fact that market entries 
and business start-ups were not encouraged or stimulated sig-
nificantly by the conventional incentives.
The vast majority of these businesses could not (or did not 
want to) grow. in 2009 there were 688,996 active companies in 
hungary and in 89 percent of those there were fewer than five 
employees (kSh 2010). Several new companies and businesses 
entered markets where they expected a long-term and remark-
able increase in demand. We carefully documented in this study 
how the above mentioned two exceptional incentives played a 
decisive role in the increase in entrepreneurial activities. 
These exceptional incentives lost their importance in the sec-
ond stage of the post-socialist period which started in 1997–1998. 
7 Taxes were measured by the rate of levy.
8 economic growth was measured by conventional volume indices.
9 See also important details in Lengyel (1997).
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Their impact diminished: privatisation and the deregulation 
process came to an end in the last years of the 1990s and because 
of the additional supply of newcomers the market of several ser-
vices and goods became saturated. The favourable changes of 
the conventional incentives could not counterbalance these de-
velopments. in spite of the slowly waning tax-rate and the easy 
access to the prolifically available and relatively cheap loans and 
also despite the fast economic growth the number of market en-
tries did not increase. Moreover, the expectations and the fore-
casts of our group of the hungarian owner-managers of sizeable 
firms clearly turned more pessimistic than their orientation had 
been in the late 1990s (Laki 2011).
The market situation and the state of several markets also 
differed in the two periods. as we mentioned earlier, market 
disturbances and a growing number of market entries char-
acterised the first period. in the second one which began in 
1997–1998 we observed the consolidation of markets of goods 
and services in a large number of cases. Mainly due to the de-
crease in the number of regulation-changes and modifications, 
the market regulation became more calculable in these years. 
Moreover, formal and informal rules which were formulated 
spontaneously by the market players or by business associa-
tions were accepted and increasingly followed by the parties 
concerned. a spontaneous learning process also ranked among 
the stabilisers – the market players knew more and more about 
the behaviour of the others.
one of the indirect statistical indicators of entrepreneurial 
inclination in society is the number of registered and/or active 
companies. This indicator shows (of course in an inaccurate 
way) the prevalence of market entries. The number of registered 
companies increased very quickly in the first years of the post-
socialist transition. The number of registered limited companies 
was 17,341 in 1989 and about nine times more, that is 162,588 in 
1998. The number of sole proprietors doubled in these years: it 
was 320 thousand in 1989 and grew to 648 thousand by 1998. 
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The entrepreneurial inclination remained vivid also in the 
second period. The number of enterprises with legal entity was 
324,906 in 2009 which is two times more than it was ten years 
before. The number of sole proprietors was over one million in 
this year. The other side of the coin is that there were years when 
the number of registered business units declined in this period. 
These were indirect symptoms of the diminished dynamics of 
the entrepreneurial inclination. 
also, the indicators of business climate changed remarkably 
in the second decade. The share, more precisely the actual dom-
inance of entrepreneurs with pessimistic self-evaluations and 
expectations has increased permanently since the turn of the 
Millennium (Table 3 and Table 4). 
Table 3 
how do you evaluate the present conditions of your company? (%)10 
1997 1998 1999 2003 2005 2007 2008 2009
average 66 62 66 64 61 62 64 56
bad 22 25 20 24 26 28 26 35
o/P indicator11 -11 -13 -6 -11 -13 -18 -17 -26
Source: NFgM (2010) 
Table 4  
how do you see the future prospects of your company?12
1997 1998 1999 2003 2005 2007 2008 2009
improving 23 20 19 14 14 12 8 12
no change 55 63 64 65 68 68 55 57
decaying 22 16 17 21 19 20 37 31
o/P indicator 1 4 2 -7 -5 -8 -29 -19
Source: NFgM (2010) 
10 Based on questionnaire-surveys on representative samples of 2000 small- 
and medium-size companies in the years of the table.
11 Calculation of the o/P (optimism/pessimism) indicator: the percentage of 
those companies which expect improvement minus the percentage of those 
which expect the deterioration of the conditions and terms.
12 Based on questionnaire-surveys on representative samples of 2000 small- 
and medium-size companies in the years of the table.
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Based on these statistical data we may assume that the lost drive 
and the declining performance of a remarkable part of our inter-
view partners’ companies were not extraordinary phenomena. 
Studies dealing with the reasons and the impacts of the gov-
ernmental austerity programme and of other economic policy 
changes in 2006 documented that the competitiveness of the 
hungarian economy stated to deteriorate steadily even before 
the world economic recession of 2008.13 hungary was positioned 
28th on the ranking list of 75 countries in the World Competi-
tiveness Report in 2001. Then the country’s position was stead-
ily declining: it was ranked in 41st position in 2006 (out of 125 
countries) and fell back to 61st in 2008 (out of 133 countries)
(Czakó-Chikán 2009, Török 2011).
There are different explanations for this unwanted develop-
ment. Some see the origin of it in structural factors: 
in the second half of the first decade of the new century slowing 
down of economic growth was not due to cyclical reasons but it 
originated primarily in long-term structural factors. The relative 
slowness of growth that proved to be lagging behind the respec-
tive rates of other countries of Central europe also in medium-
term comparison can be explained by the concurrent decline of 
public finances and the deterioration of all the important param-
eters of long-term economic growth (investment,employment, 
institutional environment) that turned into a negative direction 
in the period of defects in fiscal policy between 2001–2006. 
(Bartha 2008, p. 4)
other participants in the debate about the causes of the down-
ward turn focus on the social and welfare expenditures by 
pointing out that these were not realistically planned and 
adjusted (they were exaggerated) – more exactly, that it was the 
high taxes and other common charges that preconditioned the 
high budgetary outputs. Some experts argued that it was these 
expenses (more precisely, the high rates of these expenses that 
13 WeF World Competitiveness Report (2001–2002), (2006–2007), (2008–2009).
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for decades were significantly above the international averages) 
that caused the declining competitiveness of the hungarian 
companies: 
…extensive welfare expenditures in substitution for labour-
based incomes (wages), extensive state support in substitution for 
private savings, and the high tax burdens (progressive income 
taxes that are adjusted to social security contributions) together 
undermined the conditions for efficient economic growth. (Csil-
lag 2009, p.648)14
yet other participants in the debate – also including the authors 
of this study – distinguish conventional and exceptional factors 
in influencing economic growth. Based on the theory of Ferenc 
Jánossy (1971), they hold the view that the recovery which fol-
lowed the post-socialist transitional recession (kornai 1993) was 
a special case of the post-war restoration periods. András Csanády 
argues that after an artificially intensified and transient period 
of the post-socialist transformation (that was marked by the 
frequent re-employment of those who had previously lost their 
jobs at the privatised or collapsed state-owned companies), the 
state of exhaustion can be described in the following way: 
after 2001 the growth of the economy slowed down. This was 
not considered as a necessary development but the public unani-
mously attributed it to political negligence, in more concrete 
terms, to the short-term acts that were motivated by self-inter-
est. it was the actors of such behaviour whom the public held 
responsible. however, among the factors of the early recession 
one could have assumed as an important – if not the most impor-
tant – factor the impact of accelerated growth that by this time 
had approached the line of a trend which had characterised the 
hungarian economy between 1979 and 1990 when the line was 
deliberately suspended. (Csanády 2010, p.60)
14  Mihályi (2008) and Muraközy (2008) use similar arguments. 
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We do not regard it our task to judge any of the above interpre-
tations and argumentations. From the perspective of the dis-
cussions that follow it seems enough to underline the common 
ground of the departing reasonings and this is the unanimously 
held view that the performance and the competitiveness of the 
hungarian economy had definitely deteriorated in the period of 
reference for our study.
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The TWo gRouPS oF  
huNgaRiaN gRaND eNTRePReNeuRS:  
The ‘oLD’ aND The ‘NeW’
The above overview indicates that it is not only economic and 
social-psychological factors that are in the background of the 
slowdown and the erosion that we recorded in the case of our 
‘old’ partners – though the unfavourable economic and social 
processes of the last two decades have certainly contributed to 
these developments. at the same time, the experienced perfor-
mance differences of the companies cannot be satisfactorily explained 
by the macro-level data. The time-series of macro-indicators do 
not provide the necessary explanation of how and why did it 
happen that previously successful companies collapsed and how 
did it come about that the latecomers established fast-growing 
businesses in the period after 2000?
This methodological weakness of the macro-level analysis 
reasons the comparison of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ generations of 
grand entrepreneurs. Below we will show that the two groups 
have a number of similar characteristics. This is apparent concern-
ing their socio-demographic backgrounds and career paths. But 
there are remarkable differences between them as well. among 
others, it is their socialisation and educational paths and also 
their modes and ways of professional practice that significantly 
differ between the two groups. 
First we look at the characteristics of the two groups sepa-
rately.
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The ‘old’ group: turning points of the life- and career paths
in the group we interviewed in the late 1990s (that of our ‘old’ 
partners) the proportion of men was about 90 per cent. The 
share of those with a degree in higher education was about the 
same. The majority of this group was born in large towns or 
in Budapest. Most of them also lived in these settlement types 
at the time of the interviewing. Those of young age made up a 
minority even ten years ago. The average age of the group was 
over 50 years and about four-fifths of our partners were above 
the age of 40 when the first interviews were made.15
The members of the ‘old’ group followed different paths and 
mobilised a range of skills and techniques for entering the social 
stratum of medium- and grand entrepreneurs.
one of the subgroups embraces those who used preferential 
loans that they obtained by their own resources; they took part in 
the process of buy-out type privatisation that made them the main 
owners of the company where they had been employed before.
another group includes those who mobilised their own ac-
cumulated assets or those of other private persons (family mem-
bers, friends, etc.); they took part in privatisation tenders and 
sold and bought companies or company shares.
a third subgroup comprises those who established legal private 
companies before or just after the collapse of socialism. The share 
and amount of their own invested resources was not significant 
in these cases. This was possible because a limited amount of 
money and some equipment and buildings were enough to es-
tablish a small business at that time.
Finally, there were those who combined the above mentioned 
methods.16
15 These proportions are similar in the representative sample of TáRki’s 
research on the hungarian grand entrepreneurs which was conducted in 1997. 
See details in Laki–Szalai (2004, pp. 248–253).
16 See a more detailed description of the typical career paths in Laki (2003, 
pp. 698–700).
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The differences of business start-ups and of property acquir-
ing methods follow from the various income-maximising strate-
gies and career paths chosen by the owner-managers at the turn-
ing points of their lives before the collapse of socialism. Refusal 
or a supportive fulfilment of membership in the Communist 
Party (hWSP), the time and the degree of moving away from 
the state towards the private sector, and in connection with these 
characteristics, position in the management of the company or 
involvement in its cooperation activities deeply influenced the 
mode and the chances of property acquisition of our interview-
ees in the post-socialist environment. The former members of the 
Communist Party became owners mainly in the course of the 
privatisation process. (Some of these people also founded new 
companies but mainly in a later phase of privatisation.) The re-
verse also holds: those who were not members of the Commu-
nist Party mostly started new private businesses and did not take 
part in privatisation projects. The respective career paths – stay-
ing in the state-cooperative sector or converting partially or fully 
to private business – also influenced the mode of property acqui-
sition. Those who were permanently employed in the state-coop-
erative sector till 1989 acquired property more often in the course 
of the privatisation process than those who, partly or fully, had 
left this sector several years before. Then again, members of the 
latter group established new businesses more often than those 
who quitted the state-cooperative sector only in or around 1989. 
To sum up, as a tendency, the one-time managers or deputy 
managers of state-owned firms who had been members of the 
Communist Party prior to the regime change and who had re-
mained in key positions of ‘their’ companies in 1989 or a few 
years after acquired their property by privatisation. in contrast, 
those who were not members of the ruling party and who es-
caped from the state sector before 1989 mainly acquired prop-
erty by establishing new companies. a part of the latter group 
successfully increased their property by taking part in privatisa-
tion projects as well.
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Table 5 
Turning points of the career paths and methods of property acquisition 
Turning point 
indicators Privatisation
Founding of new 
companies
Former Communist 
Party membership        
typical for former 
Communist Party 
members 
typical for those 
never joining the 
Communist Party
Rank or position          typically top manager typically staff 
member
Sector change         
typically remained 
in the socialist sector 
till 1989
typically moved into 
the private sector 
before 1989 
in spite of the above mentioned complementary ways of acquir-
ing their properties, the performance of the depicted two groups 
of the new owner-managers did not differ. ‘Privatisers’ as much 
as newcomers, coming from the private-informal sector under 
socialism worked in equally knowledgeable and profitable ways. 
Both groups managed their property efficiently: as a result, the 
majority of their companies produced steady growth in the first 
decade of the post-socialist transition (Table 1).
The group of the ‘new’: turning points of the  
life- and career paths
The well-known characteristics of the hungarian business com-
munity were discernible also in the group of the younger gen-
eration of the grand and medium-size entrepreneurs. The share 
of highly educated men living in urban environments is signifi-
cantly above the countrywide average in this group.17 From the 
31 members of the group the number of men is 27. out of the 
group, 23 hold a degree from higher education and 24 live in 
Budapest or in one of the larger cities. also, the headquarters 
17  There were only seven women among the 290 persons on our mailing 
list. We tried to maximise the number of female entrepreneurs in the sample, 
therefore, there were cases when we consciously set aside the age limit.
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of 23 firms belonging to this group are located in Budapest or 
in one of the urban centres of the country. if the listed socio-
demographic attributes are among the necessary conditions of 
entering into the stratum of grand entrepreneurs – as seems 
plausible – then these attributes can hardly explain the perfor-
mance differences between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ groups.
as we mentioned earlier, social, educational and professional 
differences influenced the composition of the ‘hard’ indicators 
of entrepreneurial performance. We will document in the fol-
lowing chapters that the explanatory power of such ‘more sub-
tle’ cultural and professional factors in explaining the differ-
ences has increased in the last decades. Due to their power and 
influence, a generation gap seems to appear that sharply divides 
the society of hungarian grand entrepreneurs.
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The geNeRaTioNaL ChaNge –  
gLiMPSe FRoM a CLoSeNeSS 
The long-term impact of the age differences
The average age of the members of our ‘old’ group was relatively 
high when they started their private businesses: they were then 
of an age of 40–45 years.18 This is why two-thirds of them were 
well above 50 and 15 of them surpassed the hungarian retiring 
age in the days of the follow-up interviews. They remained hard 
workers – spending daily 10–12 hours at their workplaces – but 
this duration was shorter than the 12–15 hours long working 
days as painted 10 years before. These days they take home 
less work and spend less time with business at weekends than 
before. a remarkable part of them is less motivated19 but more 
worn out and more exhausted than a decade before. a quote 
from an interview that accurately reflects the general picture 
puts this into the following words:
i don’t want my business to grow, not at all, i have no inclina-
tions for this. even what i do today is more than i would like to 
do. i would like spend more time with the babies– albeit i spend
18 The members of the ‘new’ group were much younger when they launched 
their businesses: their average age was 44 years in 2009. The possible reason 
for this difference is that the 40-year-old managers had better chances than 
the younger ones in the privatisation of ‘their’ companies in the first years of 
the post-socialist transition.
19 Together with the business organisations and the consulting agencies, the 
researchers of the family business formation consider the differences between 
the generations that follow each other an important factor of the business 
(Carlock–Ward 2006, S. huszty 2006, Szerb 2008). The good examples and the 
cases of efficient strategies and techniques of adaptation are often presented 
along this line of reasoning (hámor 2007, Pap 2010).
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quite some time with them. i don’t find it pleasing working all 
day. i have been doing this for the past twenty years, let me be 
allowed to be fed up with it. indeed, it is exhausting some time. 
it was enough. [31]20
The proportion of those who expect shrinkage or stagnation of 
their businesses increases by age (Table 6). The share of those 
who are expecting company growth is much higher in the group 
of the ‘new’ entrepreneurs (which includes younger entrepre-
neurs for the most part) than among the ‘old’ ones. another 
indicator of the declining ambitions and a general tiredness 
of our ‘old’ partners is a change in the managerial structure of 
their companies: by the time of the follow-up interview, in near 
to one-fourth of the cases the firm’s top management or at least 
some of the leading positions in it were taken over by the chil-
dren or younger relatives of the original owner. 
a telling example of forced generational change is provided 
by the case of a subcontractor company in the construction in-
dustry where the waves of collapsing, restarting and passing 
leadership to the next generation took place simultaneously:
unfortunately, we were fooled by the main contractor. it was 
he who put us on the wrong track. Therefore, we decided to 
close down the business and restart it, better to say, start it 
again so that my two sons would launch it. i am walking out 
from this nasty construction industry. it was decided that, 
while they can count on my advice and assistance, it was the 
two young ‘tigers’ who would start the new business after 
we fully closed the old one. The profile practically remained 
the same – this is the area where we are competent. if we 
were experts of bell-making or confectionery we would be 
doing that. But we have learnt this profession. i am slowly 
reaching the retirement age and i decided not to go to the 
front line of the war, but help my sons in all possible ways. 
20 Quotations from the interviews are followed by the interviewee’s 
identification number in brackets. By using the same identification numbers, 
short characterisations of our interviewees are presented in the appendix.
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i established my own little service company in which it is 
me and two of my colleagues who are working. Construc-
tion is not our profile. i told my sons: you must avoid grow-
ing too large. This is like going up the mountain and falling 
down. The hill is better, the downfall is much less severe. [25]
Table 6 
Business plans and business ambitions
Business plan ‘Old’ entrepreneurs 
‘New’ 
entrepreneurs 
Shrinking or market exit 4  4
Stagnation or subsistence 10  4
growth or expansion 12 23
Restart after bankruptcy  5 
No business plan is mentioned 2
Total 33 31
The decline of performance and a growing crisis of the company 
induced a forced exchange of the generations only in a part of 
the cases. in other cases, it was the drafting of a new strategy 
for the company or a deliberately planned hR policy that pre-
sented new challenges to the younger generation. in such cases 
of a planned generational exchange the shifts usually followed 
the owner-manager’s (the parent’s) design. a typical story of 
combining the generational transfer of knowledge, skills and 
experience with a careful protection of the family’s property 
describes the transition in the following way: 
Coming back from abroad, my daughter joined the com-
pany. She has been working with us since then. She has been 
engaged in different tasks. having a fresh brain, she deals 
with the unresolved projects of the company. The theme of her 
thesis at the Corvinus university was the ethical code of our 
company. after presenting this code she built up our market-
ing and controlling system. her current task is to supervise 
the basic processes of our company. how to improve these 
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processes? What she is doing is some sort of process manage-
ment. She does not work alone, of course. This is a matrix-
based project with a great number of participants... My elder 
son has accomplished the first three years at Corvinus uni-
versity. he is completing his apprenticeship here at the com-
pany. he enjoys this environment and our colleagues like 
him as well. he works in a range of different areas includ-
ing controlling, so he is also in the financial division. [2]
growing pessimism in their economic expectations and a 
decline in ambitions contributed to the decision of several of 
the members of our ‘old’ entrepreneurial group to leave business 
life and to become involved in educational, cultural or charitable 
activities and institution building. one of our interviewees went 
as far as reshuffling her company for accommodating her social 
and re-employment projects: 
i settled in Sárospatak in 2003. When i came, my only aim was 
to close down my company here. But i gradually internalised 
the claim that one simply cannot leave the employees without 
their resources. We have to do something. and my personal life 
completely turned into a cultural or – how to say – into a charity 
project. [11]
one of the cases getting high media coverage in the past years 
was the story of a very successful entrepreneur in producing 
software for constructions who, after selling his company, 
launched a gigantic educational project: 
gábor Bojár, President of the Board of Directors at gra-
phisoft Co. has tried to invigorate competition in hungar-
ian higher education by founding a purely market based new 
private university of information science in September 2009. 
gábor Bojár intends to cover a part of the necessary invest-
ments (about 1 billion huF) from his personal income from 
selling graphisoft, but he keeps on finding new investors as 
well. according to the plans the necessary infrastructure of 
the university would be covered by a preferential lease ren-
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dered by graphisoft Company. This way the wealth of the 
new institution would not be inactively sitting in real estates.21
The thesis of ‘growing age equals decreasing performance’ is 
weakened by cases from the group of the ‘new’ entrepreneurs: 
several of them gave accounts of giving up their business or 
turning to new engagements in culture or sports.22 one of our 
‘new’ interview partners (aged 40) described such a turn in the 
following way: 
you ask how one re-evaluates the priorities of life? i did such 
an assessment around 2000. i recognised that the work was the 
number one priority in my life and all the other activities were 
subordinated to this ranking in the 1990s. and i said in 2000 or 
a bit later that work was not my top priority any more. it is very 
important but not the top priority. Where is my place in the uni-
verse or in the country? What have i done until now and what 
will i do? The conclusion of this meditation was that i have got 
a lot from this country and it is high time to return it. and at 
the end of the day i have found this field. This is some form of 
supporting arts. More precisely: it is the popularisation of arts 
– in particular, support of contemporary fine arts. This is the 
transparent form of representing what i consider to be my social 
responsibility these days. i am really pleased when i see that my 
21 http://itcafe.hu/hir/informatikai_maganegyetemet_grundol_bojar_
gabor.html
22 The change is not intended definite views for engaging in charity or 
in sponsoring cultural events or activities. Sometimes it is not more than 
some change of the business profile combined with fun: “Robert Láng fell in 
love with yachting at age of 40. His hobby altered into business within a short time. 
After selling his car spare-part trade company and becoming one among the 100 
richest businessmen in the country, he had enough money to renovate among others 
‘Nemere 2’ the legendary flagship sailing boat of the Balaton Blue-ribbon competition. 
After that his activity has focused on the sailing boat market on the Adriatic Sea. 
He established the adriatic Challenge Company which is outstanding in Europe 
concerning its size and profile. One of the prominent events of this company is the 
Championship of the Hungarian Big Sea Sailing Boats. The main profile of the division 
of company sealing is to manage team building and company events. The charter 
division deals with renting boats to families and providing grants.” (http://www.
elitemagazin.hu/lang-robert)
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foundation gives support to pieces of art carrying the promise of 
becoming of eternal value. of course i know that it will become 
clear only 100 years later whether a given piece of art reaches 
eternal value. [47]
in addition to the above, the explanatory power of age is 
decreased by cases of the retired owner-managers or top man-
agers who started successful new businesses or founded small 
companies based on their accumulated knowledge and network 
capital. a retired top manager of a large multinational company 
summed up the story of his innovative resumption: 
i departed from the kékkúti Company by mutual consent. We 
agreed originally that i would remain. But that is another story. 
This company where i am working at present is a private one. it 
was founded by a few hungarian private persons. We are deal-
ing with a new technology of mineral water production as you 
may observe here. This is the cooler which heats and cools the 
water in the large container above it. There are different machine 
types… This is not only water bottling in a bigger than usual bot-
tle. The company has bought the source and we bottle its water 
into the containers. We distribute the water and the services. We 
provide maintenance and servicing of the cooler. you may buy 
or rent the machine. We entered this industry. This is a brand 
new offer in hungary. There are only three companies dealing 
with this technology.23
The original owners’ withdrawal and the giving up of their 
leading role in the company seem to take place in a gradual way. 
Steps into this direction are rather taken with the motives of a 
career change or of realising new ideas or expressing ‘sleeping’ 
ambitions. at the same time, the hope to reduce and restructure 
the responsibilities and duties of management are also involved 
in the decisions. The goal of creating more limited and more 
23 Part of an in-depth interview with a retired manager of a mineral water 
manufacturing company. The interview was made in the framework of our 
research on market development in 2003. For more about this research see in 
Laki (2011).
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focused managerial positions seems to be a general motive of the 
life- and company histories of our ‘old’ interviewees. 
The above mentioned cases and the presented associations 
question and weaken the thesis that there is a strict functional 
relationship between older age and the decline of one’s career. it 
has to be added that the expected relationship between age and 
performance does not always function in the opposite direction 
either. We met several cases when fast growing and promising 
companies of the young entrepreneurs also went bankrupt or 
collapsed in the last decade.24
The ‘age thesis’ is further weakened by considering the fact 
that a remarkable part of bankruptcies and fiascos – as we will 
document later – happened in the first years of the new cen-
tury, i.e. well before the world economic crisis. This means that 
our ‘old’ interview partners suffered from such negative occur-
rences much before their retirement age. We may conclude that the 
age of the entrepreneurs is among the factors which explain the 
performance differences and the worsening results of the ‘old’ 
group but such explanations fit only in a part of the cases and 
mainly in combination with other factors. 
Family backgrounds – a picture painted with broad brushes
our article of 2006 summarised the main characteristics of 
our ‘old’ group in the following way: “By considering the parents’ 
career, the family’s wealth, the interviewee’s level of schooling, and the 
sequence of his/her pre-1990 occupations, it can be established that the 
overwhelming majority of the respondents came from well established 
middle class backgrounds.” (Laki–Szalai 2006) This was a new 
24 The young owner-manager in wine-making, Béla Vincze from the eger 
region became the awarded prime wine producer of the year 2005. But in 
2008 the winery’s trade was suspended for 30 days because of some wine-
doctoring actions. vincze was prohibited using the brand name of ‘eger’ for 
three years in 2010 because of similar reasons. his company collapsed because 
of these scandals. Details of the case see in Czauner (2009), (2009a), - hj - (2009), 
kelemen (2009), (2009a).
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middle class of the socialist system: the majority of parents 
were hired as middle rank managers or employees by the state-
cooperative sector. We found only five cases when the parents 
or grandparents were private entrepreneurs (small artisans, 
shopkeepers).
The ‘new’ entrepreneurs are children of the (new-new) mid-
dle class, too. But a remarkable shift appears: in their case one-
third of the fathers is (or was) owner-manager of a private com-
pany. White-collars and middle-rank employees are in a minor-
ity among the parents of this latter group. The mothers – like 
in the case of the ‘old’ group – are/were middle rank employees 
working as administrators or perhaps as managers. The expan-
sion of the private economy can be seen in their case as well: 
most of the mothers of the ‘new’ entrepreneurs still work as em-
ployees but they are employed by the family business.
Table 7  
occupational category of the parents in the group of the  
‘new’ entrepreneurs
Occupational category Father Mother
entrepreneur 12  3
worker  9  4
white collar (professional)  5  4
employee (in administration)  4 13
no information  1  7
These shifts in the family background indicate that the modes 
and locations of acquiring the knowledge and the experience 
that is needed for becoming successful in business have remark-
ably changed in the last decade. it was mainly in the course of 
running their new private business that our ‘old’ interviewees 
reorganised the knowledge, the skills and the usable experi-
ences that they once had accumulated in the socialist economy 
and combined such an asset with purposefully selected human 
 39
contacts and an improved network capital. a remarkable part of 
the group of the ‘new’ followed a different path. They collected 
and accumulated entrepreneurial and managerial skills and 
took over market contacts within the family businesses that mostly 
had been established by their parents. 
The mode and the location of acquisition did not qualify the 
usability and the quality of the accumulated knowledge and 
skills but the probability of success was increased if experi-
ences were collected in the family business. in a part of the 
cases, the second generation owner-managers took over close 
to bankrupt businesses or firms that had been struggling with 
multiple troubles. They had definite advantages in comparison 
to newcomers: in addition to having deeper local knowledge 
about certain hidden features of the business, they were in a 
position to learn from assessing the parents’ earlier steps and 
strategies and prepare their new business plan accordingly. af-
ter locating the earlier business failures and the weaknesses of 
the company they could formulate more feasible market- and 
investment strategies.
at an earlier slowly growing family company with a broad 
range of products and services, which turned to grow fast after 
the generation change, the young owner-manager gave an ex-
planation by pointing out significant changes in the structure 
and the way of functioning of the firm: 
We decided in 2000 – more precisely, i proposed it to my father – 
to divide the company (the conglomerate of our companies) into 
two parts. and let’s divide the product lines at the same time! 
Products which are marketable would develop themselves. and 
we have to give up the production of those that are not mar-
ketable. We distributed the property – although the property 
structure remained the same. i managed the redemption of my 
share and in 2003 i established my own company and began to 
build the brand. [34]
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The globalised fields of organised education
The parents of our ‘old’ and ‘new’ partners followed similar 
educational strategies. The majority of the two groups attended 
prestigious secondary schools (gymnasiums). in both groups, 
those coming from more modest backgrounds or from families 
where education was not seen as having primary importance 
finished technical high schools or attended vocational schools. 
The majority of those in the ‘new’ group who had acquired 
a degree in higher education after the systemic change had 
preferred ‘pragmatic’ high schools and university faculties. 
our interview partners very often criticised the quality of their 
education. But they admitted that their schools and universities 
offered knowledge and skills which were adaptable to and usa-
ble in the conditions of the market economy. The lack of similar 
courses and subjects was recognised as a major disadvantage of 
their educational history by our ‘old’ partners: 
of course, i could acquire knowledge about the functioning of 
the market and about the essence of capitalism only towards 
the end of socialism. if i would have been able to get the basics 
of such knowledge earlier in my life, perhaps my life would 
have taken a different course. Let me refer to the case of a 
70-year-old chartered accountant at our firm. his path was 
more than interesting because he had been familiar with capi-
talism prior to the Second World War – he had lived a little in 
that system –, therefore he could take steps forward easily even 
after forty years of socialism. [13]
‘Really existing socialism’ was a closed system with extremely 
few opportunities to travel or to stay permanently abroad. Simi-
lar to the vast majority of society, members of the ‘old’ group 
(with two incidental exceptions25) did not attend secondary 
25 These two entrepreneurs attended local schools or universities during 
their parents’ long-term employment abroad. apart from such familial cases, 
‘studying abroad’ meant to learn in another socialist country. There were 
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schools or universities abroad. More than one quarter of our 
‘old’ partners did not speak foreign languages ten years ago.26 
The transition of the social-economic system did not change 
the performance of this group in this respect. They postponed 
or gave up their language learning ambitions and ran busi-
ness negotiations with foreign partners typically either by con-
tracting professional interpreters or by involving one of their 
language-speaking associates. 
although they did not manage to learn a foreign language, they 
were aware of the importance of the matter. Their disposition is 
signalled by the fact that their children – without exception, and 
regardless whether they took over the company or not – acquired 
foreign languages at special language schools, universities or by 
working abroad. one of our ‘old’ partners describes the genera-
tional difference with mixed words of regret and pride: 
To learn languages? i did not take part in it. i usually mention 
the lack of time – but i am not sure this was the genuine reason. 
over a certain age it takes an extremely long time to learn a lan-
guage. young people are more efficient in this respect. Both of 
my children speak english and French. My son is using english 
no less than two to three hours a day. he has everyday practice 
because a large part of our business partners are foreign. he is 
their meeting partner on our side. he is responsible for sales. [15]
Not only the children of well-off entrepreneurs but also the new 
generation of businessmen have much greater language skills 
and much better knowledge than our ‘old’ partners or than the 
hungarian average (Medián 2004, Laki 2006). eight of the 31 
members of the ‘new’ group attended high schools or universi-
ties abroad. Close to one-third of the group (10 out of 31) speak 
state financed scholarships based on bilateral governmental agreements with 
socialist countries that financed such programmes. 
26 Learning Russian was mandatory in the primary and secondary schools. 
however, due to the low efficiency of language teaching (and also out of 
silent opposition) only very few acquired the skills of speaking or reading in 
Russian. For a detailed discussion see Laki (2006), Medián (2004).
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(use) two or more foreign languages. 16 of our ‘new’ partners 
speak one language though it has to be noted that eight of them 
are only at the beginner’s level.
Looking back at the years after the Millennium, apart from 
languages, members of the ‘old’ group were not particularly in-
terested in any other forms of retraining either. occasional pro-
grammes of business or professional organisations, study visits 
combined with family holiday tours were mentioned most com-
monly. These training forms did not compensate for a regular 
organised retraining course. By contrast, in the course of their 
long out-of-school experiences abroad, our ‘new’ partners not 
only accumulated knowledge and skills but they also collected 
a substantial network capital that they then used in their own 
businesses later. (We will return to this issue soon.)
Out-of-school learning – how to be a modern journeyman?
in our earlier book we documented in detail that a remarkable 
part of the ‘old’ group was ‘not in a hurry’ to conclude their 
university studies. They often interrupted studying or worked 
and learned simultaneously in a given period:
it is an important characteristic of the group that concurrent 
working and learning was a pattern of their life from the end 
of their secondary schools, at best from the first years of their 
university studies onwards. after finishing the secondary school 
or completing their military service our interview partners 
(without exception) began to work at the lower levels of busi-
ness organisations at state-owned companies or cooperatives. a 
part of them was employed by hungarian companies or worked 
for ‘practical’ university departments as a regular university 
student or graduated (often having taken years out) on evening 
or correspondence courses. By being employed and working at 
companies they attended retraining courses run by the firm, 
learned new professions or developed skills which were of use 
for being efficient in their jobs. (Laki-Szalai 2004, p. 225)
 4 3
The corresponding part of the careers of our ‘new’ partners 
usually followed similar patterns. Like the members of the ‘old’ 
group, they also entered employment at companies as univer-
sity students, worked and learned simultaneously for a while, 
suspended and then later restarted their studies. Let us recall 
here a typical example: 
i was first on student work at a company engaged in media 
monitoring and translating. My english was relatively good 
and i tried to put it to use. after stepping out of the student 
work i changed my status on the labour market and i started 
to engage in accountancy. i had a part-time job besides being 
a university student. in that period, i basically translated from 
english to hungarian. My boss was an english guy. We had a 
friendly relationship. he helped me to learn english to a high 
standard indeed. This job was very useful. By the way, i was able 
to finance myself. [39] 
We also met some who returned to the labour market either after 
graduating or after failing in their first businesses; then they 
engaged again in further study until acquiring a degree; and 
this zigzag course ended by founding their current business.
The time difference in the phases of life between the mem-
bers of our ‘old’ and ‘new’ groups manifested itself in the differ-
ing occurrences of participating in a peculiar form of schooling 
as offered by self-instructive workplace training. 
only a few among the ‘old’ entrepreneurs were employed in 
spheres outside the economic domain (including the state ad-
ministration and the Communist Party apparatus). During the 
period of socialism, the vast majority of them were in employ-
ment at large and medium-size state-owned companies. They 
belonged to the category of those who changed companies two 
or three times, and worked in each of these for quite some time; 
we can say that they “were parts of the group of upwardly mobile com-
pany changers” (Laki 2003, p.699). These people typically started 
their careers as lower-rank managers of units, departments or 
4 4  
shops of a company or a cooperative. at a later stage they became 
the bosses of larger units (plants, shops networks, divisions) and 
thereafter a part of them stepped up to the network of chief 
managers and subsequently several of them became the num-
ber one manager of their firm. it is worth noting that very few 
among them climbed as high as fulfilling key positions in the 
top management of a socialist firm and none of them worked in 
divisions of employment or human resources, or in legal depart-
ments, or in units drafting investment plans. in sum, we can just 
reiterate how we saw the build-up of successful entrepreneurial 
careers at the time of writing our earlier book:
The knowledge and experience that had been accumulated 
when working as managers of lower units or, later, of their com-
panies increased the capabilities to attain successful company 
development and to become entrepreneurs in thriving large 
businesses. Looking back from the later stage of their career, the 
everyday practice of cost-benefit analysis, the experiences of how 
to supervise and motivate several hundred blue- and white collar 
workers, the local knowledge, the personal contacts with buyers, 
suppliers, bankers and with officials of the state administration 
in charge of their companies’ affairs were all very important 
constituents of our interviewees’ achievements. (Laki–Szalai 
2004, p. 225)
as already mentioned, our little sample shows that the vast 
majority of the ‘old’ group was engaged in the sphere of state-
owned companies (Table 7). again, members of the ‘new’ group 
followed different career paths. Before or besides starting their 
own businesses they acquired the necessary knowledge and 
experience by being employed in companies which were owned 
by their parents or other private owners: 
i thought that i have my own company for 2–3 years but it would 
have been profitable to look around at another office to ascertain 
the up-to-date knowledge. i had a job at a company and managed 
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my own at the same time. i thought it was truly romantic. Like 
in the past when wandering journeymen used to work abroad. i
 applied for a job at the coolest company and they employed me 
immediately. They did not know that i came from a competitor 
company. i was able to erase my name on the internet. Today i 
would not be able to do the same. [51]
Working abroad is a very important part of the acquisition 
of out-of-school learning that was only exceptionally accessi-
ble under socialism. in contrast to the experiences of the ‘old’ 
entrepreneurs, every second member of the group of the ‘new’ 
already worked abroad. others had the opportunity to collect 
similar knowledge and experience in hungary as employees of 
foreign-owned companies. in particular, the managerial skills 
accumulated this way proved to be precious for later entrepre-
neurship: 
i was employed by the X Brewery as a junior clerk in the mar-
keting division. a trade marketing subdivision was organised 
there as a brand new activity at that time. They were satisfied 
with my performance but i went back to finish the fourth year 
of my studies at the university. after performing successfully 
and getting my degree i went back to this company X and told 
them that i graduated and i would like to work with them if it 
was possible. i was convinced that it was not enough to have a 
degree and i wanted to know more about the practical side of 
the business. how is a brewery run? how are the decisions made 
concerning marketing and trading? My ambition was to gain a 
general overview about the entire operation of the firm. all in 
all, i remained there for six years. [52]
We recognised not only differences but also similarities between 
the two groups. a part of the ‘new’ group also collected experi-
ences and knowledge and learned by doing amidst the condi-
tions of the socialist economy. as their stories reveal, managerial 
skills, accounting experience and organisational knowledge of 
our interview partners were often accumulated in the informal 
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economy or on the black or shadow markets of the socialist and 
post-socialist economies. illegal trade of imported or exported 
goods was among the very profitable business activities. here 
is an example: 
What was the first action? it was very trendy to travel to Poland 
and bring silver and the fur of fox or things like that into hun-
gary. These were my first smugglings. an established market of 
these goods existed. i joined in with somebody who had practice 
in this business. We took a train to Poland and back. We wore 
the coats and round these things under our overcoats in a very 
risky manner. We were gambling all the time without calculating 
the consequences. [53]
Table 8 
Typical fields of learning by doing
Field of learning Members of the ‘old’ group
Members of the 
‘new’ group
Company owned by 
parents 6 17
hungarian (state-owned 
or private) company or 
institution
28  21
working abroad 6 15
The older members of the group of the ‘new’ started their 
private businesses in the last years of the 20th century or 
later. Similar to the majority of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs, they 
launched their new businesses on the bases of the network 
capital and the managerial skills that they had accumulated 
in the last decades of socialism as top managers of large state-
owned companies or cooperatives. These latecomer members 
of the ‘new’ group usually participated in the privatisation and 
thereafter in the management of the newly privatised compa-
nies and cooperatives: 
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i became the secretary of the board of directors. Six companies 
belonged to the trust. The market was divided on a regional 
basis, therefore the companies did not compete in that time. in 
spite of my two university diplomas i was not bothered that i 
became a secretary and i was responsible for the protocols. a 
friend and colleague of mine told me: ‘The person who controls 
the information is the cleverest one. So be happy to write the 
minutes of the meetings’. By sitting regularly in the company of 
the top managers of the trust i got access to an all-encompassing 
overview and broad knowledge about all the technical, human, 
economic and organisational problems that arise in the life of 
a firm. ‘Put together the minutes, but never do it simply out of 
routine’– my friend said. [61]
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DePaRTiNg PeRFoRMaNCeS oF The CoMPaNieS 
oF The ‘oLD’ aND The ‘NeW’ eNTRePReNeuRS: 
eCoNoMiC eXPLaNaTioNS 
Without exception, entrepreneurs of the ‘old’ group set up or 
reorganised their businesses in the 1990s. They performed excel-
lently in this first phase of the post-socialist development when 
– as we documented earlier – not the usual but the exceptional 
incentives favoured the market entrants. however, a remark-
able part of the companies of the ‘old’ group went bankrupt or 
slowed down or even stopped in development in the second 
phase when the impacts of the exceptional incentives of assist-
ing marketisation through specific regulation or by inspiring 
deregulation and privatisation diminished or ceased while con-
ventional incentives have taken over the lead (Table 1, Table 2). at 
the same time, the vast majority of the companies that belonged 
to the ‘new’ group grew very fast in this period. Why did the 
companies of those in the ‘old’ group perform better in the first 
than in the second period? and why did the companies of the 
members of the ‘new’ group outperform them in the second 
period?
Thinking in a speculative manner we may suppose that the 
reasons for the performance differences could be:
– that a high proportion of the companies owned by the mem-
bers of the ‘old’ group operate in the traditional branches of the 
economy while those in the hands of the members of the ‘new’ 
group are represented with high frequency in the progressive 
branches (branch hypothesis);
– that the ‘old’ entrepreneurs offer fewer new products or ser-
vices on the market than their ‘new’ peers (innovation hypothesis);
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– that members of the ‘old’ group have got less public orders 
and less money from state subsidies than those in the ‘new’ 
group (state dependence hypothesis).
Based on our in-depth interviews and a range of documents, 
we test these hypotheses in the sub-chapters that follow.
The branch/industry hypothesis
There were companies owned and operated by the ‘old’ entre-
preneurs in the traditional branches of the economy that were 
incapable of increasing the yearly turnover and/or production 
in the second decade of the post-socialist period. an example is 
given by a company in the garment industry that earlier deliv-
ered the decisive part of its products on the West european 
market: “We were at the top in 1998–2000. We have declined since 
then – I think. There were about 1100 employed at this network of cloth-
ing manufactures at that time. And we are about 100 these days. Such a 
drop is a correct indicator of the situation.”[30] 
in a later part of the interview, this same interview partner (a 
member of the ‘old’ group) went on to explain the tendency of 
decline by the permanent over-valuation of the exchange rate of 
the hungarian forint: “We were export producers primarily, that’s 
why the changes in the exchange rate contributed significantly to the 
crisis of the company.”[30] No doubt such an unfavourable con-
dition contributed to the shrinkage of the market share of this 
firm. however, we recognised in the course of the interview 
that the prime factor was different: due to the competition of the 
extremely low prices of the flow of imported products from asia 
the company lost its market positions first in Western europe 
and then also in hungary. 
We met with cases when the owner-managers changed the 
industry or the field of the company’s activity in the hope of fast-
er growth. Such decisions indicate in an indirect way how the 
decline or the stagnation of certain industries put limits to the 
performance of the involved firms. a manufacturer of sweets 
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and candies left this traditional market and entered a new 
one because of the permanent increase in the market share of 
multinational companies and also due to the experienced slow 
growth of the yearly turnover: 
The decisive element of the story was that i reached only the 
break-even point of the previously loss-making company. after 
that i sold it in three steps in 2005, 2006 and 2007. The price 
was practically the same as the earlier purchase price. it was a 
waste of time. however, with this slowness i gave some hope to 
the poor guys who worked there. i believed for some time that 
i would revitalise the company. it was a miscalculation. The 
company has been eroding in an unstoppable way. a part of its 
capital is somewhere in the Czech Republic, other parts are in 
a mess. The positive side of the story was that together with my 
son we began to deal with venture capital meanwhile. We per-
formed remarkable transactions and since 2003 we have focused 
all our energies on the real estate business. [9]
another earlier successful company went bankrupt in the slowly 
growing bakery industry: 
We managed a massive company development that embraced 
certain technological aspects, the modernising of equipments, 
the improvement of hygiene in the production process, the 
upgrading of products and the advancing of the production 
and transportation culture. But the market did not confirm our 
decision, so to say. it had been obvious already in 2005 that the 
return on our investments is insufficient. one year was enough 
to recognise this fact. Three multinational companies came to 
the region within two years and the Plus Company declared 
that it did not matter who delivered and what the baked goods 
looked like. This company announced a lowering of the price 
paid to the earlier distributors by 18 percent. Such a drop in price 
could be accepted only by those who did not pay vaT and did 
not pay social insurance and other contributions either. We were 
forced to participate in this competition. We had enough capaci-
ties but with extremely high costs. We produced sufficiently 
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but our revenue became less than enough. This construction 
somehow operated in 2006 but we were forced to borrow bridg-
ing loans. and there was a point when simply thinking about 
the possible future made it useless to take counsel on company 
development. i concluded that it seemed lucrative to sell the 
company with its well-equipped production capacities to an 
investor who knew what he was buying and what he wanted to 
do. and i sold the whole capacity of the company – our biggest 
factory – to an investor in 2007. [7]
at the same time, a company operating in the same industry that 
was owned by a businessman from the group of the ‘new’ grew 
extremely fast in the same period: 
We delivered to 150 small shops in 2006. We opened 2–3 new 
shops in győr in January. Within a year, we set up further 3–4 
shops there which were our properties as well. alert business-
men discovered that our shops were doing well, moreover that 
they could be involved as subcontractors. and at a stage of our 
development we subcontracted with the transporting compa-
nies too. and the new partners worked in a franchise-like con-
tracting system. The next turning point in our history was in the 
summer of 2007. We were already the owner or the contractor 
of some 20 shops in the town when a bread-making factory was 
put up for sale in Tatabánya. We bought this typical factory of 
socialism. We reinvested all the profit into the company’s pro-
duction. The only aim of our investment was to develop an effi-
cient factory. First we cleaned the profile. half of its capacities 
that were based on the traditional mass production technologies 
work now for the conventional market of small shops and of 
hypermarkets. Concerning the other half, we apply traditional 
handmade-type technologies there. We distribute this part of 
the output through the network of our franchised shops… We 
concentrated on the Budapest-Érd region that demonstrated 
a fast growth potential, moreover it fulfilled the requirement 
of the distribution radius for a bakery factory which is maxi-
mum 60–80 kilometres. and in two-three years we opened 
about 60 new shops. at the moment, the network consists of 
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83 shops and 32 of them are located in Budapest. i have to add 
that we entered the Slovakian market one year ago. We have 
four to five shops there and we are members of a chain in Bra-
tislava. We plan to broaden our capacities there by a bakery 
on 600–700 square metres. all in all i would like to extend our 
market share in Western Slovakia and, in addition, we will 
open further 20–25 shops in Budapest within half a year. [60]
We know from other studies that there are a great number of 
fast-growing companies in declining or slowly growing indus-
tries (Békés-Muraközy 2012). The above documented story of 
the Lipóti bakery is not an exception: we have found similar sto-
ries across the group of our ‘new’ entrepreneurs. The interviews 
revealed fast-growing companies as well in the hungarian con-
struction industry that was stagnating for many years as in the 
slowly growing stationery trade or in the brandy production. in 
other words: we found evidence showing that the conditions 
of fast company growth were not more favourable in the fast-
growing than in the declining industries. The performances of 
the companies that are operating in declining industries also 
demonstrate significant differences. The growth or the poten-
tial of growth of an industry influences the performance of a 
company belonging to this industry but these certainly do not 
determine it. a clear conclusion follows: we have to look for 
other explanatory factors.
The innovation hypothesis
Ten years ago (at the time of publishing our first book about the 
hungarian grand entrepreneurs) innovation was rather modest 
in the hungarian economy:
...some sort of innovation was adapted by 52 percent of the com-
panies. The majority of these companies introduced goods that 
earlier had been produced and distributed by other hungarian 
companies. on a global scale, only 8.5 percent of these products 
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were appraisable as innovations. even fewer companies estab-
lished formerly not applied world class production lines or tech-
nologies. Most of them only upgraded technologies that more or 
less had been known before. (kiss 2005, p.5)
These tendencies of the 1990s did not change after the Millen-
nium. “Based on the comparison with two previous surveys we may 
say that, concerning the innovation performances and the conditions and 
characteristics of innovation, the results are very similar to the preceding 
ones.” (kiss 2005, p.21)
Turning now to our interviews, these reveal that in the 1990s, 
the innovative performance of the companies of the ‘old’ group 
did not differ significantly from the hungarian standards: 
…we did not find cases where R+D activities decisively influ-
enced the growth potential or the general condition of the com-
panies owned by our interviewees. it was mainly among our 
partners at industrial and service companies that the interviews 
made mentioning of new products or services but these were 
usually smaller modifications and skilful realisations of ideas 
and improvisations that served to support the broadening of the 
company’s assortment. (Laki-Szalai 2004, p.149)
There were only a few exceptions at that time: 
exceptionally, we found companies that were established in the 
1980s to manufacture new products or to offer new services. in 
these cases, the decisive sources of fast development were the 
rapid growth of the turnover and/or of their market share. These 
companies expected a further increase in turnover from inno-
vation in the second stabilisation stage of their development. 
(Laki-Szalai 2004, pp.150–151)
The typical areas of genuine innovations that kept feeding fur-
ther development were data recovery, software production for 
building design, housing construction and products for natural 
healing. at the end of the first decade of the new century:
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“...the situation worsened in the field of innovation. The proportion 
of companies that introduced new products and technologies and reg-
istered patents abroad was in decline.” Moreover, “concerning the 
perspectives, it does not seem promising that the managers ranked 
R+D activities among the less important functions out of the 18 that 
were listed in an inquiry about their companies.” (Chikán-Czakó-z. 
Paprika 2010)
our follow-up interviews do not undermine but rather 
strengthen this statement. our partners from the group of the 
‘old’ could not report on new innovations. They told us interest-
ing stories only on the enhancement of their previously success-
ful innovations. For example: 
Following the tradition of the Béres drops project we primarily 
develop health supportive and disease preventive products that 
still rely on the philosophy that already characterised the origi-
nal project of the Béres drops in an early form. as a first step we 
concentrated on the so-called general-acting preparations – i am 
thinking here of various vitamin pills. Later we began to deal 
with the indications of deteriorating health. By now, beyond our 
general corroborative vitamins, trace element or mineral prepa-
rations we also deliver bone-forming pills and cartilage ampli-
fiers. We have weather front or prostatic hyperplasia reagents 
as well. and in the last years since 2007, we have developed our 
synthetic agents like painkillers and antipyretics, together with 
our preparations for stomach and intestinal complaints. The 
existence of the company depends on our innovative market-
able products. We have to deal with this part of our production 
permanently. Dozens of our new products are in different stages 
of development that range from thought experiments to actual 
implementation. [2]
The innovation-based companies owned by our ‘old’ partners 
have demonstrated mixed performance in the past decade. one 
finds not only growing but also shrinking and collapsing firms 
among them. Moreover, successful innovations did not guar-
antee success even in those cases in which the new products or 
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services with high market demand played decisive role in the 
output of the company:
The exceptional fortune in our history was to discover the mar-
ket where this RWW test worked without even knowing it by its 
name. We were professional at something which was important 
for the architects. it was a real market. The architects really 
need design technology in three dimensions because buildings 
are three dimensional… in this product, we are certainly better 
than others. it was our luck that we started to deal with this 
technology earlier than others. it is worth for 5000 uSD for the 
buyers. We can offer them this package for 5000 uSD and this 
brings us a nice profit. it is a very rare constellation of the stars 
that we enjoy such luck. Such stories rarely happen. No doubt 
this product was consciously planned but it would be hard to 
organise such a project again. it would be difficult to manage 
it once more. Let the shoemaker stick to making shoes. a key 
decision was made in 2006: we have no other alternative than to 
remain on the market of architects. [3] 
Perhaps it might come as a surprise that the innovative perfor-
mance of the ‘new’ group was not any better than the hungar-
ian average. in two-thirds of the cases we found that innovative 
products or services neither accompanied nor generated the fast 
growth of their companies. The innovations that our interview 
partners mentioned were ideas that they hoped at best to influ-
ence the performance – the turnover or the profit – of their 
companies in the future. There were no signs of any established 
research and development strategies in the majority of cases. 
Turning to them was quite new: “These days we are dealing quite 
intensively with investments into renewable energy. We will see what 
will happen in this field.” [54]
The majority of the accomplished innovations were not 
more than ideas with marginal effects that had only limited 
impact on the performance of the given company. Moreo-
ver, the concept of innovation seemed to be rather opaque in 
these conversations. introduction of methods or technologies 
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that were previously applied in developed countries (such as 
electronic brokering or unusually intensive and timed brand 
building methods) were considered as innovations. one of our 
interview partners narrated proudly: 
i could make breakthrough that counted innovative not only in 
hungary but also on an international scale by leaving aside the 
development of the production (i.e. that of the technology) but 
put into the focus brand building in the first phase of the project. 
i invested all my resources into making the brand and advertis-
ing. i did not change the plant in the first two-three years but 
invested every penny into marketing. [34]
of course there were a few companies in this group where 
innovation was among the important sources of their dynamic 
development. For example at a fast-growing medium-size com-
pany we learned: “The core of the concept was that we have to differ 
from the others in all respects. And it is only me and nobody else in 
Hungary who is able to produce filled chocolate combined with freeze-
dried (lyophilised) fruit.”[52]
a product innovation is considered to provide the basis of 
the growth at another rapidly developing large company in the 
coming years: 
We are dealing with the development of solar cells. More pre-
cisely we are dealing with the adaptation of solar panels in 
the structure of our buildings. our basic idea is that the whole 
building would be wrapped by this material in the form of glass 
panels which are heat producing solar cells at the same time. 
others are unable to manage this product at this level for the 
time being. our aim is to put on the market a glass which is mul-
tifunctional. it has to have a high degree of thermal insulation in 
the first place. But it also has to protect against strong sunshine 
… at the same time it has to be translucent, but it cannot be too 
dark … all in all, one has to keep in mind a thousand different 
aspects. [43]
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given the relatively limited scale of the hungarian market, our 
inventors tried to introduce their new products, new technolo-
gies or services straight on the international market. a member 
of the group of the ‘new’ whose business is active in the metal-
lurgical area argued with the following words: 
hungary never has been a world power in metallurgy, therefore 
there are limited opportunities concerning the sort of products 
that are manufactured in the country. This was the reason why 
we visited other steelworks that were capable of producing the 
entire assortment including those constituents and goods that 
we were unable to manufacture in hungary. [41]
Cases like this are the exceptions. The group of the ‘new’ is no 
more and no less innovative than the group of their ‘old’ peers. 
This means that innovativeness contributes to the fast growth 
of some businesses but it cannot explain the difference in the 
growth-rates of the companies that belong to the respective 
groups. We have to find some further explanatory factors.
The hypothesis of state dependence
The companies of some half of both of the groups of the ‘old’ and 
the ‘new’ entrepreneurs never had any meaningful economic contacts 
with the state. Since their start, these companies have not enjoyed 
any state support or eu subsidies and neither did they deliver 
products or services to the state or the municipal governments. 
These facts can be considered as indirect indicators of the limits 
of the capabilities of the state (and the european union) to influ-
ence in any direct ways the companies’ performance.
as to the rest of the companies, the state (or eu) subsidies that 
they enjoy can be provided occasionally or on a continuous ba-
sis. Concerning the impact of such subsidies on the performance 
of the firm, these can be of decisive importance or only of a mar-
ginal role. They may be of assistance at the start-up or may influ-
ence the ongoing operation of a company.
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The purchases of the state may also contribute to the long-term 
growth or to the mere survival of a business. in other cases its 
presence and impact are occasional and haphazard. 
Focusing on those who are somehow involved in economic 
relations with the state or who are parts of state subsidy projects 
we have to recognise that in these cases the government or the 
european union are more often occasional rather than perma-
nent partners and their contribution is more often complemen-
tary than decisive in the financing of the operation of the given 
firms. The state and municipal procurements usually fit into a 
multi-pillar company scheme: there are occasions when such 
transactions turn out to be very profitable but the entrepreneurs 
do not consider these as permanent elements of the corporate 
strategy. a typical case of the multi-pillar strategy was observ-
able at a large construction company where: 
...the inauguration of a 1000-seat Congress Centre at Pécs took 
place now. a little over a year has passed since we put down 
the foundation stone. We are involved in the reconstruction of 
the zsolnay-quarter as well. But simultaneously we have built 
remarkable commercial facilities as well like the Polus Shopping 
Centre, the Csepel Plaza and the Fehérvár Plaza. [29]
in addition to the similarities, we recognised important differ-
ences in those attitudes of the two generations of entrepreneurs 
that directly influence the performance of their companies. 
Nearly half of the companies – owned and managed by mem-
bers of the ‘old’ group – made use of state-supported preferential 
loans (named e-loans or Reorg-loans) in the first decade of the 
post-socialist transition. according to our first round of inter-
views, it was mainly the ‘privatisers’ (the owner-managers of pri-
vatised companies) who were taking out such loans. at the same 
time, preferential loans are practically missing from the financial 
portfolio of the ‘new’ entrepreneurs. Their lenders are mostly the 
commercial banks that provide loans according to conventional 
measures. an important sign of the gradual re-arrangement of 
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the financial links and relations of their companies is the fact that 
our ‘new’ partners very rarely mention politicians and local or 
central government officials among their contacts while goodwill 
and friendly relations with the banks or with the local branches 
of banks remains a recurrent topic of the interviews with them.
Market conditions
Growing share of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs on the shrinking markets in 
the 1990s
Continuous shrinking of the share of the state sector throughout 
the 1990s (Table 9) – an immediate consequence of mass privati-
sation – generated unusual conditions on the markets of a great 
number of products and services. The old balance was not in 
place any more and the new one was just in the making: 
in comparison to the general trend, the number of entries 
increased faster in shrinking markets where – due to the bank-
ruptcy or the collapse of the large producers or the most impor-
tant suppliers – the supply decreased faster than the demand. 
This development gave opportunities to the new businesses and 
meanwhile privatised former players of the market to increase 
their market share and yearly turnover. (Laki 2011, p.64) 
The first decade of post-socialism differed from the second one 
in this respect: 
occupation of the market niches that had been generated by the 
collapse of state-owned companies took place almost exclusively 
in the first stage of post-socialist market development. The pros-
pect of obtaining or redistributing markets that earlier had been 
controlled, distributed or dominated by state-owned companies 
or large cooperatives radically decreased after the completion of 
the privatisation process. (Laki 2011, p.64) 
entering the monopolistic markets involved exceptional prom-
ises: 
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Following the systemic change, the one-time party-state was 
forced to give up several monopolistic positions and a great 
number of those who were able to obtain these positions grew 
rich very quickly. it is worth recalling that, mainly due to serious 
restrictions on the imports from the West, chronic shortage was 
observable in nearly all of the former socialist countries. as soon 
as this barrier disappeared or it became possible to circumvent 
it, thousands of enterprises moved into these preferred busi-
nesses and were able to make remarkable profits.(Mihályi 2010, 
vol. 1, p.20)
These general tendencies also greatly influenced the strat-
egies of the members of the ‘old’ group for obtaining their 
market shares. The prompt reactions of the majority of them 
show how fast they were in recognising the changes and how 
quickly they were able to grasp the opportunities to obtain the 
redistributed or abandoned market niches or to use the above 
mentioned methods of restructuring. Some of them used such 
methods already in the 1980s, in the years before the collapse 
of socialism:
State-construction in housing was already sharply declining in 
the 1980s. in veszprém, the local authority was unable to finance 
the public construction projects, hence the companies using the 
so-called large-scale system building technology went bankrupt. 
in this situation we smoothly won the tenders by offering 60 per-
cent of the unit-price calculated by applying the system building 
technology. We made high profits in those years. [23] 
Business connections, acquaintances, relationships with coop-
eratives that had been accumulated in the 1980s also contributed 
to the successful market entries and the market development of 
the ‘old’ entrepreneurs:
The most important source of success is the capital of trust that 
i transferred to my business from my preceding workplace, the 
Skála Company. i knew practically the entire branch including 
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wholesalers, several decisive figures in sales and purchase. They 
accepted me without any problem. This was evidenced by the 
safe relational backing of my firm that i was then able to put 
together. [26]
The successfully privatised companies of our sample not only 
kept their market shares but increased the turnover on the 
stagnant or shrinking markets in the years of transitional reces-
sion. They also obtained the market shares of those formerly 
state-owned and newly privatised companies that the new own-
ers did not want or could not keep either due to the involved 
financial or distributional difficulties or because of opting for 
some different plans of investment and purchase: “I keep saying 
that we just keep slicing the cake while the cake has somewhat shrunk 
in the fridge. In other words, the market has narrowed. We were lucky: 
we were able to cut a relatively large slice. However, this happened, of 
course, at the expense of others.” [5]
in this situation, a part of the ‘old’ group followed the ration-
ale of the moment: if the share of those who left the market is 
given then there is no need to put efforts into expansion, it is 
enough to be present at these segments of the market and keep 
one’s market share. one of our partners outlined the following 
strategy: “It is unnecessary to find new markets in Hungary. This is 
the Hungarian market and we have to serve it perfectly. We have to cover 
this market in full and always in a timely manner. This way one’s market 
and market share will automatically develop.”[5]
But the situation profoundly changed soon: one of the im-
portant developments of the second decade of the post-so-
cialist period is increasing competition. Mass privatisation con-
cluded in 1997–1998 when the public sector reached its cur-
rent size and share. This means that the opportunities for the 
accumulation of wealth or the possibilities to increase one’s 
market share by means of privatisation henceforth have di-
minished (Table 9).
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Table 9 
The distribution of the subscribed capital of enterprises with single and 
double entry in 1992–2008 
Year
The dominant owner is
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1992 52.1 10.2  0.0 11.4 26.2 100.0
1994 44.5 10.7 17.6 17.8 9.5 100.0
1995 25.7 11.5 19.1 26.8 17.0 100.0
1997 13.5 10.5 22.6 35.0 18.4 100.0
1998 12.0 10.7 25.6 40.3 11,3 100.0
1999  9.2 9.1 20.6 51.6  9.5 100.0
2000  7.9  9.2 18.0 58.5  6.4 100.0
2001  7.7  8.8 17.0 60.1  6.4 100.0
2002 12.3 13.2 24.5 40.2  9.9 100.0
2003 13.3 12.9 22.0 44.2  7.7 100.0
2004  13.3 14.0 24.0 40.7  8.1 100.0
2005  8.9 15.1 24.0 40.9  11.1 100.0
2006  8.1 14.0 25.0 44.2  8.7 100.0
2007  6.6 13.1 30.9 40.6  8.4 100.0
2008  6.5 10.4 25.7 50.0  7.2 100.0
Source: Calculated by Kállay and his co-authors (2009) based on data of the 
hungarian Tax office and cited by Laki (2011)
This was an important change that evidently brought about 
sharpening competition among the actors of the market. how-
ever, the change was gradual and it took place in subsequent 
periods of the second decade of the post-socialist transition. 
This was reflected in slowly modified strategies. For example, 
in the first years of the second decade several companies with 
majority foreign ownership invariably adhered to their earlier 
adapted strategy that was based on quickly seizing the acces-
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sible market and the capital at the expense of the firms of the 
collapsed public sector. At that time, this mode of manoeuvring 
did not generate tensions between the enterprises in domestic 
hands and the foreign-owned companies. Just to the contrary: 
companies in the latter group that increased their turnover on 
the hungarian market very often became the sources of growth 
and stability for their hungarian partners:
The Western capital is the main source of our company’s devel-
opment. The decisive part of our output is construction com-
bined with building design. and about 70 percent of our installa-
tion work relates to those Western companies which in some way 
settled and developed in hungary. We are working for a number 
of large motor car companies like Suzuki, opel, and audi. [5]
The growing presence of multinational companies also involved 
some disadvantages and certain risks. The majority of our ‘old’ 
entrepreneurs experienced many signs of attempts at domina-
tion on the part of their foreign business partners already a dec-
ade before. The domestic companies (including the companies 
owned by our ‘old’ interview partners) recurrently lost the race 
against the foreign owned ones in all aspects of competition. it 
was the foreign owned companies that set the conditions and 
terms of business connections and transactions. They controlled 
and defined the prices of the products of their hungarian part-
ners and also supervised their quality control systems: 
another peculiar symptom of predominance was the unbalanced 
market sharing between the hungarian and foreign competitors. 
There were several cases when powerful foreign owned compa-
nies controlled the more profitable and/or faster growing niches 
of the market of a product or service and the hungarians were 
forced to remain or to move into the less profitable and stagnating 
or slowly growing segments of these markets. (Laki 2007, p.204)
here is a typical story of a hungarian company on the losing 
side of the competition: 
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Together Transelektro and my company would have been able to 
deliver the entire product-line. But, according to the regulations, 
if we had participated together that would have meant that we 
did not comply with the tender conditions concerning the volume 
of capital, the yearly turnover, the references, and some other 
requirements. Therefore, Transelektro was forced to cooperate 
with another company. They would deliver the electronic parts 
and buy the vehicles from a subcontractor. and we were forced 
to cooperate with yet another subcontractor separately. We would 
have produced the vehicles and they would have delivered the 
electric components. We failed in this competition, while Transe-
lektro became the winner of the tender. But unfortunately shortly 
after they won they went bankrupt. at the end of the day the 
whole project was delivered by their Swiss subcontractor. and 
here is another story about the tram line reconstruction on the 
grand Boulevard in Budapest. our tandem with Transelektro 
would have been able to offer the work for two-thirds of the final 
transaction price that the local government paid to Siemens as 
winner of the tender. There was a pre-qualification of the offers 
and it became clear how cheap we were. it followed that the 
conditions were modified so that we would not be able to win. 
and Siemens was paid 1.5 billion huF instead of us receiving 650 
million. Moreover, the tram stops on the grand Boulevard had 
to be rebuilt. This additional investment could have been saved 
if our offer would have been accepted. [8]
Several of the earlier successful entrepreneurs in our ‘old’ group 
could not avoid bankruptcy. The feature story of the Telecom-
munications Products Trading Company heRTa demonstrates 
this in a telling way.27 New and powerful competitors entered 
the market where heRTa had earlier enjoyed a leading position: 
Media Markt entered the hungarian market in 1997 in europark 
Budapest. electro World entered this same market in 2002 in 
the Budaörs shopping mall and other hypermarket chains all 
27 We had an interesting in-depth interview with the owner-manager of 
heRTa in 2000. unfortunately we were unable to contact him in the second 
round of the interviews.
 65
distributing technical articles competed on the hungarian mar-
ket. Their main instrument of competing for the price-sensitive 
hungarian consumer was to offer decreasing and low prices. 
heRTa with its much weaker financial background lost this price 
competition and therefore gave up its retail activities. The man-
agement of the company was still optimistic at that time. They 
supposed that a successful return to the company’s earlier profile 
of delivering wholesale communication products would create 
a profit that would be sufficient for the further operation of the 
firm. heRTa closed its last operating shop which was located in 
the eurocenter mall in the spring of this year. at the same time, 
the yearly turnover of the company dropped to 7 billion huF and 
the number of employees fell to 70. in spite of these developments 
they declared that after normalising the market position of the 
company they would again try to engage in retail trade. however, 
a few months were enough to see that there was no chance of the 
survival of the company. (Mihálovits 2005)
The above documented story is not an exception. about four-
fifth of the companies owned by the ‘old’ entrepreneurs com-
peted with foreign-owned companies on the hungarian market 
or was a subcontractor to foreign-owned companies with hun-
garian subsidiaries.
Some of our ‘new’ partners – especially those who established 
their businesses in the second half of the 1990s – also followed 
the strategy of fast growth that was based on the redistribution 
or procurement of markets which earlier had been controlled or 
dominated by state-owned large companies. an entrepreneur 
dealing with trading in stationery described the prevailing con-
ditions in 1992 in the following way: 
The biggest stationery shop of the town was closed on 1st of 
March. We carefully followed its decline therefore we were well 
informed about the lock-up. and we moved from our 40 square 
metre store into this 300 square metre down-town store. it has
been ours since then. it became the no.1 stationery store of the 
town and our turnover has tripled. [53]
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and here is another case: “There were two big trading companies, 
Omker and Metrimpex, and the cake was distributed. We also ate little 
pieces of this pie. And these companies have disappeared from the stage 
and the bigger part of the cake is now ours.”[37]
The successes of the ‘new’ group: specialisation  
and careful selection of markets
it can be assumed that the success that both our ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
entrepreneurs demonstrated in the early period originated in 
their qualities of being open-eyed, flexible and creative. Such 
an aptitude, together with their local knowledge and network 
capital, was enough to enjoy certain advantages in comparison 
to their (foreign) competitors. in the following we will show that 
these advantages gradually disappeared and the relative short-
age of capital, the blind spots in skills, and the weaknesses of 
goal-oriented management turned the position of the companies 
of many of the hungarian entrepreneurs into definite disadvan-
tages on the market. 
When members of the ‘new’ group started their business-
es in the first years of the new century, they considered the 
small and shrinking state sector as an independent variable of 
their market activities. By that time their predecessors (the ear-
lier entrants to the market) had already captured the market 
niches that had been created by the mass privatisation process. 
The additional demand that was generated by privatisation 
was met by these established actors of the market. From this 
time onwards (that is, after 1997–98) all other market players, 
including the new entrants, could only increase their market 
share or the turnover at the expense of each other.28 one of the 
decisive factors of the business strategy of the ‘new’ group was 
to accept and assume that it was the powerful domestic firms 
28 in the early 2000s the majority of the group of the ‘new’ – 26 out of the 
31 entrepreneurs – worked on competitive markets. (This means that others 
have also marketed their products and services.)
 67
and particularly the foreign companies that dictated the terms 
of market behaviour: 
it was obvious that more and more business actors, moreover 
multinationals, entered our markets. and in this multinational 
world we did not have enough capital. even if i am very good 
in corporate finance, the multinationals still would not work 
with me upon the entry of Merrill Lynch. and then one has 
to conclude that one of the options is to be sidelined from the 
advisory market. and the other option is to give up because a 
multinational company would contract the multinational finan-
cial services company instead of ours. [47] 
another interview partner from the ‘new’ group reported that 
he consciously designed the business strategy of the company 
by taking into account the differences and specialities of market niches. 
he said:
our market is segmented according to product lines. There are 
markets that are controlled by the subsidiaries of strong and 
capital intensive international companies. in such cases our 
chance is not more than to take possession of a smaller segment 
of the market. however, in other areas – like the production of 
roofing membranes or of the so-called additional façades – the 
story is different. These products were marketed as by-products 
by the big tile or plaster factories. We entered the market of these 
by-products by offering advantageous prices, better quality and 
appropriate logistics. a great number of consumers preferred 
us soon. The tile and plaster companies recognised that their 
partners ordered only the main products and we became the 
supplier of the by-products. This development embarrassed 
them, but since these were not their main products ultimately 
they did not care too much. Nowadays they are taking some 
steps for a change, but the period of their negligence provided 
a good possibility for us to strengthen our position in this area. 
Likewise, when taking the international stage, we were success-
ful when we arrived early enough to the market of a country.
We preferred those situations when we arrived prior to the fully-
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fledged development of the market in that country. We built 
strong positions on these markets because we were the ones who 
introduced the culture of construction accessories there. [63]
and here is another version of the same market strategy: 
The marketing department is the core unit of our company. 
We are looking for opportunities on markets where there are 
blank holes. More precisely, we are looking for market segments 
where the present organisational structure of the company can be 
directly applied, where our existing sales organisation is able to 
perform the new task. after all, it is the same for the accountant 
whether it is paints or cutting rolls that appear on the invoice. [57]
an important element of this strategy is to avoid or to mini-
mise any potential conflicts with the powerful multinational 
companies: 
Skoda was never one of our partners. We are producing Skoda-
type windscreens but not for the company. We distribute this 
product on the market of spare component parts. When a car 
mechanic changes the windscreen of a Skoda car, the company 
has nothing to do with this business. Moreover, this is real com-
petition because it is us and not Skoda who produces and sells 
these component parts. unfortunately it is not enough for stay-
ing in a good position that our spare part is cheaper than theirs. 
This competition advantage is over. The world has changed radi-
cally. These days many companies are producing windscreens 
for the market of spare parts. Now this product is imported from 
China and it is also delivered in containers from the Far-east. 
We have competitors in Poland as well. Their products are very 
cheap therefore it is very hard to compete with them. [44]
another of our interview partners offered an interesting exam-
ple of the careful but fast selection of market segments. he put it in 
the following way: 
i can describe our first seven years as a perfect success story. We 
landed in the expanding tourist business like a comet. one may 
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explain this by the fact that there were very few restored castles 
in those days. originally we functioned as a wellness hotel. 
When we started our business there were very few wellness 
hotels in hungary. We opened a new market segment with this 
entry. everybody was interested in what we were doing and we 
were on the top, indeed. in an opinion survey 70 percent of the 
respondents said they knew us. This is a good result in hun-
gary. The respective proportion is certainly below 70 percent in 
austria, but our level of publicity is around 30–40 percent in the 
eastern part of the country. in the first seven years we reinvested 
all the money we earned. We engaged in extensive repair work 
and also in renewals. and we purchased land as well. We have 
not been up but re-invested all our profit. in the meantime we 
rebuilt the old barn that stood unfinished when we started. We 
were building and investing permanently in that golden period. 
We extended the wellness service and built a conference centre 
and a children’s pool. [38]
in another case, our interviewee could successfully identify and 
select a niche on the real estate market:
We could grow this large because we discovered a sub-market 
that was out of the interest of other real estate agents. This was 
the apartment rental market. More precisely, the others started 
to deal with this area since the crisis began. The reason was 
clear: because of tight resources more and more young people 
could only afford to contract sublets or rented apartments. Prior 
to the crisis, most estate agents were not enthusiastic about this 
sub-market because the commissions were much smaller than 
on the market of apartment sales. The latter was the favourite 
field of our competitors in those years. [51]
The selection of market niches often involves certain specialisations: 
The most important event in the history of the company was the 
moment when we found a very definite market to target. This
was the production of spare component parts and the assem-
blies of large engines and generators… The old-fashioned com-
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pany with diversified production lines became obsolete, after 
all, we are in the age of specialists. Nowadays production is 
nothing else but being efficient. i can be efficient if i am spe-
cialised, if i am well-prepared to manufacture a definite group 
of products. This was the reason why we bought machines that 
were the most efficient in making this product line. Further-
more, we send our colleagues to trainings that provide know-
led ge in specified products in a focused way. We built a new 
plant in which the ways of mobilising the necessary materials 
are carefully adjusted to the manufacturing process of this line 
of goods. [49]
There was a subgroup among the ‘new’ entrepreneurs whose 
members consciously selected the market niches on the inter-
national markets alone. one of them gave the rationale for this 
strategy in a concise way: “It is no secret that my company was set 
up to collect orders only on Western markets. It is obvious that there are 
remarkable differences between the costs here and there.”[39]
another example of the utilisation of the comparative advan-
tages was summarised in the following way:
We have a dynamic profile exerting a pulling effect on the entire 
company. That is flywheel production. There are three flywheel 
producers in europe and we are one of them. and we are some-
what cheaper and faster than the others. our time-span for 
delivering is five weeks and not ten, and our price is 90 percent 
of that of our competitors. [63]
Concerning their market behaviours and attitudes, these cases 
and examples indicate significant differences between the ‘new’ 
and the ‘old’ entrepreneurs. There are exceptions in both groups 
but we may conclude that those in the ‘old’ group tend to fear 
the multinational companies or, at least, they regard them as 
unequal competitors. however, those in the ‘new’ group cleverly 
adapted to the situation. They cooperate with the multinational 
companies or with their subsidiaries in hungary and meanwhile 
they focus on drawing the benefits of these partnerships. 
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Reluctant and hesitant ‘old’ entrepreneurs on saturated markets
in addition to the above introduced aspects, the speed of deci-
sion-making and the extent of the planned changes were differ-
ent in the two groups as well. one of the most important lessons 
of our interviews was that several members of the ‘old’ group 
only slowly and reluctantly recognised and even more slowly 
accepted that the market niches – especially those that emerged 
due to the collapse of state enterprises – saturated gradually in 
the first years of the new century and in this way the usual paths 
of company development became blocked and inaccessible. a 
part of these entrepreneurs did not change the old and proven 
strategy of market expansion. as an example, this was the major 
cause behind the bankruptcy of an earlier mentioned successful 
company in the bakery industry.  
Both the speed of changing the profile and the timing of 
market entry or exit are complicated and costly strategic ma-
noeuvres of a company. To change the structure of produc-
tion or to modify the order of importance of one’s market 
relations required at least as much care from the ‘old’ entre-
preneurs as did the actions of establishing and introducing 
a new company from their peers in the ‘new’ group. These 
factors explain why our ‘old’ interviewees preferred partial 
and gradual shifts. 
The following sentences of one of the ‘old’ owner-managers in 
the car rental business help to understand this mentality: 
We focused on the extension of the car rental division in the last 
two years. For maintaining all of our money making activities it is 
a must to deal with all the segments which are in connection with 
the car. Car repair was among our traditional profiles, too. More 
precisely: in the old times, the whole business began with car 
repair. our car repair capacity is the key to survive the present eco-
nomic crisis. in the absence of these stable and significant capaci-
ties, all the plants of the company would have been closed. [24]
72  
No doubt such slow decisions inducing only partial changes 
are associated with the experiences and the routines of the 
‘old’ entrepreneurs. at the same time, this double-faced and 
controversial legacy of the past is part of the reasons of their 
hesitant behaviour. as an indication of such behaviour we 
found that it was not uncommon among our ‘old’ interview 
partners that, instead of engaging in a radical and fast market 
change, they sold (depleted) a part of the company’s real estate 
assets. it can be assumed that this route to escape from the 
rising pressure (this mode of property conversion) provided 
some temporary comfort. however, it created a very risky and 
false sense of security in the longer term. Those who followed 
this route postponed or delayed important decisions and this 
opportunistic behaviour influenced the performance of their 
companies negatively.
Real estate development – a route of escaping or deadlock?29 
We have arrived at a hazardous point in our analysis. it is a well-
known source of errors when the multi-factorial analysis gives 
place to a mono-causal description and evaluation. We would 
like to avoid such a source of error but we have to state here that 
the paths of real estate development and investments into prop-
erty were unusually popular forms to tackle the growing market 
uncertainty in our ‘old’ group. What is more, besides the inter-
views with them, our encounters with their ‘new’ peers revealed 
a similar frequent occurrence of the phenomenon. one of the 
members of the ‘old’ group – who participated in one of the rare 
privatisation actions after the completion of the large wave of 
privatisation in 1995–1997 – remembered it in the following way: 
29 Real estate that became under-used because of the company’s shrinking 
turnover or because of internal reorganisations often turned to sources for 
money-making. a spreading form among the ‘old’ entrepreneurs was to set 
up new businesses for dealing with these parts of the company’s assets or to 
put them up in special profit-centres. 
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The privatised company had several plants. one of them (located 
in Barcs) had been sold earlier. i bought and took over the other 
three in Budapest, Debrecen and in Nyíradony. in order to avoid 
borrowing large sums and to accumulate some capital surplus 
i sold the plant in Debrecen where the production had been 
shut down before. as i recall it happened immediately, in the 
first year. This transaction ensured that our company remained 
solvent. Moreover, we had enough money to invest and to renew 
the equipment. [57]
a construction owner-manager from the ‘old’ group made real 
estate development the core part of his business: 
in addition to our main profile, certain real estate development 
actions were taken. using the available part of our accumulated 
capital we built apartments for sale and also as investments. We 
were constructor-investors of shopping centres, too, but this was 
not a defining part of our output. it was less than 20 percent of 
the yearly turnover. But there were years when the real estate 
profile brought us about 2–3 billion huF – which was more than 
nothing. [23]
Real estate marketing as a mode of fund-raising has become a 
popular method mainly among the ‘old’ owner-managers. as 
we mentioned earlier, they often financed using preferential 
loans (the earlier mentioned e-loans or Reorg-loans) to buy 
state-owned companies. Their performance would have been 
worse without the sale of assets in the early 2000s. Lease or sale 
of privatised assets improved the chances of survival. This form 
of exploitation of the property was available mainly for the ‘pri-
vatisers’. Those who arrived from the one-time second economy 
of the socialist period or the fresh entrants of the ‘new’ group 
could employ this option less often.30
30 a remarkable part of the assets of state-owned companies served cultural 
or welfare purposes. another significant part served the self-sufficient 
production (the manufacturing of parts and components) of the socialist 
companies. a part of these assets (buildings, plants, equipments) became 
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at a company in the machinery industry, which was owned 
by a member of the ‘old’ group, the income from selling the com-
pany’s real estate was used to substitute for the loss of income 
from shrinking production. he described his strategy with the 
following words: 
one of the divisions of the company deals with the exploitation 
of real estate which is not used in production. They work as an 
industrial park. in other words, they are looking for renters for 
our plants. at the same time, they are trying to sell those plants 
or workshops that we cannot make use of in the long term. i 
have to say that such a way of using assets by buying and selling 
property does not belong in our profile. When we acquired the 
company the rationalisation of it required the radical merging of 
production and service areas. our profitable operation required 
the concentration of activities and the optimal exploitation of 
space. Therefore, we gained buildings to let or sell. But we did 
not use them for housing, for example. [8]
income from the sale of real estate may cover the debts of bank-
rupt companies.
The wind-up of the company was initiated by the authorities at 
that time. We had to sell all the real estate to cover our liabilities. 
But there were no buyers for a year or more. Therefore, we had to 
start the compulsory liquidation. The liquidation was officially 
declared but there were no applicants for the buy-out. This real 
estate was advertised but there was no demand for it. [16] 
This last citation shows that the route of escaping through 
manipulation of immovable property can be highly insecure 
and risky. The managers of production or service companies 
are usually not professionals of real estate marketing. however 
profitable this business may be, they are not experts at it. For 
obsolete and saleable in the market economy. The ‘new’ entrepreneurs tried 
to minimise the investment costs, therefore they did not have such reserves 
for sale. an excellent case study about the business strategy based on these 
inherited capacities was published by János köllő ( 2003).
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them, this area is out of their main profile, hence, playing on it 
may work or it may not – it is hard to tell in advance. The boom 
in the real estate market ended in 2005–2006 and the risks and 
disadvantages caused by the lack of market experience have 
grown ever since then.
Impacts of the world economic recession of 2008
The troublesome events and tendencies of the real estate market 
described above indicate that, well before the global economic 
crisis of 2008, a significant part of the ‘old’ group were already 
faced with a drop or, at best, the stagnation of the turnover of 
and the demand for their products and services and also with 
a decline in their yearly income. in these cases decaying per-
formance followed from other factors than the impacts of the 
global recession. on the markets of traditional products and 
services, the usual reasons behind the worsening tendencies of 
shrinking yearly turnover or falling market share were business 
failures, seasonal effects, or the restructuring of the demand.31 
The business cycle and the fluctuations of the economic growth 
might have had similar outcomes. austerity measures can be 
added to the list. in 2006, such measures of the government 
reduced the turnover and the magnitude of orders in the con-
struction industry. one of our interview partners from the ‘old’ 
group described how his business was affected:
Because of the worsening conditions of the economy, state 
support to housing construction was halted. and the decline 
started in this sector immediately. investments of the central 
and the local governments diminished because of the worsen-
ing position of the central budget. Moreover, private investment 
31 Quite a large number of companies were involved. an example in the 
printing industry: “Some of the companies that were constrained by their existing 
technology and labour force were edged out of the market for newspaper and journal 
printing but began to produce catalogues, leaflets and (especially in election years) 
political posters and propaganda bulletins.” (Laki 2010, p. 949)
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dropped as well. We recognised a remarkable decline before the 
recession. [29]
it has to be recalled that similar difficulties affecting a great 
number of companies were generated by the transitional reces-
sion of the 1990s. But in that case we witnessed a regional eco-
nomic downturn which caused troubles only in a definite group 
of countries. That is why several companies were able to re-
route a part of their turnover to the markets of the developed 
industrialised countries that were untouched by this recession. 
Likewise, the Russian crisis of 1998 caused a decline in turnover 
and irregularities in payments only for those companies that 
were directly involved in import or export transactions on this 
market. as an analyst established: 
it can be related to the Russian crisis that the share of those com-
panies that recognised deterioration in utilising their capacities 
increased from 9.5 to 15.3 percent in the period of July-November 
of 1998. The same is shown by the fact that the proportion of 
the companies experiencing the declining utilisation of their 
capacities is significantly higher among the firms that are directly 
affected by the Russian recession than in general. (Tóth 1998)
our research documents show that the world crisis of 2008 has 
been of a different character: its effects have been all-encom-
passing. Considering our partners, it followed that the wide and 
deep-going negative impacts were felt not only by the members 
of the ‘old’ group but also by the ‘new’ entrepreneurs. The major-
ity of our interviews were prepared in the years of the crisis, in 
the period of 2009–2011. at the time of writing the hungarian 
original of this book – in the first months of 2013 – the reces-
sion still was not over, therefore we could not learn the ultimate 
impacts from our partners. Their accounts revealed only the first 
reactions and their initial experiences. however, the impact of 
the recession affected the companies at different stages. in the 
construction industry the decline in output already started in 
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the years 2005–2006. in other industries the recession started in 
the second half of 2008 or somewhat later, in 2009, however, the 
direct and indirect negative impacts surfaced very soon. 
one of the direct symptoms of the recession affecting some 
members of our ‘old’ group was a sudden drop in the yearly 
turnover at a rate that they had never experienced before. one 
of our interviewees gave the following account about the conse-
quences: 
We are profitable but, unfortunately, the yearly turnover fell by 
half. We are severely hit by the crisis. The turnover of the last 
year was 130–150 million huF which was half of the respec-
tive figure a year before. i decreased the number of employees 
accordingly. i was cruel. There is no work, goodbye, my friend. 
We were sitting face to face. This is the case, i said, and sent him 
away. We laid off half of our employees. We fired the majority of 
those working in corporate administration and also the secretar-
ies, and so on. it was a must. That is why we are still alive. [20] 
Similar symptoms of the crisis have also reached the businesses 
of our ‘new’ entrepreneurs. at a farm machinery sales company 
“the annual income was 57 billion HUF last year. We expect revenue of 
some 30 billion this year.”[42] 
another of our interview partners characterised the situation 
in the following way: 
We had an income of 24 billion huF last year. Before the reces-
sion we already had 27–28 billion a year. and this was not an 
exception by then. First we grew from 30 to 100 million huF, 
then from 100 to 250 million and then from 250 to 500 million. 
We grew very fast every year in a period of 11 years till 2008. 
Probably this trend would have continued. The rate slowed 
down, of course, but it remained dynamic in the whole period. 
But the crisis has destroyed the market. [59]
These citations are in full accordance with the results of a survey 
in 2009 that involved 2000 small and medium-size companies. 
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according to the findings, 88 percent of the companies reported 
a decline in income. 69.1 percent of the respondents gave an 
account of a drop of more than 20 percent in revenue. The final 
report summarises the results with the following words: 
The declining performance of the hungarian economy reduced 
the chances of increasing turnover at the majority of the compa-
nies. in the first quarter of 2009, the total of orders in industry 
was 25 percent less than in the respective period of the preced-
ing year. in the subsequent surveys of the Ministry of economy, 
45 percent of the respondents in 2007, 48 percent in 2008 and 62 
percent in 2009 mentioned the contraction of orders among the 
factors that impeded their companies’ growth. (NFgM 2010)
The proportions and the frequencies in the mentioned surveys 
imply that there were exceptions to the above trends. Likewise, 
we also encountered cases in both groups of our interviewees 
for an adverse tendency, when the crisis did not diminish, but 
rather increased the demand for the services and products of 
their companies and it affected the turnover in a similar way. 
it is instructive how one of our ‘old’ interview partners found a 
market niche in the middle of the recession: 
how does hungarian State Railway behave? These days no cur-
rency is available to the company. it can do no shopping at all. 
The minimal condition for preserving the existing stock of its 
vehicles is to find domestic companies that deliver them compo-
nent parts. We deliver them in multiples of the earlier volumes 
and the company is begging to provide more and more of the 
component parts. it is part of the story that earlier the entire 
construction and production of the engines was covered by 
german and american companies. and as a new development, 
nowadays they are again using the old engines that we supplied 
several years ago. They are forced to renovate these engines to 
keep their stock of vehicles in operation. hence, we enjoy some 
positive benefits of the recession. [8]
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another owner-manager from the ‘new’ group rapidly enhanced 
the revenue of his company by concentrating on real estate rent-
als. he focused on the market niche that emerged due to the fact 
that an increasing number of young people with deteriorating 
living conditions were forced to postpone the purchase of their 
first apartment. The company of our partner offered relatively 
cheap lodging for them: 
The present recession looks extremely favourable for us because 
the demand of apartments for rent increased remarkably. The 
situation including job salary and costs of living of several young 
people – young couples or families – became uncertain. That is 
why they cannot borrow money. Those who borrowed money 
earlier had difficulties with the loan repayment. There are sev-
eral factors that turn people to the rental housing market. [51]
our interview partner from the printing industry had expected 
a serious recession years before the crisis of 2008. The business 
plans of his company were prepared on the basis of this forecast: 
Two years before the recession i told my colleagues at a meeting 
in the boardroom that an economic crisis of quite a large scale 
was on the horizon. in the light of this, i proposed to dismantle 
the company into five ‘strips’. Based on a well-prepared baseline 
of actions these strips have to be further decomposed and then 
we should put together the pieces into a new structure. When 
this was done we concluded that we would launch a large invest-
ment. The recession will produce losers and winners. What 
should we do to be among the winners? an efficient technology, 
up-to-date products, a competitive distribution system, a better 
corporate image, and more efficient communication are needed. 
Despite the fact that we were convinced that the great recession 
would come we managed the biggest investment of our company 
history. We were just launching the new machines when it came 
in the news that the crisis has taken its start. and we became the 
absolute winners of this development. Many of our competitors 
collapsed because of the recession or due to the lack of liquidity.
or their bank stopped financing them. Based on our distribution 
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system, we were able to occupy these market shares by our new 
products or by building on our new company image. [35]
The exceptional stories like the one above contributed to the 
belated responses of the majority of the ‘old’ and also of the 
‘new’ groups. although our interview partners instantly sensed 
the changes, they only gradually accepted the fact that the usual 
evaluation methods for measuring the costs and the benefits 
in association with the crisis were not suitable any more. They 
reluctantly recognised that the current crisis was longer, it cov-
ered larger areas of the international economy and it tended to 
cause more significant market losses than the preceding local 
and regional recessions. it did not count as an exception that one 
and a half years after the start of the crisis one of our partners 
still explained the decline by usual conventional reasons: 
in the course of the past 19 years we were accustomed to the fact 
that none of the years were similar to the preceding ones. There-
fore, we constantly adapted to the market trends and opportuni-
ties. in the past, we used to have good and bad years alike. and 
the last year’s experience added to this recognition. in the yearly 
plan we predicted that less agricultural machinery would be sold 
than before but we never expected such a bad outcome. We sold 
250 harvesters last year and only 20 pieces this year! Despite the 
fact that the rate of the decline was remarkably smaller for agri-
cultural machines in the relatively cheap category than in the 
case of the harvesters, this year [in 2009] we may suffer a 50–70 
percent decline in the yearly turnover which is significant also 
in a countrywide comparison. What was the reason for this fall? 
how could we handle the situation? The lack of state subsidies, 
the changing political situation, and some weather effects caused 
the drastic drop in the demand for agricultural machines. in 
such a radically changing market situation we were able to tackle 
only the most burning symptoms. [42]
There are further factors which explain why a remarkable part 
of our interview partners reluctantly and slowly recognised and 
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therefore optimistically underestimated the size, the expect-
able length, and the scale of the recession in 2008.among other 
things they were forced to notice very quickly that it was much 
harder to borrow money than before: 
in times of a crisis everything slows down. We could not keep 
away from the effects of the market situation. We were able to 
borrow money on 125 basis points in 2008 and on 350 nowadays. 
The price of the money increased, indeed and the supply of bank 
loans is not as attractive as it was two years ago. We are affected 
despite the fact that our relations with the banking sphere are 
very stable. [5]
The last sentence of the citation is important and characteristic: 
apart from a few exceptions, our interview partners reported 
solid banking relationships. They remained good debtors in 
spite of the unfavourable developments on the financial market, 
therefore they expected better and easier access to bank loans 
than the average. one of our partners in the ‘old’ group phrased 
the typical opinion in the following way: 
The majority of the real estate developers are in trouble in their 
relations with the banks. We have no problems with them 
because we have gained an incredibly good reputation by repay-
ing our obligations with clockwork precision. They know that 
my private wealth is substantial. i never used it as a collateral 
factor, nevertheless it is a guarantee for the bank to know that 
the company would not collapse. [3]
a broadly felt and unpleasant manifestation of the recession was 
the significant drop in the occurrences and also in the share of 
successful transactions on the real estate market. This market 
has literally become frozen. Due to this development, mainly 
those who had entered the real estate business to try to counter-
balance the losses of their companies through opening towards 
this new profile found themselves in a difficult situation. and 
as we saw above, this was a widespread practice among our 
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interviewees, especially among the members of the ‘old’ group. 
however, the risky experimentation continued despite the unfa-
vourable outlook: 
at the end of 2008, the owners came to decide that the company 
should be liquidated. and the liquidation process is still in place. 
The process embraces the estates that were advertised for sale, 
but nobody seems to be interested to buy these. The changed 
conditions that affect the real estate market in the first place 
sensitively influence the entire process. [16]
our ‘old’ and ‘new’ partners gradually recognised that the usual 
modes of adjustment were not enough for managing the new 
and atypical situation. in an earlier writing, one of us summa-
rised the new tactics of adaptation in the following way: 
The owner-managers of the companies usually adapt to the 
changing economic environment with a package of measures. 
The most common methods of adaptation are: modification of the 
prices, diversification, increase of the turnover, expansion of the 
capacities, increase of the market share on certain markets, reduc-
tion of the costs (e.g. by reducing the inventories), postponement 
of payments (mainly by forced lending), conscious tax avoidance, 
reshuffling of the company’s organisational structure, lay-offs, 
and the sale or lease of the company’s assets. (Laki 2010a) 
The interviewed entrepreneurs were well aware that changing 
the company’s strategy or redrafting the business plan were 
necessary preconditions for the survival of their firms. We found 
that many of the companies prepared their crisis-management 
scenarios or drafted emergency action plans for the business. 
one of our interview partners from the ‘old’ group gave the 
following account:
We began to deal with different crisis packages. The first sign 
that we noticed was the rapid rise of the interest rates. We have 
rather significant bank loans both in huF and euro, therefore
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 the burden that these loans put on the company matters a lot. it 
was clear from the outset that if the trend remained unchanged 
this would imply a loss of 200 million huF for our company. 
and yet nothing else was considered but only the interest rates. 
it was a must to immediately bring home this money. The two 
biggest items among the expenses of our company are wages 
and marketing costs. We prepared various scenarios roughly 
on a quarterly basis. how to decrease the costs of the weighty 
items and simultaneously make small savings? We prioritised 
them. it was a significant achievement that the marketing costs 
were reduced by several hundred million forints. Moreover we 
created and activated a controlling system with the purpose to 
manage the consequences of the recession. Based on different 
performance indicators we observe our market performance 
on a monthly basis. We worked out a set of crisis indicators 
that we apply in a so-called roll-over system and that monitor 
how the company’s performance changed if compared to the 
preceding year or to the business plan. and we determined the 
set of measures that ought to be taken if the indicators showed 
or would have shown negative tendencies. There were no wage 
increases and no bonus payments this year. More precisely we 
paid a monthly wage as a bonus at Christmas. Furthermore, no 
lay-offs were made due to the crisis. [2]
hoping for a recovery, the owner-managers – first of all, our 
‘old’ partners – tried to avoid the dismissal of the workers and 
employed them in reduced working hours and with reduced 
wages: “They know that these days their personal income turns out to 
be some ten percent less than before. But they work less for this money. 
This is an unfortunate situation. But our current stock of orders made 
it a must for us to engage in such reductions.” [23]
a customary way of keeping the company’s manpower or 
reducing it only at a necessary minimum is to entrust the em-
ployees – especially the most needed workers – with tasks that 
earlier were accomplished through outsourcing: “The labour 
force of the company has not changed. However, we also used to have 
subcontractors and it was them whom we fired. All the production 
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was concentrated into the factory and the level of employment was 
maintained.” [27]
our interview partners applied some more offensive meth-
ods of crisis management as well. at a number of companies, the 
drop in turnover was countervailed by changing the markets of 
delivery or by reshuffling the range of products: 
During the past years, our company faced a decline of three-four 
percent which was just a fraction of the general recession rate in 
the construction industry. a variety of activities and interven-
tions were behind this achievement. in the course of the past 
years we became an export oriented company. Moreover, we 
implemented innovations and developed special projects, first 
of all the production of laminated safety glasses. This counts 
as a unique product in the glass industry. Due to these steps, 
practically we have had fewer and fewer competitors. a kind of 
selection has taken place in our industry. a great number of the 
companies went bankrupt. We used to have ten serious competi-
tors that were liquidated in 2010. The cake has become smaller 
and the companies that were poorly prepared in technical terms 
or that had a broad portfolio but without any special products 
all went bankrupt. [43]
The collapse or the disappearance of the competitors may stimu-
late investments and the expansion of the productive capacities, 
provided that the entrepreneur’s long-term expectations are 
positive. hence it is not a surprise that this strategy of escap-
ing through running ahead could be recorded only among the 
most optimistic members of the ‘new’ group who trusted that 
an upward turn of economic development would come shortly. 
one of them gave the following reasoning: 
given the conditions, our aim was to build a new factory. The 
construction started in the autumn of 2008 and was completed 
by 2010. Many had doubts whether to engage in an investment 
of such a large magnitude in the autumn of 2008 when the 
global recession started. This was a two billion forints invest-
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ment financed by the company without external sources.
 i think that it was without precedence in this industry. and it 
also looked unique among the investments which were man-
aged by medium-size enterprises. i am convinced that it is not 
only a chance but more or less an obligation to make this kind 
of investment in a period of recession. For us, it was the best 
period to manage this investment. The costs of investment are 
remarkably lower in crisis than in recovery periods. The prices of 
construction or of other elements are lower than before. another 
advantage of this timing was that, due to the shrinkage of the 
stock of orders, we were able to regroup a much larger part of 
our physical and human resources than we had expected. and 
it was a fortunate coincidence that the stock of orders has grown 
since the new factory was completed at the end of the last year. 
in fact the trend of increase began somewhat earlier, in the 
second quarter of the last year. Let me stress that, in addition to 
building new estates, this large-scale investment also comprised 
the installation of a number of new machines that significantly 
enhanced the capacity of production. These additional capacities 
have run in full use for the past months. [49]
all in all it seems that the accumulated experiences during the 
periods of earlier smaller downturns and the collected know-
led ge of how to respond in crisis situations have developed a kind 
of ‘hardiness’ among the entrepreneurs. on the ground of this 
routine and knowledge the majority of them were able to avoid 
bankruptcy or the collapse of their companies due to the lasting 
global economic recession. among the factors of efficient defence 
and control of primarily the members of the ‘new’ group we can 
record an optimistic perception of the future opportunities and, 
in connection with this, the expansion of innovative actions and 
a proactive prevention of failures. at the time of finishing the 
manuscript of our book the recession is still in place and as of 
today one does not notice any signs of an economic recovery. in 
such circumstances we cannot yet assess whether the optimism 
of the factory builders or the tactic of postponed actions of the 
cautious businessmen will ultimately prove to lead to success.
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oN The SoCiaL PRoFiLe oF The gRaND 
eNTRePReNeuRS – TeN yeaRS aFTeR
Differences in the social roles between the two groups of the 
‘old’ and the ‘new’ entrepreneurs
The above presented and documented processes of erosion 
and shrinkage cannot be explained in full by considering only 
certain economic factors or by relying only on associations as 
grasped by economic sociology. obviously the unfavourable 
economic development of the past decade played an important 
role in shaping these processes. Still, we can assume that further 
components of a non-economic character were also at work in 
the background. if nothing else, the comparison of the ‘new’ 
and the ‘old’ generations of grand entrepreneurs should draw 
our attention to them. For in the economic conditions that have 
induced stagnation or retreat in large circles of the business 
world, our ‘new’ owner-managers could manage to stay success-
ful, they could facilitate their dynamic presence on the market, 
and they were able to stimulate the growth of their companies. 
it seems important that for attaining their goals they mobilised a 
management style and a range of means that differ in a remark-
able way from the tool kit of the members of the ‘old’ group.
This observation inspires us to ask: apart from the genera-
tional differences due to age, are there any departures in the 
patterns of socialisation, behaviour, values, and attitudes and 
also in ambitions that help to explain these diverging trends? 
This question is all the more important for us because the ‘new’ 
generation has little in common with the ‘old’ cohort when an-
tecedents of a citoyen upbringing or aspirations to run a bour-
geois way of life are concerned. in simple terms: the ‘new’ en-
trepreneurs seem successful owner-managers as technocrats but 
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they do not aspire to take up the roles of social models that wide 
circles should follow as parts of the bourgeois elite. of course, 
there are some among them who demonstrate important accom-
plishments in culture and education, but it has to be emphasised 
that they always keep these engagements in sharp separation 
from their entrepreneurial activities. at the same time, it is true 
as much for them as for other members of the group that a con-
scious build-up of elite roles that encompass all the aspects of 
one’s private and public lives do not appear on the horizon of 
desires, aspirations, and plans. it seems to us that not only the 
dynamism of business has declined but also the momentum for 
widespread civic development has broken in the past years. This 
encourages us to repeat the question of our earlier book: are our 
heroes entrepreneurs or citoyens? and the question implies the 
task of looking beyond the economic processes and to rethink 
the roles of the life- and family histories and the impacts of so-
cialisation and certain value orientations in shaping the current 
economic and broadly perceived social positions of the hungar-
ian large- and medium-size entrepreneurs. 
as we will try to demonstrate below, the break of the career 
paths of the ‘old’ owner-managers is in close connection with 
three sets of sociological factors that come in addition to the al-
ready discussed economic ones. 
The first among these constituents is the ‘socialist’ embed-
dedness of the start-up of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs. More pre-
cisely their temporary relative advantage has to be considered 
that inspired a speedy development in the early years of post-
socialist market development but that then induced a break 
within a few years. as we saw earlier and will demonstrate 
through some further aspects, this heritage of the socialist past 
meant a lot: among others, it involved in-depth technological 
preparedness and a dependable knowledge of corporate rela-
tions and also the possession of the techniques of how these ac-
cumulated skills and knowledge could be upheld and, if neces-
sary, repaired. Further, they had an overview of the potential 
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cooperating partners and the competitors and this knowledge 
was embedded into a deep understanding of the strengths and 
weaknesses of their own companies. But the most important 
asset of the heritage was the precious set of their tested, reli-
able and well operating economic, political, and administrative 
contacts. at the start, the heritage provided significant bene-
fits, indeed. Considering local knowledge, those coming from 
outside could hardly compete with the new owners: the former 
managers or chief engineers of the privatised companies. The 
other side of the coin was that the possession of this heritage 
frequently generated a false and dangerous sense of security. 
Due to such a false sensation, the necessary adaptation was 
often delayed and the redefinition of the corporate profile and 
the redrawing of the business philosophy did not take place. 
Slow shrinkage or decline of the companies have been the fre-
quent consequences of this behaviour. 
The fact that the strategy of building on the socialist heritage 
results in deadlock becomes obvious in a comparison with the 
cases in the ‘new’ group. as was demonstrated above and as will 
be supported by further details below, members of this group 
have chosen a totally different way. By developing their family 
businesses32 or by separating a part of such businesses they tried 
32 The hungarian Statistical office does not collect data on family 
businesses. There is no special category of this organisational form in the 
methodology of the office, therefore we have no comprehensive knowledge 
about the number and the distribution by size of this type of company. 
Nevertheless, there are certain signs indicating the growing popularity 
of family property. The fast increase of the membership of the influential 
association of Responsible Family Businesses in hungary (Felelős Családi 
vállalkozásokért Magyarországon egyesület) is one of the clear indicators of 
this tendency (hvg.hu 2011). however, the international aspect is perhaps 
even more important: we may interpret the headway of family businesses 
as adaptation of the hungarian large- and medium-size companies to the 
conventional company ownership structure of the developed countries. 
according to the literature, dynamic penetration of this company form has 
been observable in the last two decades in Western europe and in the united 
States. as a result, these days the majority share of company property belongs 
to family businesses in this part of the world. “The family businesses have a share of 
75–95 percent among the registered companies worldwide and their contribution to the 
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to discover market niches where ‘the coast was clear’, where 
they possessed local knowledge and where it seemed easy to de-
velop a network of contacts. By applying intense marketing and 
an active behaviour in competition they strove for building up 
a modest but secure monopolistic position in these niches. This 
strategy gave an opportunity for stepping forward. The func-
tionally designed organisational order and the roles built into 
it could easily be converted to other areas and to new business 
activities. in the light of the success of the ‘new’ entrepreneurs, 
the stagnation and the shrinkage are clear signs of the disor-
ders of adaptation on the part of their ‘old’ peers. Differences in 
ability cannot provide an explanation because both of the two 
groups demonstrated great talent and dynamic development in 
the initial years of the working of their companies. The true rea-
sons behind the departures may be found when looking at the 
prehistories of their business start-ups and the divergences in 
their socialisation.
While its role was certainly important, still it would be mis-
leading to believe that the ‘socialist heritage’ was the only rea-
son for the shrinkage of the companies of the ‘old’ entrepre-
neurs and that this was the only cause for the decline in their 
careers. The sheer number and the variation of the major steps 
that they have engaged in since leaving behind their old posi-
tions (as managers of state-owned companies, salespersons of 
foreign trade companies, or chief agronomists of cooperatives) 
and becoming owner managers of private companies convinc-
ingly demonstrates their adaptation skills. one has to ask then: 
why would not they have been able to perform another sig-
GDP is about 65 per cent. In Europe, family businesses make up 75–80 per cent of the 
companies. Their share in employment is 40–50 per cent (there are countries where their 
weight reaches 70 per cent). The share of these businesses in the production of the GDP is 
20–70 per cent. In the US the contribution of family business to the GDP is 49 per cent 
and they provide 78 per cent of the new jobs.”(Filep 2011). We may formulate it as a 
cautious assumption that the strikingly high number of family businesses in 
the group of the ‘new’ entrepreneurs is an indication of a more general trend 
of adaptation in the hungarian economy.
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nificant performance increase? We have to assume that most 
probably there were additional components of the slowdown 
that originated in external forces of a kind that proved to be 
impossible to circumvent.
The analysis of these factors leads us to the second impor-
tant syndrome that broke the careers of our ‘old’ partners. This 
is the escalating dispersal of deepening distrust in hungarian 
society that poisons all kinds of relationships and that affects 
all spheres of life far beyond the boundaries of the economic 
domain. The ‘old’ entrepreneurs were doubly struck by this 
phenomenon. on the one hand, their sudden rise and out-
standing performance were interpreted with suspicion by 
the public. Since the beginning of the post-socialist transition 
it has been a widely shared popular view that one could get 
rich and accumulate capital only in unfair ways in our country. 
This suspicion has escalated to an all-embracing distrust in the 
meantime: civil servants, tax inspectors, and customs officers 
anticipated fraud and corruption behind every single accumu-
lated forint. Likewise, workmates accused each other for using 
deceptive methods of profit making. at the same time, those 
suffering accusation were left alone in their battles because the 
chambers and the professional bodies of representation prac-
tically lost their protective functions. on the other hand, the 
spreading of distrust directly affected business relations. after 
all, expanding one’s business needs stable relationships and a 
clearly drafted contract that is based on reliable associations 
among the partners. however, these conditions hardly can be 
established today in the atmosphere of all-round and unceas-
ing distrust and uncertainty. 
The ongoing fights for self-respect and for justifying one’s 
honesty left a trace on the most immediate human connections. 
as the follow-up interviews demonstrate, there has been a shift 
towards the familiar relations in the daily lives of our ‘old’ part-
ners whose accounts emphasised the increased importance of 
home-based intimate relations and gave vivid examples of the 
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unavoidable and multi-functional protective aspects of these re-
lations in the current conditions. Likewise, their old friendships 
– if these remained in place – have become highly valued and 
our partners strove to make these reliable contacts an integral 
part of the business, too.
The life strategy of the members of the ‘new’ group is dif-
ferent. The interlocking of the family and the business is the 
point where they depart from. The rest of their human relations 
are adjusted to this ranking. They evaluate friendships in their 
functionality and it is obvious to them that friendships are tem-
poral. These people are convinced that they can only count on 
themselves and on the closed circle of their family. From time 
to time they verbalised their loneliness but they did so without 
nostalgia or bitterness, rather in a way of taking stock of the un-
changeable order of things. Despite all the differences, the sto-
ries of our ‘old’ and ‘new’ partners have an important aspect in 
common: this is the apparent diminution of the human relations 
in their lives and work. if this is the case, then it is of outstanding 
importance to improve the ‘business environment’ in the broad 
sense of the term. however, as we will demonstrate, the two 
groups of entrepreneurs have different ideas about this issue. 
The ‘old’ owner-managers urge for some sort of state interven-
tion that should confront corruption and the black economy. The 
members of the ‘new’ group express resignation in this respect, 
too: they do not expect any protection from the state. Rather, 
they are trying to defend both the business and their privacy by 
preserving economic independence and by strengthening the 
market position of their companies.
The third negative factor behind the decline and the slow-
down of the companies of the ‘old’ group is of an ideological 
nature. This is a turning away in politics and also in public 
attitudes from the programme of catching up to (Western) eu-
rope. The spreading new orientation is based on a conservative 
interpretation of the so-called hungarian values and it is cou-
pled with the revival of a widely praised inward-looking atti-
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tude that refuses the country’s breaking out through moderni-
sation and that claims instead withdrawal behind the national 
borders. These new tendencies carry important messages for a 
remarkable part of the ‘old generation’ of entrepreneurs. They 
find themselves called on to give up their cosmopolitan atti-
tude and openness to cultural diversity that once were inher-
ent parts of their economic and social roles. The proposed new 
orientation claims joining in the loud criticism over the ‘op-
pressive’ and ‘exploitative’ nature of the West while it also in-
volves agreeing to a strong formulation of the re-strengthening 
of the state that is seen by dominant circles as the sole reliable 
actor of protection. 
This political-ideological shift is accompanied by deeply felt 
uncertainties: the once much hoped-for membership in the eu-
ropean union nowadays seems to show its downsides to our 
partners. in accordance with the general atmosphere, they see 
and criticise the european union as an over-bureaucratised 
organisation that provides little in advantage. Furthermore, 
our ‘old’ entrepreneurs stated unequivocally that hungary’s 
accession to the european union has not made any changes 
in the market position of their companies. The dominance of 
the multinational companies – the main structural determi-
nant of their businesses – had been an accomplished aspect of 
the prevailing market relations prior to the accession and the 
country’s newly attained membership in the european union 
did not bring about any changes in this regard. Neither were 
any changes made in the policy of the hungarian state: it had 
not protected them against the negative impacts of the multi-
nationals’ dominance prior to the accession, and, likewise, it 
has not offered protection for them ever since. in such a situ-
ation our partners concluded that there were practically two 
ways of national self-defence: either to accentuate and mili-
tantly represent the peculiarities of hungarian-ness, or to fol-
low a resigned accommodation to the international hierarchy 
by giving up aspiring to some sort of leading role in the re-
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gion. The necessity of an economic policy that should be based 
on assisting the production of acknowledged ‘hungaricum’-
s was claimed mainly by the ‘new’ entrepreneurs, while the 
prominent figures of advocating a pragmatic subordination 
programme also belonged to this group. Concerning subscrib-
ing to these alternatives there were no differences between the 
two groups of owner-managers. our ‘old’ partners were of the 
same opinion as the ‘new’ entrepreneurs. The only difference 
appeared in the tone: the disappointment over the lost dreams 
of an outbreak came through with clarity in the formulations 
and argumentations of the ‘old’ group while those in the ‘new’ 
one gave yet again a clear demonstration of their ‘matter-of-
fact’ style of thinking and relating. 
While we regard the above three factors very important in 
their contribution to the decline of the majority of the businesses 
that were launched in the first years of post-socialist transition 
and also to the shrinkage of the stratum of the grand entrepre-
neurs, it has to be emphasised that these factors did not exert 
their impacts on their own but always in an interaction with the 
economic roles and business behaviour of our owner-managers. 
By introducing a range of such interactions below we do not in-
tend to provide brand-new explanations. instead, we hope to 
deepen the knowledge about the motivations and also about 
the dynamics of the changes in the roles and conduct of our in-
terview partners. however, we do not think that even such a 
processing would provide an all-exhaustive picture with all its 
nuanced details. 
By reconsidering the preceding chapters of the book, first we 
made an attempt to approach the economic decline through the 
lens of a range of sociological factors that characterise our ‘old’ 
entrepreneurs. however, we faced certain difficulties in this 
regard. The in-depth exploration of the reasons for the with-
drawal from a clear citoyen role would have needed a detailed 
mapping of the entire scope of the relations of our interview 
partners and also an inquiry into the changes in these rela-
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tions. Moreover, the research should have covered the prob-
able rearrangements in their families and the ways how they 
conducted their daily lives, while it should have investigated 
their positions in the civil society and their value preferences 
as well. however, our interviews provided only partial bases 
for the purposes of such an in-depth inquiry. although below 
we rely on as many interview details as possible, in our attempt 
to reveal the wider implications we will follow the already 
known route to broaden the framework of interpretation: by 
bringing in the knowledge that we collected through the in-
terviews with the ‘new generation’ of entrepreneurs, we will 
try to sort out those general characteristics of the hungarian 
enterprises and their owners that have remained in place for 
several subsequent periods. Concurrently, we aim to separate 
the historically determined and unique characteristics of the 
‘old’ group that followed from certain unrepeatable one-time 
conditions and that have not appeared later. as was already 
discussed, these attributes were generated by the specific cir-
cumstances of departure and the situational specificity of the 
group.
as we saw earlier and will present through further aspects, 
the 10–15 years span, that separates our two groups in age and 
also in the timing of the start of their companies, presents a 
ridge in a broad understanding of the conditions well beyond 
the economy alone. as we showed above, the differences did 
not follow solely from the demographic implications of age, nor 
were they the manifestations of the late start and the weariness 
of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs. While members of the two groups 
operate in the same social, political, and economic environment, 
the representation of their economic roles, their entrepreneurial 
actions and their social perceptions separate the ‘new’ group as 
if it lived in a totally different world. By keeping such a mirror in 
front of their ‘old’ peers one is inclined to sense the historic shift 
as an epochal change. By looking into this mirror we can observe 
in a magnified way the non-recurring inspirations and also the 
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later devastating effects of the socialist heritage. Further, the 
mirroring impressions help us to understand the generational 
differences in the responses to the spreading distrust that domi-
nates the social and personal relations of the entrepreneurs. Fi-
nally, the same technique of reflections will be of assistance in 
revealing the conditioned embeddedness of the expectations of 
the two groups towards the state or the departures in their eve-
ryday philosophy and practices. 
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oN The SoCiaLiST heRiTage
Hidden marketisation: A way for quasi-adaptation
The start-ups of our two groups were formed by significantly 
differing social relationships and by markedly different ways of 
socialisation. Those, who were born in the 1960s or in the subse-
quent years of the last century were students at the time of the col-
lapse of the socialist system. They had learned about the spirit and 
the mode of operation of the socialist workplaces from stories of 
the family and friends but they had first-hand information about 
the working of the regime only in its partiality as it appeared 
in the school system. and even this knowledge was deformed: 
compared to the ‘classical times’, the schools had undergone 
important changes in spirit and conduct. The tales and stories 
about the heroic Soviet pioneers had disappeared from the com-
pulsory curriculum. The monopoly of the Russian language was 
broken and german, english, French, and Spanish were taught 
at a growing number of places (Laki 2006). The critical reviews 
and evaluations on the role of hungary in the Second World War 
and on the communist-Stalinist rule of the fifties slowly gained 
space in the history classes. Students in the school literary circles 
openly discussed the ‘bourgeois’ works of ‘bourgeois’ authors 
and differences in taste were acknowledged without repercus-
sions. Furthermore, active participation in the pioneer or young 
communist organisations was not requested and membership in 
these organisations was not expected any more. 
The fundamental taboos of the socialist system still remained 
in effect: it was prohibited to speak in public about the revolu-
tion of 1956 while demanding the retreat of the Soviet troops in 
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any forms involved severe punishment. however, it was not too 
difficult to by-pass these few proscriptions, hence the work of 
the diligent secret agents who were installed in workplaces and 
educational institutions was in decline. Nevertheless, every-
body was obliged to keep the rules of the game and people were 
aware of this. at the same time the climate was clearly chang-
ing: behind the rhetorically remaining socialist façade feverish 
work took place towards decomposing the remains of the decay-
ing socialist regime. By the time they entered the world of work 
(often much before through working during holiday times) the 
‘new generation’ of the grand entrepreneurs considered the 
evolving market economy as the sole domain of engagement 
and as to the personal aspects, there were no alternatives in 
their minds other than to follow an independence based career 
path. although the members of the ‘new generation’ were born 
some 10–15 years before the regime change, they were typically 
the children of the transition. 
The patterns of socialisation of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs were 
totally different. Their lives were ruled for decades by their 
powerful workplaces, the state-owned socialist companies and 
cooperatives. They well remembered the weight of the words of 
the local communist party secretaries. But they knew that their 
professional activity in the narrowest sense was evaluated in 
another system of references where performance, diligence and 
talent did not matter against the assessments that were based on 
and dictated by one’s political aptitude and loyalty to the system. 
Many faced the well-known dilemma of the socialist system: if 
they desired more than just being one in a faceless crowd, such 
desires could hardly be fulfilled without joining the Party. at 
the same time, subordinating one’s life to the Party often led to 
moral discords, further, it also made one the potential victim of 
blackmailing. Despite all manoeuvres to avoid the political traps 
of the ruling order, adaptation to the dominant behavioural con-
ditions of socialism worked as a benchmark of acceptance for 
the ‘old’ entrepreneurs. a telling story gives some insights: 
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he praised me to the others, saying that this boy is going to be 
someone! … as i remember i became a member of the Party 
there at the state farm. Those who did not live in those times 
cannot imagine that situation in retrospect. it was a huge thing 
at that time if these people had taken up a young man like me. in 
particular, if they invited saying: listen, come on! Well, nobody 
would have said in those days: i refuse to go with you. i became 
a Party member at the age of 23–24 years. Those people around 
were faithful members of the Party and they formed a clique… 
There were several signs of a political paralysis around 1989. 
We have got different directives from the Party but we were 
unable to figure out the direction of escape or the route of avoid-
ance from these documents. i often thought … if other people 
were sitting there, maybe there could have been another path 
of development. The elections took place in 1990. The hungar-
ian Democratic Forum (MDF) was the winner. There was great 
uncertainty among people like me … Some of us were scared 
of admitting the past, we feared that some sort of examination 
would come. [22]
There were many for whom it was undoubtedly the Commu-
nist Party that worked as the compass of a successful career 
in the socialist conditions. however, for a long time there was 
also another very effective value system in operation that was 
formed by the informal relations in permanent opposition to all 
‘official’ requirements and that filled all the non-official spaces 
of society. This was the value system of an alternative profes-
sional spirit which highly praised personal achievements that 
were conceived in confrontation with the rules of the prevailing 
order and that was maintained and protected by far-reaching 
informal associations. appearance against the logic of the sys-
tem was the main point of departure of recognition and per-
sonal esteem in this structure. This system of values addressed 
our interview partners mainly as professionals. as ambitious 
innovators or young managers in high positions at their com-
panies they aspired to the appreciation of their colleagues and 
strove for public recognition of their performance as measured 
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by the market. it was this highly controversial social space that 
shaped the first experiences of our ‘old’ partners about the large 
state-owned industrial companies or large-scale agricultural 
production. a permanent balancing between the challenges and 
contradictions of the formal and informal worlds moulded their 
professional careers. 
in our earlier book, we presented in detail the conditions of 
the reform era when their careers started in the seventies of 
the last century. The new economic mechanism of 1968 was 
new because it tried to find new ways for managing the above 
controversial conditions. The political implications were very 
important: all innovations and new organisational forms were 
launched within the socialist domain and all these were meant 
to strengthen the supremacy of the party-state. This develop-
ment helped to maintain the continuity of the conventional mo-
bility tracks. young men and women striving for advancement 
imagined their lives amidst these well elaborated social forms. it 
was their workplace in domination above nearly all segments of 
their lives that served as a frame of reference: their studies, their 
relations of cooperation, the forms and contents of their contacts 
in daily life, and their visions about the future all were adapted 
to what their companies required or suggested. hence, the main 
source of later success became the collected local knowledge: 
these young people navigated with great confidence in their lo-
cal worlds and this sense of local embeddedness was the main 
source of their gradually advancing career, too. They accumu-
lated detailed and accurate knowledge about the workplace 
where most of them had spent several years before becoming 
private entrepreneurs: they understood all the important con-
stituents of their companies’ technology; they had a realistic pic-
ture about the technical level and the developmental potentials 
of the firm; and they were well informed about the cooperative 
capabilities and the export-import connections of it, too. how-
ever, their most important asset was the knowledge that they 
had at their fingertips about the ‘human capital’ of the company, 
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including not only an overview of the skills and the potential 
performance of the local workforce but also a mapping of the 
value orientations and expectations of the employees. 
These very important constituents of their local knowledge 
were expanded by further elements in the 1980s. Firm-based 
self-governing production units and auxiliary workshops33 were 
established one after the other that combined three components 
each with important roles for future development: they provid-
ed for the shortages hindering smooth production and/or ren-
dered innovation to raise efficiency of the socialist companies; 
by an often elitist selection among the workers, they created a 
space for new hierarchies and new paths of advancement; fi-
nally, they became the ‘early birds’ of marketisation by applying 
rules and a way of management that openly followed the pre-
scripts of the market. There were many among our ‘old’ partners 
for whom these production units or auxiliary workshops served 
as springboards on their paths towards self-ruled entrepreneur-
ship. These laboratories of permitted and controlled marketisa-
tion provided the know-how, the technological bases and the 
network of skilled labour to set up one’s own independent busi-
ness in the not very distanced future. 
The accumulated experiences of climbing the ladder of the 
organisational hierarchies of the socialist companies or of en-
gaging in the self-governing production units brought true ben-
efits at the time privatisation. Those who learned the rules of 
the shortage economy enjoyed unbeatable advantages. Shortage 
as the basic characteristic of the system was the starting point of 
the calculations: one knew that if it disappeared at one point it 
certainly reappeared at another. in this context, local knowledge 
33 These organisational innovations of late socialism were unique 
combinations of privately managed organisations of the employees and the 
state-owned capital assets (equipment and machines). employees of a state-
owned company established these organisations within the framework of a 
contract with their workplace. By using the capital assets of the firm, these 
autonomous units delivered goods or services for the state-owned company 
that were accounted at market prices.
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was rewarding in assisting fast increase in performance that 
outsiders hardly could compete with. Those who knew all the 
details of the technology and had an overview about the chain 
of production were able to respond with a range of smart sub-
stitutions: they had at hands the tools purposefully carved by 
the local gadgeteers; they could mobilise the collection of com-
ponent parts that had been put aside for use in case of shortage; 
and they could rely on little product innovations that helped to 
skip the non-functioning technological or production phases. 
in these conditions of the shortage economy the winners were 
those who were fast enough to speed up the business by clev-
erly using this arsenal of shortage-minimising. Sharp eyes – in 
our case the skill of forecasting the coming of shortage in due 
course – served as capital in these circumstances. Based on this 
special local knowledge smart people were capable of starting 
fast-growing and profitable businesses and they shortly became 
the icons of rapid enrichment. one of our ‘old’ partners remem-
bered in the following way: 
at that time there was a shortage economy in hungary. Bump-
ing into shortage was the typical situation. Those who figured 
out what were the goods in great need due to shortage and 
were able to import them into the domestic market they could 
sell these products fast and with huge profits. i think that this 
period was practically over by the second half of the 1980s or by 
the first years of the 1990s. in ‘92 perhaps… There were certain 
products that could be sold in hungary in a sound way, without 
cheating with invoicing and by paying the proper taxes, still 
these transactions brought extraordinary profits. … hence, there 
were extremely huge sums in circulation. and as the company 
got richer and richer, its owner could accumulate a tremendous 
financial advantage that allowed for a wide range of opportuni-
ties. it was easy to move on because financially the company 
was strong enough to start the next businesses from one day 
to the next and one could do so without running the company 
into indebtedness and also pay the taxes in an ordinary manner 
without any risk. [5]
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This route of accumulation and acquisition was open primar-
ily for those who were engaged in retailing. however, shortages 
did not appear only in the turnover of final goods and services 
but were around at every stage and at every point of the produc-
tion process as well. it followed that not a small part of the hun-
garian innovative potential worked on temporarily counter-
balancing the shortages by developing locally applicable smart 
solutions while these solution remained confined exclusively to 
the given local markets and to the locally relevant conditions. 
The recognition of elsewhere unknown associations and their 
witty technical-technological applications characterised the in-
novative capacity of the country and the ongoing battle against 
the emerging shortages kept expanding this capacity. at the 
same time, this innovative spirit produced real capital and real 
development for quite a long while: 
i managed the service of magnetic storage units for years. at that 
time – in the first years of the seventies – it was rather compli-
cated to import machines and equipment because of the strict 
foreign exchange regime. and the data storage devices (those 
large boxes in those years) broke very often. it was clear for me 
that the lack of these devices made a headache all the time and i 
thought that the broken pieces somehow should be repaired. But 
such pieces were not repaired anywhere. People simply threw 
out the broken devices and bought new ones in those countries 
where the supply was sufficient. This was not the case with us: 
one could not buy a new device to replace the broken old one. 
Finally, i have figured out how to fix these facilities. and that 
knowladge was the source of my later career. [17] 
Limitations of the advantages stemming from the socialist heritage
But these advantages of the shortage economy proved to be tem-
porary and transient. Due to the spreading of the market condi-
tions, a massive turn has gained place by the mid-1990s: prod-
ucts which previously had been in short supply became hard to 
sell. however, this was only one among the many aspects that 
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signalled profound changes in the rules of the game. The inter-
play of the demand and the supply reconstructed the production 
lines which had been broken by the always unexpectedly surfac-
ing shortage. at the same time, the unlimited competition which 
was generated by the now all-round appearance and active 
intervention of the foreign market players devalued and made 
useless the witty innovative ideas that had materialised in the 
promptly invented goods and services in substitution of those in 
paucity. of course, the innovative skills and the ability of always 
being alert if needed did not disappear, what is more, such capa-
bilities could provide the sources of longer-term advantages. 
The smartest and cleverest ones could enter large-scale projects 
even if they possessed limited capital for realising their far-
reaching ideas. But this was possible only if further skills were 
associated with their desperation and resourceful thinking. 
Most importantly, fast recognition of the changes in the nature 
and the working of the system was needed. Furthermore, the 
skills of abstraction for translating the technical innovation into 
genuinely new tools, goods, and services and to adjust their dis-
tribution via new methods in trading had to be applied. if these 
associative conditions were missing, then even innovations that 
once had been successful in the shortage economy were now 
destined for quick and traceless disappearance.
There are examples of both outcomes in the stories of our 
‘old’ interview partners. The above mentioned computing busi-
ness belongs to the typical cases of successful adaptation. in this 
case, one can observe a straight pathway that led from the repair 
service of data storadge equipment to the development of data-
recovery technologies and to building up complete data man-
agement service systems. This pathway was paved by continu-
ous innovations that ultimately converted the one-time modest 
‘socialist manufacture’ into one of the most successful large en-
terprises of the country. 
in some other cases it was the privatisation process that kept 
alive the shortage-based business relations in an artificial way. 
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The illusion of a never-ending working of the technological and 
commercial divisions of labour that were meant to deal with 
the shortage gave the false impression of safety which, in turn, 
hindered the necessary adaptation to the changed market con-
ditions. Further, the substantial delay of due accommodation 
gave rise to mutual blaming and a sudden crisis of trust which 
was then further deepened when the one-time partners found 
themselves in fierce competition with each other. 
having a closer look at such failing cases one may recog-
nise that the source of the failure can be identified in exactly 
those factors that once had worked towards producing success. 
Flexibility that reminds one to the suppleness of the fast-mov-
ing lizard belongs to the essence of the shortage-based busi-
ness. The key to such a moving is in constantly detecting and 
occupying the breaches that the shortage has created. But the 
market niches covering the breaches always were provisional 
and changeable by nature: one day they appeared here, then 
disappeared, and then appeared again elsewhere. given these 
characteristics, such ‘breach-covering’ niches were not suitable 
for building up long-term business relationships, nor were they 
appropriate for designing and running technological lines and 
development strategies. in these cases, it was the fast reaction 
itself that represented a genuine value, and compared to it, both 
the profit and the professional requirements occupied second-
ary positions. and the failure came here: the upgrading of the 
technology and/or of the products fell short and if it took place 
at all, this usually happened with uncorrectable delay. But these 
delays were fatal: as soon as the coordination and the regulation 
of the economic relations were taken over by the demand and 
supply relations of the market the ‘breach-monitoring’ business 
strategy of the disappearing shortage economy was doomed to 
fail. Due to the lack of proper new relations serving stabilisation 
and the protection of the business in the long term, these strate-
gies that successfully functioned in the conditions of all-round 
shortage now became the barriers against further development.
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in addition to the above, socialisation to the shortage economy 
also had certain spill-over effects that influenced the build-up 
of the technical and business structures of production and that 
had severe implications on the operation and the management 
of the enterprise. The experiences that had been accumulated in 
the conditions of chronic shortage gave the foundations of large-
scale technological innovations which later became the points 
of departure of private businesses in many cases. in such cases 
the innovations that were born under the pressure of shortage 
turned into the foundations of independent new business that 
brought safe income and decent profit for a while.
But it was revealed soon that the soil was muddy: the com-
fortable and guaranteed export contract which involved fixed 
prices became a barrier to creating new market relationships 
in the new competitive environment. The innovation that once 
served to counterbalance the negative effects of shortage in the 
field now became obsolete, and the strongly cemented adjoin-
ing technological and trading relations started to ‘imprison’ the 
business by seriously hindering a breakthrough to the market. 
as one of our interview partners recalls, the clash simply be-
came unavoidable: 
a very bad infrastructure evolved. The company owned a ger-
man subsidiary which bought the products of the factory at 
Salgótarján and sold them abroad. it was managed by a system 
that was based on independent accounting units inside the com-
pany and that served to measure the performance and to deal 
with wage-setting issues across the units. This system worked 
in all those areas of internal income-redistribution where the 
output price of the given units did not matter for the company 
as a whole. our contracted partner company received the end 
product at a very low price. it was enough to meet the operation 
costs there. This was ok while the big enterprise worked but 
since this company has been separated the fixed price contracts 
became unprofitable. and practically a part of this process was
the elimination of these contracts. a new export structure was 
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built which was based on new connections and new contracts… 
it was a very difficult step at that time… Nevertheless, this was 
the step that gave the foundation of the new structure which, 
in turn, later contributed to the development of new customer 
relationships. [12] 
We met a number of different versions of such stories. The 
core of the followed strategy was to take advantage of the local 
knowledge. in practical terms, it meant to take over all the ben-
efits that came together with privatisation, including the nearly 
automatic renewal of the firm’s earlier market connections and 
the uninterrupted serving of the old patronage and/or of the 
circle of former suppliers. Since the owner feels safe in this 
environment, the in-built comfort of the inherited market con-
ditions does not stimulate him for long to initiate any changes. 
given the convenience of the ‘self-propelling’ relationships and 
procedures, he fails to engage in searching for new business con-
nections and ignores the necessary innovations that would help 
a gradual adaptation to the changed conditions.  one faces here 
a situation of genuine entrapping. on the one hand, ‘the wheel 
is still on the move’, hence it looks unreasonable to cause losses 
by leaving behind the customary routines and conditions. on 
the other hand, the first signs of a slowdown indicate that the 
time for change has arrived: it would be useful – perhaps com-
pelling – to prepare new technologies, to develop new products 
and services and to explore new markets. however, the forces 
of inertia usually pull the company into the former direction. 
of course, the sense of comfort is not the sole reason behind 
postponing engagement in any change: there are the pressures 
of the severe scarcity of capital and the widely shared fears of 
borrowing that come with heavy weight into influencing the 
decision about ‘staying or going’.
it seems that the reserves of the shortage-based economy 
were exhausted within a decade. as to the reports of our en-
trepreneurs from the ‘old’ generation, the turnover, the income 
of their companies, the number of the employees and, first and 
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foremost, the amount of the yearly profit began to diminish in 
an unstoppable way much before the world economic crisis. 
Maybe we are not far from the truth when stating that one of 
the main sources of the long-term break of economic growth 
and one of the main reasons of the country’s declining trend 
of international competitiveness before the Millennium can be 
identified in a paradox: ‘marketisation’ of the shortage economy 
by creating the relations of a quasi-market took place ‘too suc-
cessfully’ in the last decade of the socialism. The quasi-market 
conditions made the pressure for change very weak: the past-re-
lated mechanisms still in work did not initiate new orientations 
and novel behavioural patterns while left the economic actors 
satisfied with the prevailing forms of making business. 
We have to add here that the shortage economy had some im-
pact also on those private businesses that came into being out-
side of the privatisation of state-owned firms or cooperatives. 
The interviews with our ‘old’ partners pointed out as a recur-
ring motive that the necessary investment capital to start with 
had originated in shortage-based earlier businesses – be they 
businesses for producing goods, services, elements of a service-
line, or efforts to countervail the lack of skilled and experienced 
workforce. 
however, despite all the important similarities, the accounts 
of those establishing their own enterprises back in the early 
years differ in some key aspects from those whose independ-
ent business came into being via privatisation. The most impor-
tant difference appeared in the weight that shortage played in 
the company’s life: in the former cases response to the condi-
tions of shortage always remained ‘external’ in its relation to 
the main activities and it involved at most a small segment of 
the entire scope of production. as the recollections of the cir-
cumstances of the start-ups back in the late 1980s and straight 
after the collapse of state-socialism reveal, the fast but inten-
tionally transient response to the given conditions served noth-
ing else but the immediate increase of income, and it was out of 
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any considerations to build some long-term business strategy 
on the shortage that brought such income as a ‘godsend’. This 
approach allowed the involved companies to leave behind as 
easily and painlessly the niches of a shortage market as they 
had occupied those with quick but partial solutions when the 
opportunity occurred. a further important difference is shown 
by the cooperative relationships. in contrast to the ‘privatisers’, 
the ‘early private owners’ never made shortage a point of de-
parture in building up their business relations. in their case, the 
autonomous business has built on its own, new, market tradi-
tions and considered the involved contacts as its points of refer-
ence when deciding about future investments, or the expansion 
of its production, or when seeking new market niches for its 
main activities, or in developing the inside division of labour 
of the company. Due to the mentioned characteristics, the busi-
nesses of the ‘early private owners’ reveal important similarities 
with those of our ‘new’ interview partners. however, there is 
an important difference between them: by the time the latter 
group appeared on the stage, shortage as a source of temporary 
and partial business transactions disappeared from the scope 
of economic operations.
The issue of labour force deserves a separate chapter in the de-
scription of the socialist heritage. The ‘old’ entrepreneurs hardly 
could circumvent those deep conflicts of the systemic change 
that accompanied the privatisation process of the huge socialist 
firms: these firms had been operated with severe over-employ-
ment entirely unfit to market adjustments. in its essence, over-
employment involved surplus and shortage at the same time: 
on the one hand, there were many lacking the skills and quali-
fications for a future continuation, on the other hand, important 
skills and knowledge, like expertise of marketing and advertis-
ing, were lacking. Drastic and massive lay-offs together with a 
simultaneous fierce competition for certain specialists were the 
unavoidable outcomes of this situation. The dimensions of the 
realignment are tellingly shown by the contemporary statistical 
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data. By the mid-1990s, some 1.5 million jobs had been elimi-
nated and the rate of unemployment rose above 12 percent. all 
this was accompanied by the dramatic increase of wage differ-
entials and also by the mass proliferation of job insecurity. No-
body could feel safe: a placement of today could be easily lost by 
tomorrow. it is worth recalling that the general feeling of inse-
curity and the massive lay-offs called for a series of strikes and 
demonstrations. although these events remained peaceful and 
they usually concluded in agreements through negotiations, the 
general fear of their turning into angry and conflicting mass 
protests was always in the air. 
one may be surprised that all these changes, events and con-
flicts hardly left any traces in the interviews. While our inter-
view partners gave detailed accounts about their struggles amid 
the ongoing fierce competition, one hardly could read about the 
purportedly difficult process of sending away large numbers of 
the employees and accommodating the internal division of tasks 
to the new requirements of the market. it appeared as it was as 
easy as putting into a suitable order the production line. 
even in a retrospect, the new owner-managers of the early 
times gave voice to their feelings of satisfaction: as they said, 
they did all what could be done for their employees. in line with 
this conviction, they presented a long list of services and facili-
ties that they had established for maintaining the internal cohe-
sion and, of course, also for raising productivity in their new 
company. Recollections of conflicts and clashes were entirely 
missing from these accounts. it follows that the emerging repre-
sentations remained one-sided and strongly fragmented.
By taking the texts of the interviews with the new owners of 
the one-time state-owned companies as testimonies of their per-
ceptions of the ‘socialist heritage’ in the world of labour and as 
expressions of their readiness to share or to refuse some respon-
sibilities for its state, it becomes clear that their horizon reached 
out at best to those representing the best qualified stratum of the 
workers. The subjects of mass lay-offs, the workers of the outdat-
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ed heavy industries, the large groups of the semi-qualified and 
unqualified labour force fell beyond this horizon in the old times 
and remained unnoticed by the new ovners in the contemporary 
conditions as well. at the same time, they mention as an impor-
tant achievement that the unity of the one-time labour force of the 
company could be preserved. in translating this statement into 
concrete examples, they list the old craftsmanship, the foremen 
whom they have known by name back for decades, and those in 
intermediary leading positions. Loyalty of these circles towards 
them and the reciprocity of such relationships are underlined as 
the most precious and safest foundations of the new business. 
Such a tacit redefinition of the circle of the employees ‘who 
matter’ was motivated partly by business considerations and 
partly by a certain understanding of social responsibility. it was 
this latter attitude that many among our interview partners saw 
as the main difference between the hungarian grand entrepre-
neurs and their multinational peers. our interviewees kept on 
emphasising that, due to their embeddedness and personified 
contacts, the hungarian businessmen see the issues of employ-
ment having key importance in the economy and society, while 
the managers of the multinationals lack such sensitivities and 
count only in faceless numbers. 
often a kind of entrepreneurial creed was formulated along 
this logic. Many among our partners presented the local employ-
ment policy as a primary concern of the business. They saw it in 
programmatic terms that all the employees – of course those who 
‘mattered’– should find their place and role in the new enterprise 
where all of them should feel at ease by organising the rhythm of 
the daily work according to clear principles and where, instead 
of the permanent ideological-political control from above, all of 
them should enjoy the fruits of proper work in terms of a decent 
income. The new conditions are described by a new terminology: 
the term ‘familial ambiance of the workplace’ more and more fre-
quently appears in both the self-characterisations of the compa-
nies and in their advertisements. The fundamentals of ‘familial 
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ambiance’ have been known for a long time: the patterns of the 
caring boss come from the socialist past as well as the sources of 
proud identification with one’s firm that finds its origins in the 
emotionally heated, personified relations that once surrounded 
some famous giants like the ‘1st of May Factory’ or the ‘Red octo-
ber Complex’. The modernised versions of old corporate togeth-
erness appeared soon. uniform work-clothing decorated with 
the company’s logo, a football team named by the firm, a well 
equipped and friendly modern canteen, less frequently a com-
pany club offering a range of recreation and leisure activities are 
all to serve the deepening of corporate identity and to strengthen 
in-house community networks. it well may happen that the crea-
tion and the permanent maintenance of such deep-going labour 
relations proves to be as hard a task as running the business and 
keeping it on track.34 in several cases, moulding and supervising 
the conditions of a good atmosphere took top priority in shaping 
the new enterprise: 
But the main goals have been achieved. My clear aim was to 
establish a farm, to create a mode of farming that serves as an 
example to be followed. it should be a workplace where people 
feel comfortable and are happy to work. We cannot pay them 
too much but everything else is available for them, despite the 
costs that are involved. and they cannot find similar conditions 
elsewhere. This firm offers some sort of a living-space because 
plain agricultural activity and farming are two utterly differ-
ent things. it is a way of life here, it is some sort of contact with 
people which differs from what one experiences on the big 
industrial estates and at the large firms. [22]
The new owner-managers of the once state-owned companies 
have a deep and detailed knowledge well beyond the staff of 
34 it is important to note that the patterns point backward, well into the 
socialist traditions. as it will be shown, the ‘new’ generation does not find 
them worth following: their efforts for creating the company’s identity are 
driven by new values and new conventions.
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their own companies: concerning at least the representative pro-
fessions and expertise, they are also very well informed about 
the other companies and factories of the branch or of the area of 
production. There are old stories behind this knowledge: shared 
illegal businesses in the semi-secret times, reciprocal work on a 
friendly basis at the weekends, memorable corporate events or 
programmes of the Communist youth Federation. No need to 
mention that such memories connect with others. That is why 
trust and loyalty are among the fundamental values in these 
circles that sometimes prove even more important than one’s 
skills, endurance, or knowledge of certain production practices. 
The hierarchy of values is clear, indeed:
People like me would select figures, who consider the tasks as 
their own. one of my fellows – we started together in the past 
– used to be the chief accountant of the small cooperative. We 
graduated together and he has been with me since then. Back in 
the old times, i personally knew all the workers, i interviewed 
the majority of them before they entered the company… i can’t 
stand it if the workers cheat me. if they are not honest and i 
discover something, they are fired immediately. i tell them in 
advance: honesty is one of the most important things for me. 
and if any of them tries to fool me five times or six times – it may 
be that i discover it only at the eleventh attempt – i immediately 
say goodbye and we depart. [14]
The launching of the company – what many experienced as a 
kind of ‘resumption’ – often upset the established hierarchy. 
The systemic change stirred the emotions, values and orienta-
tions: a political punishment of the past might have become 
reinterpreted as a merit; the informal rankings of the one-time 
auxiliary workshops and of the hidden cooperation within 
the framework of the second economy have become twisted 
around by turning into the points of departure in forming the 
new hierarchies of positions. out of all these changes amazing 
new structures have emerged that were cemented by a widely 
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shared dedication to the radical changes and by the readiness 
to build an entirely new social construct on a new onset. one of 
our partners gave a vivid description of those years: 
everybody was a carpenter by profession and there was an 
unskilled helper with a university degree who is today the 
director of logistics and one of the owners – but he served as a 
helper for six years in that little core. and there was a surface 
treatment worker, a painter, who is still doing the same. Then 
there was a carpenter who is still in this job. another carpenter 
became the shop-superintendent. There is yet another carpen-
ter who is responsible for the quality assurance and he is the 
project manager nowadays. and there are the revenue officer 
and me. oh sorry, there is another colleague of mine who was a 
carpenter and who now deals with the so-called metal vehicle 
supplier subcontractors. he has been moving upward, for sure. 
and after five years i faced a personal assessment at a certain 
management training course. i sat down in the circle of my col-
leagues with the aim to find out whether i was able to preserve 
my sense of reality. and in the course of the tests it became 
obvious that everyone felt good in his or her position. There 
were rarefied questions put in a complicated manner but the 
answer was recurrently the same: people felt that they were ok 
in their positions and they would not initiate any change in the 
company’s management. it means that the team is as it has been 
since the start in 1990. [11]
With the shared experience of the now waning state-socialist 
history behind them, the new owner-managers intended to 
give new meaning to the commonality of the local collective: 
according to their design, the privatisation of the firm had to be 
managed in a way that ultimately makes all the employees the 
winners of the process. Beside the moral dedication to fairness, 
such an approach was dictated also by business considerations: 
in an exsanguinous economy grappling with a severe shortage 
of capital, the most important sources of economic advancement 
were knowledge and close cooperation. one of our ‘old’ partners 
put the requirements in the following way: 
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i called a meeting of the workers and i asked for two things. 
and from the poultry-cleaning lady to the head of department 
they all accepted my proposal that they ought to take care of 
two things. The first was that they should accomplish… the 
annual plan that i signed, because i was unable to perform it 
alone. My second request was that they should make all efforts 
to keep the state of anarchy that characterises the country at the 
moment outside of the firm. »if you act this way and help me to 
manage the company i guarantee that your standard of living 
will not decline. it will not increase, one cannot be sure that it 
will increase, but it certainly will not decrease.« [22] 
at the same time, one has to pay quite a high price for main-
taining in an unchanged way the size and the composition of 
the local labour force: the relations of dependency can become 
extremely strong and attempts at tight subordination may con-
clude in severe conflicts. While in the past, the hierarchy of posi-
tions was moulded by the invisible ‘system’ that dominated all 
segments of society and that was somehow counterbalanced by 
an unconditional acceptance of and a tacit self-defence against 
the rule from above, the new era is characterised by the harsh 
and unmitigated relations of face-to-face power. however, the 
fear of the ‘uncontrollable forces’ remained high: the employees 
worry about their jobs and the bosses worry about the human 
capital that represents the most precious asset of their company. 
The uniqueness of the local workforce is clear: 
Well, out of those who worked under my directive in the past, 
the majority still work with me. Due to my good relationship 
with the employees, i could select the best people when i went 
private: they came with me because i was working in this same 
area and people knew me. and they looked up to me. Those 
whom i invited to join were pleased to do so; most of them still 
work with me. if they were not around, the situation would be 
much harder for me. i could not ‘ride’ so easily, so to say. They 
have been working here for 20 years by now. They are fair and 
decent people therefore i am in a good position. From time to
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 time when they slow down they need to be shaken up a little bit. 
i have to do this from time to time – not in a harsh way, but ten-
derly and by avoiding break-ups. For i would be badly off if these 
people left: i could not find substitutes for them, for sure. [18]
Due to the ultimate waning of the illusion of the strongly believed 
unbreakable unity, the later layoffs were usually extremely pain-
ful. hence, our ‘old’ entrepreneurs kept postponing such deci-
sions up to the last minute. Despite the apparent decline of the 
efficiency indicators and also of their firm’s competitiveness, 
they made all attempts of preserving the initial, cohesive collec-
tive of the one-time heroic epoch. There were professional and 
humanitarian considerations behind their efforts: on the one 
hand, they were motivated by a feeling of responsibility towards 
the old workforce, on the other hand, a clear interest in saving 
the skills, knowledge and experience – and, of course, also the 
unconditional loyalty – of the collective inspired them. That is 
why they were willing to do a lot of things. if they owned more 
companies instead of lay-offs they used several tricks of restruc-
turing the labour force between these units. There were cases 
when – as a forward escape – they started a new business (and 
completely got out of the old company) whereby they spared 
actually themselves from confronting the nastiest. of course 
it was not easy to manoeuvre between the requirements of the 
market and of the multiple labour-force policy. This practice 
needed a lot of capital trust: 
only a minimal amount of assets plus about a dozen of people 
and some used equipment remained there. Then i made the 
decision that as a boss i was somehow responsible for these 
people whom i had lured to join my firm. Therefore we decided 
to try to find some solution and founded the Daruline Company 
Limited in 2002 strictly on a family basis. There were only two 
owners: the daughter of my wife and me. She graduated at the 
Department of accounting of the university of economics in 
those days. She gained her degrees in accounting and marketing.
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 She was trained in everything that was needed, also including 
a degree in logistics. She had an all-encompassing view on the 
whole firm. although formally she was a new entrant she had 
gained an insight into the company’s life several years before 
because she has been living in this atmosphere at home. [20] 
as the interviews indicate those becoming the new owners out 
of the one-time representatives of a now decaying old world 
found themselves in deep confusions regarding the human rela-
tions of their businesses. on the one hand, they were strongly 
bound to the shared past and the exciting collective experiences 
of starting a new firm. on the other hand, they recognised the 
pressures of the market and were aware that aspiring to a lead-
ing position in the market segment of their business involves a 
change among the employees by giving priority to people with 
new skills, knowledge, and professionalism. The outcome of the 
play of these conflicting forces usually was the emergence of a 
peculiar local labour force policy which was characterised by a 
slow and gradual cut-back and by a restructuring of the man-
power more in favour of maintaining an internal harmony than 
to be responsive to the market challenges. The choice implied a 
price, of course: it was the slowdown of the company’s growth. 
Nevertheless, such decisions were accompanied by the good 
feeling of seeing well-known people all around whose good and 
weaker sides have been known to the owner for long and whose 
unconditional loyalty and personal affection were unquestion-
able assets for him. and, as already mentioned, these qualities 
proved to be more important than the short-term profit. The 
owners had good reasons for such options: there was a lot from 
the past that was better to conceal. after all, one’s one-time 
party secretary engagement, or the (fear driven) joining of the 
workers’ militia, or the political-professional abuses remained 
remembered for decades. in the unclear times of the transition, 
it was uncertain whether such involvements would be punished 
and what the punishments would be – the sanctions could per-
haps go as far as to question the legitimation of ownership and to 
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challenge the newly attained position. attacks may come any-
time from all directions and from the old foes. in brief, the sur-
rounding people know too much about each other and while 
this knowledge can provide the basis of cohesion and solidarity, 
it can equally well become the foundation of vulnerability and 
mutual humiliation. The new democratic ideas and the verbal 
dedications to them are hardly of any help: fear has not disap-
peared for long from the stage of the workplace relationships. as 
we shall see soon, fear has been among the important drivers in 
the formation of the management, the recruitment of those ful-
filling the most important positions and the involved relation-
ships bear upon the traces of a peculiar mixture of suspicion and 
complicity that have been so characteristic for the post-socialist 
human relations till today. 
in sum we may say that, despite all their skills and artifices, 
the rapidly rising entrepreneurs of the transition remained pris-
oners of the outdated socialism. Their in-between position had 
been the source of their initial advantages but later the very same 
position created those barriers that remarkably slowed down the 
growth and that then concluded in the actual shrinking of their 
companies. This becomes especially clear when compared to the 
positioning, the market reactions, and the business philosophy 
of the members of the ‘new’ group. as if the representatives of 
two different worlds were speaking. But the members of the two 
groups are living in the same environment, in the same social, 
economic, political, and cultural surroundings.
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ReLaTive aDvaNTageS geNeRaTeD By The 
DiveRSiTieS oF DePaRTuReS
Diverse business behaviours
When looking at the conditions that moulded the start and the 
functioning of the businesses of the ‘new’ entrepreneurs, one 
does not see any traces of the shortage economy. By the time 
of the business start-ups of the group – around the new Mil-
lennium – the prevailing conditions have profoundly changed. 
The dominant part of the property was in private hands; the 
institutions of proper market regulation were put in place; the 
privatisation process practically came to an end; and the own-
ership structure took up its ultimate shape. given the chronic 
scarcity of capital, only those could start a new business in this 
environment who had already accumulated and/or who had 
mobilisable assets at their disposal. it was practically impossible 
to appear on the scene as an unknown, brand new player com-
ing from nowhere.
it is then no surprise that one experiences much less diver-
sity of the starting options among the ‘new’ entrepreneurs than 
among their ‘old’ peers: the options have substantially narrowed 
down. as we documented earlier, after the mid-’90-ies, business 
start-ups were manageable only in the framework of the clas-
sical market conditions. Market entries were founded on accu-
mulated capital, sometimes on loans, but more often they were 
based on market changes which relied on family traditions. The 
latter was the dominant form in the group of our ‘new’ partners 
that took place in a wide variety of organisational forms. The 
‘new’ entrepreneurs entered the market as reorganisers, perma-
nent operators, or revivers of family businesses which had been 
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working for a long time. in other cases the division of the origi-
nal family business and the agreed separation of the new owner 
established these business careers. Despite the great diversity of 
the stories, it is a rather uniform trait that the family serves as a 
kind of ‘springboard’ for the new entrants. given such an out-
standing importance of the kinship relations, below we take a 
closer look at the complexity and the variations of the unfolding 
roles of these private terrains. But before doing so, we may em-
phasise in advance that these start-ups and the circumstances 
(which somehow formed the persisting strategies) decisively dif-
fer from the conditions which defined the start-ups and devel-
opments of the enterprises of our ‘old’ interview partners. 
The first and most important difference stems from the fact 
that while the ‘old’ businessmen remember the first stage of 
their entrepreneurial past as a heroic age of creation and as a 
peak of their personal performance, the relating of the members 
of the ‘new’ group is more factual and it involves a traditional 
attitude to entrepreneurship as a natural state or as an ‘occupa-
tion’. They consider the established market environment as an 
aptitude, as a natural state and they accommodate their strategy 
to the rules of it. 
at the start, they followed one of two characteristic ways.
Members of the smaller subgroup began their business career 
as traditional small entrepreneurs. it was mainly in the area of 
trading where one still could find some unfilled market niches. 
The starts were usually built on the deliberate search of such 
‘holes’. in fact, systematically searching and smartly utilising 
such market niches meant the core of the business strategy of 
the members of this group. They usually started the business 
with a modest amount of money that was backed by the care-
fully mobilised and cautiously calibrated loans from their ex-
ceptionally extended network of contacts. in their conduct, they 
focus on a definite segment of the market. By clinging to the 
recognised options and by investing in intensive marketing and 
market research activities they extend the supply step by step, 
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yet always in a way that it should follow but never supersede the 
demand. Clearly, the business behaviour of these ‘new’ entrepre-
neurs hardly shows anything in common with the ‘excitement’ 
of their ‘old’ peers whose permanent agitation was generated 
and renewed on a daily basis by the unpredictable forces of the 
transition economy. The ‘new’ businessmen may count securely 
on the market, therefore they may wait calmly until the time for 
the next step arrives. after selecting the suitable profile and fol-
lowing the first successes the business extends in a spectacular 
speed that is not fed any more by shortage but adjusts itself to 
the rules of competition. These rules imply selling more in better 
quality and expecting permanent growth on these simple bases. 
Their observance requires consciousness and patience. as one of 
our ‘new’ partners put it: 
We enjoyed the life of the playboys but remained cool and bal-
anced. We did not rifle the company. We defined a good salary 
(measured by the standard of that time). We took out about 30 
thousand forints a month each. But i have to emphasise that we 
have not gone after the consumer. Practically we were not forced 
to do that because the business went well. it was in ‘91 until ‘93 
or ‘94. Later our yearly turnover tripled. The prosperous com-
pany became even better. [53]
The second type of start-ups, which is represented by the major-
ity of our ‘new’ interview partners, leads through the family 
businesses. in the eyes of the members of this group, continuity 
between the generations is a self-evident and primary goal when 
thinking about a new business. They consider it as the point of 
departure to build on the history, the clearly formed profile and 
the established market relations of the family’s business in all 
future operations, be those actions and interventions based on 
the partial or full takeover or the purposeful reshuffling of the 
existing enterprise. For the most part, members of this group are 
of the opinion that their task is nothing more than taking the 
next step on the foundation of what their parents had created. 
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This usually implies the transformation of the earlier small-scale 
and self-reproductive business into a growing modern enter-
prise by applying well-targeted innovations and by a systematic 
and careful searching of the yet not-covered market niches. 
in this context, this group of the ‘new’ entrepreneurs pays 
particular attention to the accumulated professional experience 
at disposal: in fact their innovations arise on the very basis of 
such long-term practices. Many of them grew up with the busi-
ness: from their 8–10–12 years of age they spent the afternoons 
and the summer holidays on the plant where everybody knew 
them and where they knew everybody and where they gradu-
ally learned the strengths and the weaknesses of the firm from 
all its angles. and when the time comes, the young people who 
grew up with the plant often come to the conclusion that there 
is not too much to the point to continue education beyond sec-
ondary graduation; it seems fully satisfactory for them to envi-
sion a career within the frames of the gradually growing family-
firm. one of the common consequences of this attitude is the 
high occurrence of atypical educational careers in this group: 
although many obtain a degree at last, their return to education 
takes place – as we saw it above – after long years of a break. in 
the meantime, they manage to gain some training, but the only 
base of such autodidactic self-instruction is the company which 
keeps on determining their everyday lives: 
i began to work at my father’s workshop… Later, when we dealt 
with product developments, glass bending caused the most trou-
ble, it had to be found out how to bent glass to the mirrors in an 
appropriate quality. When our first oven was set up according to 
my design and under my supervision, we became capable of pro-
ducing a high quality whereupon it was our firm that got nearly 
all orders in the profession. This experience showed me that if 
i decide something and we accomplish the decision in a proper 
way then i am able to fulfil my plans, and this gave me a good 
feeling, indeed… There was a market demand for this unconven-
tional product which others were not very capable to produce in
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that time. We have had our technology and the knowledge to do 
it. and this is how our business started to grow. in fact there has 
been an unbroken growth since then. We doubled our income 
in nearly each year during the last decade. [44]
Regardless of whether the goal is to develop the firm that was set 
up by the parents or it is to expand a newly established small enter-
prise, it is of profound importance to have in-depth knowledge 
about the market environment. however, the ‘new’ entrepreneurs 
look at this environment in ways that fundamentally differ from 
the approach of their ‘old’ peers. The most important difference 
appears in the two groups’ relationship to the multinational com-
panies. as we saw above, the ‘old’ entrepreneurs often considered 
the multinationals as unbeatable competitors that enjoy marked 
advantages in the market not only due to their strong financial 
background but also due the tax benefits and preferential loans 
provided for them by the hungarian state. They often complained 
that, backed by such multiple advantages, the foreign owned com-
panies threaten their very existence by their aggressive attempts at 
buy-outs. The ‘new’ entrepreneurs, however, valued the presence 
of the multinationals as an endowment and took the structures 
that they created as given. They would not venture into areas 
where they would be unable to avoid competition, but they are 
open to all forms of business contacts with the foreign partners. as 
the stories reveal, in several cases they themselves look for the mar-
ket niches that appear around the multinationals. a good example 
is given by the cooperation with a large motorcar company which 
needed component-producer subcontractors, or another one by 
a nationwide food-chain that sought partners to manage the 
wholesale purchase of milk and meat – the ‘new’ entrepreneurs 
were ready to occupy these niches and build long-term businesses 
on them. They enter such subcontracting with trust and well-
established self-esteem: their earlier successful accomplishments 
and the conviction that such stable foundations are needed in any 
case are enough to approach the gigantic partners without fears 
and worries. 
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at the same time, it is important to see that the plans for sta-
bilising the business through contracts with the multination-
als are translated into rigorously separated activities in strictly 
circumscribed units within the firm or are approached by new 
start-ups. This strategy strikingly differs from the behaviour of 
the ‘old’ businessmen who, as we saw, tried to implement the es-
tablishment of a new line and the leaving behind of the old one 
at once and with the same vigour. The two different strategies 
imply different attitudes and different behaviours. Members 
of the ‘new’ group rarely report glorious events of the ‘heroic 
age’; they acknowledge the dominance of the multinationals as 
a fact with pragmatic implications; they try to counterbalance 
their subordinate role by conscious extension of their business 
independence and by precisely defined purchase-contracts on 
an equal footing; and above all, they feel safe. By using the lan-
guage of sports, one can say that the ‘new generation’ is better 
mastering chess than high jump: they aim at safe and steady 
growth, but they never hope for a speedy break-through, what 
is more, they see such occurrences as fortune’s gift and down-
play their importance. The attitude is fairly typical: 
i always concentrate just on the next step… i never wanted to 
have a big company. i accomplished something and came to the 
opinion that i could have done it better. and the project grew 
spontaneously. But this growth was not driven by any aspira-
tions to become the biggest company in the world. [56]
The imprints of diverse life-experiences
of course the differences of attitudes are deeply embedded into 
the life stories. The ‘old’ entrepreneurs were typically employed 
by large industrial companies, large state farms or agricultural 
cooperatives before the collapse of socialism and these kinds 
of large organisations appeared in their imagination after the 
systemic change as well. There were some who were stimulated 
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by the ‘ordinary’ plant size to buy more and more assets. These 
people feel insecure as owner-managers of a small meat plant 
or of a spare part manufacturing business with a few workers. 
however, they feel they are in the right place once they own 
10–15 such plants.
The family-run company based socialisation of the ‘new’ en-
trepreneurs involves an affinity towards small sizes and trans-
parent dimensions. at a first glance it seems a paradox but it is 
not: their companies have grown remarkably in size but their 
organisation building and managing strategy somehow re-
tained – and suitably adapted – the routines and the patterns 
of the one-time small business. They often organise their high 
grown companies as a chain of small businesses or of a bush 
of small plants because they are at home in reviewing the pro-
duction lines perfectly in these smaller units and because this 
way they are able to have direct or personal contacts with the 
employees. They are convinced that these contacts are not only 
the source of efficiency but they make up the safe foundation 
of the consciously defined ‘corporate lifestyle’ that is frequently 
mentioned as an important constituent of their business. The 
‘small is beautiful’ attitude is for them the key of fast and flexible 
adaptation as well. although it is not dictated by the shortage 
economy any more, but speediness and sharp reactivity keep 
on to be important for being successful in the new world of the 
‘niche economy’. Talent and the local knowledge are necessary 
but not enough in detecting and fast occupying the niches. a 
third component is also needed and this is one’s command over 
an organisation which can be reshuffled according to the arising 
new goals by its apt size and by the relatively simple structure of 
its internal division. 
Despite all the above, the most important differences in the 
business strategies of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ entrepreneurs man-
ifest themselves not so much on the domestic market, rather in 
their relationship to the rest of the world. as we discussed it 
above, this is a complex issue which includes the paths of ac-
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cumulating experiences in young adulthood, the knowledge 
of elsewhere applied company management and professional 
developments, the ability of moving safely and bravely in the 
european – moreover, in the global – space, and the courage to 
engage in such movements. But above all, relationship to the 
outside world includes the command over foreign languages what 
is the single most important precondition, the foundation and 
the drive of all the listed accomplishments. our entrepreneurs 
form the ‘old’ generation saw and clearly formulated it already 
ten years ago that the main obstacle of the growth and the effi-
cient management of their companies and also the main barrier 
for them to enter the european bloodstream was their lack of 
knowledge of foreign languages. 
They tried to counterbalance this disadvantage in many dif-
ferent ways. on the basis of exceptional trust, they involved as 
interpreters some close colleagues who not only could speak the 
language of negotiation (mostly german or english) but who 
also were familiar with the details of the technology and the 
trade and this way were able to control the potential hidden 
traps of the emerging deal. There were other cases when their 
own children were up to this task. They not only enrolled their 
children to distinguished universities but after graduation they 
offered them different elegant jobs within the company. The aim 
of these manoeuvres was to find the organic solution: the young 
owner (owner candidate) – who became more and more familiar 
with her/his role in the company – would manage the business 
transactions. The education abroad of the offspring delivered 
not only some foreign language knowledge to the company but 
it was the source of (in hungary mainly unknown) marketing 
skills, development strategies, and team building methods as 
well. This way the next generation who were educated at pres-
tigious universities abroad brought home whole new cultures 
and topped by their fluency in languages they frequently be-
came the major actors of modernising the company: 
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We are in the middle of a qualitative change which is propelled 
by educating the head of all development: my son. abroad he 
learned all what is needed for our development. i continuously 
learn from him – and of course also from my colleagues. Now i 
feel that after ten years i am competent, but this competence will 
be surpassed by another ten years; i learn but my knowledge will 
never reach their standard. [9]
in many cases in the ‘old’ group, the lack of linguistic knowl-
edge slowly became the barrier of modernising the company. 
Regular follow-up of the foreign professional journals faltered 
and then ultimately ceased; it became more and more difficult 
to organise study-trips abroad and thus professional exchanges 
dropped out of the business routines; and through all these, 
expanding relationships with the foreign representatives of the 
profession could not be maintained and slowly died out and this 
way the foundation of organically integrating into the market 
became lost. it is needless to say: the old contacts dating back to 
the socialist times hardly could function as substitutes in pro-
viding dynamic drive, rather they deepened vulnerability and 
traditionalism. No wonder that the majority of the ‘old’ entrepre-
neurs feel safe mostly within the country. if they expanded their 
business in the course of the past ten years this was made in the 
direction of the less developed countries of the east-european 
region: Romania, Serbia, ukraine – sometimes Slovakia – were 
the target countries of their careful steps but a few years later 
they usually exited these markets as well.
in comparison to their ‘old’ peers, members of the ‘new’ group 
enjoy unmatchable advantages on the terrains of language skills 
and knowledge of the foreign world. as we have seen, when 
they started their fist business they already had command over 
one or two foreign (Western) languages. This advantage partly 
followed from the age difference: being ten-fifteen years young-
er than those in the ‘old’ group implied a turn in education 
whereby the once enforced and ineffective Russian classes were 
replaced by teaching Western languages. The replacement was 
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more than technical: it gave new inspirations and lasting motiva-
tions. No wonder that quite a few among our younger interview 
partners remembered gaining usable basics in languages during 
the four years of secondary courses. it was equally important 
that the parents often gave higher priority to language learning 
than to obtaining a university degree. in their eyes it was pretty 
much the same whether the young person continued studying 
beyond the secondary level or not but it was almost sure that the 
parents contracted a language teacher for extra private lessons 
or enrolled him or her in at least weeks-long intense language 
courses. The demand for language skills seems to be democra-
tised by now: as the interviews reveal, these days the acquisition 
of proper linguistic knowledge is as important for the working-
class parents as for parents from the intelligentsia. The prevail-
ing differences entail only some practicalities: given the lack of 
contacts, working-class parents usually find it more difficult to 
identify the best institutions and the most appropriate forms of 
language teaching, however, with the help of a teacher or a col-
league they succeed at last.
as was discussed earlier, the emphasis put on the acquisition 
of at least one foreign language was just one among the essen-
tial constituents of the training of the young generation. The 
accumulation of experiences in foreign worlds enjoyed similar 
importance in their eyes. No matter whether the parents consid-
ered their children as successors or they supported other career 
paths, roving abroad for one or two years after graduation has 
become a general norm in these families. Without exception, all 
our interview partners from the ‘new’ generation were engaged 
in such journeys at their age of 18–19 years. The destinations 
were mainly the german speaking countries: according to the 
recollections, the foreign experiences were mainly collected in 
austria, germany, and Switzerland. in most of the cases, the ac-
tual activities that the youngsters engaged in had no direct con-
nections to their later occupational trajectory. at this stage, the 
point was not the build-up of a professional career but the ac-
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cumulation of life experiences in the broadest sense of the term. 
hence, it did not cause any troubles for the young to earn a liv-
ing by carrying out unskilled physical labour or by engaging in 
low-level administrative work. in some more fortunate cases it 
was a relative living abroad who helped to find some better jobs 
that often entailed the additional advantage of providing the 
base for later lasting business relations of the young visitor. 
Beyond all such experiences, becoming acquainted with the 
foreign world is  important for the ‘new’ businessmen from oth-
er angles as well. Those who are living abroad for years have 
the opportunity to gain some insight into previously unknown 
work cultures and management methods. in this regard, shar-
ing the perspective of the blue collar workers in looking at the 
structure ‘from below’ might render some extra benefits. Such 
adventuresome experiences are well fitting into the peculiar 
(self)-educational programme of the young entrepreneurs. as 
they reflect on those times from a distance, they recognise the 
importance of the early impressions in shaping their corporate 
philosophy and see the imprints also in influencing their think-
ing about the composition and the internal human relations of 
their company’s workforce and, above all, in forging the desir-
able spirit at the workplace. at another level, those years abroad 
were associated also with creating the foundations of financial 
independence. For these young people, the higher than hun-
garian salaries gave the opportunity for some savings that were 
enough to establish their own conditions of life. after returning 
home with these spiritual and material goods in their pocket, the 
young wanderers entered a rather difficult and sensitive task35: 
leaving behind the traditional relations of parents and children, 
35 The restructuring or the roles within a family is not a conflict-free process. 
The paternal authority may not diminish but, at the same time, the business 
requires a generational change that, in turn, involves the redistribution of 
authorities and the transference of certain responsibilities. as the interviews 
reveal, the challenges caused some difficulties for both fathers and sons. in 
this context, efforts for maintaining the mutuality of trust and willingness for 
finding suitable compromises are basic issues for both parties. We will show 
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they put in efforts to create some kind of partnership with their 
parents. Based on this partnership, they founded their first in-
dependent business. even if their newly formed enterprise for-
mally remained under the umbrella of the larger family unit, the 
independence of it as a distinct entity was acknowledged by the 
parents and the employees as well.
Diversities in the composition of social capital
The interviews demonstrate that our partners of the ‘new’ gen-
eration took particular care of their accumulated social capital 
which was more precious for them than money: a few years after 
starting their own business, their foreign friends and often even 
their former chiefs appeared on the stage as business partners 
and contracting parties. Based on the old relations and the com-
mon grounds of the one-time experiences, these relations usu-
ally become the foundations of smartly designed and mutually 
beneficial businesses. By comparing their orientations to those of 
the ‘old’ generation, one may observe a remarkable geographical 
shift, too. By combining the acquired skills, the cultural experi-
ences abroad, local knowledge, and the sensing of the local envi-
ronment, the ‘new’ entrepreneurs turn towards the West in their 
attempts at expansion. They feel that the european space and 
sometimes even the overseas world belong to them, they sense 
how to approach these worlds, and therefore it is not a problem 
for them to start a business anywhere beyond the hungarian 
border. it seems very important for them to be involved in the 
Western ’bloodstream’; therefore, they see it a personal task to 
constantly refresh and to keep up-to-date the knowledge that is 
required for maintaining such an involvement. They are surpris-
ingly well informed about the different taxation systems as well 
as about the particular market regulations in all the potential 
areas and regions that they might approach and this knowledge 
below the evolving patterns for overcoming the arising difficulties that may 
prevail for quite some time. 
13 0  
is of utmost importance for them in making well-informed 
and secure business decisions. The less developed regions of 
eastern europe are not on their palette. ukraine, Romania or 
countries of the Balkans were mentioned by them at most as 
sources of easily available cheap labour force, but these countries 
and regions practically never were considered as fields of new 
investments. 
The above important differences help us to interpret the di-
vergent paths of the two generations. as we see, the ‘old’ genera-
tion used up its potentials and also its capital. Their resources 
have shrunk and their assets have melted. For the ‘new’ entre-
preneurs the major source of trusting the future is the obtained 
knowledge and the implied feeling of self-assurance that help 
them to manoeuvre in the Western economic space. Based on 
the acquired ‘westernised’ skills and knowledge they develop 
a high degree of adaptability that their ‘old’ peers cannot even 
dream about. it is their deliberate strategy to establish busi-
nesses that, if needed, easily can switch to new activities and 
that equally easily can be transferred to another country or into 
another profile. For the members of the ‘new’ generation, the 
strategy of ‘multi-pillar footing’ – this widely shared lifestyle, at-
titude and practice – implies constructing a multi-focal structure 
as the foundation of their business that allows them to adaptive-
ly shifting the weight of different activities. in contrast, the ‘old’ 
entrepreneurs withdraw to such multi-focal structures driven 
by defensive attitudes, and if they engage in such an orientation, 
they mostly do it by creating a horizontal chain of small enter-
prises that, apart from the unity of ownership, are not in any 
particular relations with each others. 
These different orientations directly affect how the members 
of the two groups think about the employment policies of their 
companies. as we saw above, in case of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs, 
the careful preservation of the group of the bests among the once 
inherited workforce provided the base of the business as well as 
it guaranteed safety and also served as a usable springboard for 
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setting up the human profile of the new enterprise. This kind 
of lasting though sometimes rather discomforting attachments 
can be reasoned by the deep-grained production routines and 
also by the ambivalences of the commonly shared socialist past. 
additionally, also the size of the company mattered: regardless 
of the extent in the reduction of the workforce, the ‘old’ entre-
preneurs still maintained rather sizeable businesses with several 
tens – if not several hundreds – of employees. after finding the 
balance between reduction and preservation, these ‘condensed’ 
companies usually slowly turned to the most profitable parts of 
their revived endeavours.36
When defining their position in the developing market 
economy, the ‘new’ entrepreneurs applied an utterly different 
perspective. in understanding the departure between the ori-
entations and the behaviour of the two groups, the difference 
in the customary sizes of their companies and plants turns out 
to be of great importance. it is worth to recall that, in contrast 
to the ‘old’ businessmen who have worked with large units in 
their entire life, the majority of the ‘new’ entrepreneurs started 
their entrepreneurial careers by engaging in the families’ small 
enterprise. apart from the members of the family, these start-
ing businesses usually employed just one or two ‘outsiders’ who 
were, for the most part, old friends or proven fellow workers of 
the parents. Through the glass of this closed small unit all others 
appear as ‘strangers’ who are typically unknown and lack any 
personal characteristics. The sharp distinction between the ‘in-
ner core’ and the employees’ collective is maintained all along. 
The borders are clear and these function as real frontiers: em-
ployees never join the family. The reverse is also true: the role 
of the family members is clearly defined and it is well separated 
from that of the ‘outsider’ employees. Plentiful ideas and ambi-
tions and ideas arise on the family side of the strict border and 
36 Those who came from the second economy of the socialist system run 
typically networks of businesses and connected plants. The units in such 
chains usually were bigger than the average small businesses.
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important decisions are taken within this circle. at the same 
time, one cannot recognise distinguishable profiles and figures 
on the other side of the dividing line. at this end, the relations 
are regulated by general rules and contracts that are lacking any 
personal involvements and human characteristics.
When the expansion of the business requires new employ-
ments, the pattern that this ‘new’ generation of the entrepre-
neurs turns to is exactly the same as what they follow with re-
gard to any other constituents: they formulate the task according 
to the requested professional criteria and then fulfil it according 
to established ‘technologies’. although personal contacts have a 
certain importance in the conditions of general distrust, the se-
lection process ultimately follows the routines that are applied 
in cases when the candidate comes at the recommendation of a 
head-hunting firm or through advertisements. and at the rare 
occasions when people with extraordinary and ‘scarce’ skills are 
sought for special posts, the ways of making bonding contacts 
are shaped according to the rules of management science and 
follow western patterns. one of our ‘new’ interview partners 
describes the process in the following way:
Like anyone else, we recruit people by mobilising our own con-
nections. We employ a hR manager we advertise jobs and inform 
our acquaintanceship. Then people come to be interviewed, we 
assess their knowledge and skills and then we select those with 
whom we would like to work together. and then the decision is 
theirs whether they also want to work with us… The specialty 
of our firm is my promise to all employees that if the company 
can go on the stock exchange or if it would be sold, all those 
currently in employment will get their share of the income. This 
method is pretty standard in the united States. in hungary it is 
less popular but i hope it will motivate a great number of people. 
unfortunately, many colleagues do not understand the essence 
of this offer, but i hope that slowly everybody will get it. [39]
The market relations between the firm and its employees also 
require the avoidance of developing strong personal ties. The 
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‘new’ generation does not consider it their task to take a share in 
the social responsibility for increasing the extremely low level of 
employment: they look at this issue exclusively from a business 
perspective. at the same time, their ‘matter of fact’ orientation 
is coupled with a significant transformation of the relationship 
between the company’s owner(s) and its employees. The heart 
of this transformation is to provide less ‘caring’ paternalism but 
to render more and better services for the entire workforce. our 
partners often list these provisions as parts of their ‘legal obliga-
tions’ but by having a closer look at these new ‘civil’ partnerships 
one may recognise a well prepared business philosophy in the 
background. They are ready to acknowledge that high-quality 
work can only be expected from people who are respected and 
who enjoy the clear expressions of an attitude of apreciation 
towards them. as part of this recognition, the ‘new’ entrepre-
neurs are ready to express their esteem by providing an attractive 
work environment with a clean bathroom, a well equipped club 
and library, a nice dining room and sometimes even by investing 
into the support of the local football team – all these are seen by 
them as parts of building the ‘brand’ of the company. Such invest-
ments into expressing respect may become a major incentive for 
the employees: a further important constituent of the ‘new’ entre-
preneurs’ democratic orientation is their readiness to provide 
opportunities for upward mobility for them. as one of them put it:
We are, so to speak, flexible in finding and selecting the right 
location where the necessary labour force is available and where 
we are not short of expertise. The key of our and of the com-
pany’s successes is a very important thing: we were able to find 
well trained, motivated, and dedicated people who wish to be 
employed at a stable workplace in the long term. and we were 
able to keep them here… There is a great emphasis on the atten-
tion to the employees… The workplace atmosphere is excellent, i 
think, the level of fluctuation is very low. There are many in our 
upper management who started their career in a lower position 
but developed and became one of the managers here. [36]
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Meanwhile new values are formulated. The company’s employ-
ment strategy is part of drawing a strong market profile: not 
only the products but also the people who construct and create 
them have to have unmistakable qualities. The demand for high 
quality is among the most important constituents of the suc-
cessful business, therefore everybody from the top managers to 
the traders have to be involved in the cooperation that quality 
management necessitates. The association is clear:
it is a story of authenticity. you have to be authentic. you have 
to have your expertise in what you are doing… you can’t be a 
flamboyant deceiver in today’s world. This was the reason why i 
trained myself so intensively. The issue at stake is what you achieve 
on your own in marketing and also in the technology… The other 
factors like personal connections serve only as refinements; you 
can’t produce by focusing only on your relational capital. [34]
in this context the earlier described orientation of building the 
business on the ‘holes’ in the market niches plays an important 
role. While the ‘old’ entrepreneurs look at the multinationals 
as rather dangerous ‘wild creatures’ and try to keep away from 
them, their ‘new’ peers look at these organisations in their cus-
tomary pragmatic way when matters of employment are consid-
ered. They attempt to take advantage from the given conditions 
by acknowledging that the ‘multies’ are not only investors, pro-
ducers and traders on the hungarian market but they are also 
the conveyers of certain principles and images that drive them 
in slowly transforming the domestic labour force. and because 
the appropriate forms of training are missing for the most part, 
our ‘new’ partners find it particularly useful to acquire highly 
skilled workers who were trained at one or another multina-
tional company: 
i may say that employment is somewhat more mixed at us. Many 
are employed here who came from the management of a ‘multi’
either because of being fed up with the work there or because 
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the company was closed down or for any other reasons. These 
are very qualified people; the multinationals are excellent in 
training and those who came over all are very well trained, 
experienced, smart, disciplined and reflective managers. But 
this is still not the typical case: the majority of the leadership 
came from among those who have climbed the ladder within 
our own firm.37
as our interviews indicate, despite their pragmatic-technocratic 
attitude the ‘new’ entrepreneurs are as good in keeping on with 
the company’s workforce as their ‘old’ peers are. although the 
former often have been forced to fire a part of their workforce in 
the years of the world economic recession since 2008, they made 
strong efforts to limit lay-offs to a minimum. Further, they tried 
to manage such discontinuities by leaving the doors open for 
the ousted employees to return when the firm’s prospects turn 
to the better. apparently, this is a great concern: 
There were 800 employees at the company in 2008 and this 
number fell to around 700 by now. The number of employees 
diminished less than the turnover but we think, and we mean it, 
that our colleagues represent the greatest value here. This is why 
we made all efforts to limit the lay-offs to a necessary minimum 
and tried to avoid going beyond this. [37]
Regardless of age and the type of the enterprise, the atmosphere 
of the workplace matters for all our interviewees. Nevertheless, 
the methods of taking care of it seem to be different between 
the two groups: in opposition to the paternalistic approach 
of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs, their ‘new’ peers, while putting 
personal appreciation into the focus, seem to forge more dis-
tanced relations with their employees. The departure manifests 
itself in slightly different approaches to team building as well. 
although our ‘new’ interviewees emphasise that in their capac-
37 These sentences are from an interview from the year 2000. our partner 
was one of the ‘old’ group who refused to give us an interview in the second 
round.
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ity as employers they aim at establishing good relations with 
all their employees, they mean rather depersonalised contacts 
and hardly ever use the term of the ‘homely workplace’ which 
is, in turn, a frequent expression among the members of the 
‘old’ group. For the ‘new’ entrepreneurs, the cornerstones of the 
good working relations are politeness and respect, but they are 
not particularly inclined to provide some sort of charitable sup-
port. They consider it a cardinal issue to pay decent wages and 
salaries to all their employees. The importance of this issue is 
tellingly demonstrated by our interviewees’ recurring reference 
to the preservation of the level of payments as one of the great-
est achievements amid the difficulties of declining performance 
and rising taxes. all our ‘new’ partners report that ‘the rate of 
fluctuation is very low at us’ and they explain this development 
by focusing on creating trust at the workplace. They assume that 
the respectful jobs that they provide represent the ‘islands’ of 
stability that are safeguarded by preserving ‘normality’ in the 
present turbulent world. ‘Normality’ as a guiding principle is 
as much of key importance for them as employers as it is in con-
ducting their personal lives. ‘Normality’ appears as the opposi-
tion of both extravagance and neglect: 
i don’t think that we are of some extraordinary character. how-
ever, it may be that we are. indeed, we provide better salaries 
than the market average and everybody is employed by set con-
tracts. These contracts include paying social security contribu-
tions for them that might be unimportant for some but it matters 
a lot for others. and we also provide some fringe benefits that 
are not very high but still… Further, there are some additional 
provisions paid by the company, for example, people can attend 
english language courses at the cost of the firm and they enjoy 
some other services. [39]
in sum, corporate employment policy has gradually become a 
highly professionalised domain which the ‘new’ entrepreneurs 
of the past decades cultivate by elevated expertise, refined rou-
tines, and a good degree of depersonalisation. This technocratic 
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and professional orientation has exerted impact on the behav-
iour of their ‘old’ peers as well. although the importance of the 
emphasised values still remained different in the two groups, 
the influence of the one-time socialist employment policy is 
declining. Those who are still ‘grand’ entrepreneurs among the 
‘old’ attempt to shift the sensitive issues of employment and 
dismissals to newly employed experts while they vindicate the 
impersonal terrain of strategy-building for themselves. a result 
of these gradual shifts is a turn in how they view their firm in 
its current form: the earlier emphasis on the ‘homely’ character 
of the workplace is slowly fading away and it brings about the 
disappearance of the anxieties and fears of a sudden discovery 
of past wrongdoings and conflicts as well. 
Likewise, social responsibility is also among the slowly fading 
topics. our ‘old’ interview partners are on the opinion that they 
are not responsible for the prevailing property relations neither 
have they anything to do with the corporate world that emerged 
in hungarian economy; the new structure simply cannot be 
translated into personalised roles and relations. in the case of 
the ‘new’ entrepreneurs the question of responsibility does not 
even surface: following from their ‘market-niche based’ strategy, 
the framework of their thinking about employment is strictly 
restricted to their own firm and within this framework their pri-
mary role is seen as to safeguard high-standard professionalism 
and the fairness of contractual relations. They define themselves 
as private persons and players and this basic approach appar-
ently pervades all aspects of their entrepreneurial activity.
While we observed a real generational turnover between the 
two groups of entrepreneurs in their ways of property acquisi-
tion and the methods of business management, now we can add 
that regarding their perceptions of the social environment – and 
employment as an important part of it –, the behaviours of the 
two groups show clear signs of a gradual conversion. although 
the reasons differ, the ‘old’ and ‘new’ entrepreneurs arrived at 
a common philosophy by today. This common new orientation 
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can be characterised by deep resignation and by the giving up 
of all aspirations to influence macro-level politics and to have a 
say in the making of a comprehensive economic policy. instead, 
the new philosophy builds on the outstanding importance of 
the micro-worlds that are regarded the terrains of creativity and 
that can provide ample scope for personal ambitions and also 
for the collective preserving and practising of a set of precious 
values.
as we show in detail below, the new philosophy has grown 
out of widespread disappointments and of a good deal of de-
pressing experiences. at its root, one can identify the apparent 
worsening of the relations of trust that is amplified by deep 
doubts concerning the western respect towards hungary and 
also by the worries regarding the deteriorating european po-
sition of the country. The promisingly emerging civilian elite 
of the first years of the transition backed off in many respects: 
as we show it below, it gave up its ambition for providing pat-
terns and leadership worth to follow. This thin social stratum 
‘privatised’ its role and activity and it turned its ambitions from 
spreading new values in society-at-large into more indirect and 
modestly identifiable domains – mainly into culture. and as to 
the ‘new’ generation, its members accentuated the new tenden-
cies with full confidence and pride.
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MaNiFeSTaTioNS oF The DeCLiNe oF TRuST
as it already came up in various contexts of the above chapters, 
the withdrawal of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs, their ever growing 
defensiveness, and the shrinking of their businesses hardly can 
be explained without delving into the massive deterioration of 
the relations of trust that manifests itself in many forms ranging 
from the spreading of mutual suspicions and insinuation to the 
all-embracing questioning of the fairness and clarity of property 
acquisition and to the ever louder repeated allegations of corrup-
tion. as we will demonstrate it, these processes and phenomena 
left their manifold deep impacts on the civilian and business atti-
tudes of the members of this group and the bad experiences also 
significantly affected their views about the social relations-at-large 
as well as their ideas about the future. above all these, studying 
the decaying relations of trust is all the more important because 
the symptoms of the falling apart of social cohesion signal impor-
tant structural changes: the speedy spreading of the family-run 
businesses hardly can be interpreted without their consideration. 
The two processes of decaying trust, on the one hand, and with-
drawal into the private domain, on the other, apparently condition 
each other while also accentuate each other’s impact.38
38 in the course of the past decade, an impressing number of studies have 
been dedicated to the impacts of trust on the economy. Many of these studies 
considered the typical reasons and forms of decaying trust as a characteristic 
phenomenon of the post-socialist transition while they also explored the 
associations between trust and fairness, on the one hand, and the normality of 
the market relations, on the other (kornai–Rose–ackermann–Rothstein 2005, 
Medgyesi–Tóth 2005, Tóth 2009, Csite–Major 2010, Muraközy 2012).
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although the relevant literature presents the overweight of 
the family businesses among the business forms as a general 
phenomenon,39 the reasons behind are manifold. out of them 
the forming of a defensive position and the high intensity of 
such an orientation seem to be characteristic primarily in the 
Central and east european region and the indicators signal their 
outstanding importance in hungary.40
When looking at the issues of trust and its recent erosion, it 
would be misleading to search only for contemporary factors. 
The least can we do this by considering the convincing argu-
ments of Francis Fukuyama who demonstrated the deep cultural 
embeddedness of trust relations by a careful analysis of a large 
number of american, Japanese, korean, italian, and german ex-
amples. his analyses show that the level of trust, its importance 
in interpersonal relations, the frames of its everyday practis-
ing and its impact on people’s daily conduct follow historically 
evolving cultural patterns that imbue the forms of cooperation, 
association and also the individual ways of interest representa-
tion. The gradual institutionalisation of the micro-sociological 
practices over years, decades and centuries and their transla-
tion into the language of the rule of law have developed diverse 
forms of expressing trust and sanctioning offences against it that 
might greatly differ by country and also by national, social, eth-
nic and religious groups. The different contents deeply imprint 
the national economic structures and influence the tacitly agreed 
norms of society and also the behaviour of the actors of the mar-
ket who sometimes are not fully aware of such determinations.  
39 Based on estimations, their share is 92–95 per cent in the uSa and 72–90 
per cent in the older member states of the european union (Baskin 2001, 
Mandl 2009).
40 See the interesting analysis of Dóra győrffy about the recent trends of 
evaporating trust in the post-socialist societies. The author demonstrates the 
negative trends on the basis of the recent eurobarometer data. She shows that 
trust-deficit is a widespread phenomenon in the post-socialist region and that 
the hungarian data signal worrying tendencies of loosening social cohesion 
(györffy 2012).
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By focusing on the domestic relations it is the works of István 
Bíbó and Jenő Szűcs that come to one’s mind. Their writings teach 
us that the low level of trust and the historical delicacy of its 
institutionalisation were (and we may add: remained) the main 
causes behind the delayed civic development and its repeatedly 
manifesting fragility throughout the Central and east-european 
region (Bibó 1986b, Bibó 1986c, Szűcs 1991). given the limitations 
of the current discussion, we may present here only the main 
conclusions of their refined reasoning and the demonstration of 
their telling historical examples. in the frames of our book we 
may evoke only short conclusions of the nuanced reasoning and 
implicative historical examples of the two authors. Their works 
suggest that in the wake of the one-way experiences of long 
years and decades of the successive generations distrust has pro-
foundly integrated into the structural order and it imbued the 
relationships of communities. Deeply felt distrust determined 
the relations of everyday communication and it has shaped the 
practices of institutional functioning. Distrust belonged to the 
basic experiences of the contacting social groups: servant and 
lord were suspiciously looking at each other. Both sides feared 
the violation of their binding contract by misuses and frauds and 
both were constantly worried about insinuation for such deeds. 
and things were not different in the industrial-urban conditions 
of the modern age either. Regardless of the size of the business, 
the factory manager or the small artisan employing a few as-
sistants looked at their workers with distrust and with constant 
readiness to expect them to steal or to consciously perform with 
poor quality. at the same time, the workers – reasoned by their 
frequent bad experiences in the past – were constantly worried 
about the arbitrary curtailment of their wages and allowances. 
Driven by such fears, they employed a defensive attitude that 
was inspired by a mixture of open antipathy and self-dictated 
subordination to their boss whom they regarded their ‘lord’. 
These micro-level relationships were organised into a system 
and were intensified by general distrust in the state that was 
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fuelled by the repeated experiences of facing unexpectedly in-
troduced taxes and duties and the raid-like shake-downs of the 
state agencies. 
The four decades of socialism nurtured general distrust with 
new experiences. The ‘denunciation culture’ of the early years 
and of the post-‘56 decade planted the seeds of mutual suspicion 
even in communities that had been the terrains of solidarity and 
that had provided protection for their members before. The de-
liberate and systematic disruption of these structures belonged 
to the tool kit of building up the totalitarian power system and 
the emerging all-embracing relations of fear confirmed the ‘suc-
cess’ of the project. Besides, the historically acquired skills and 
routines of the public administration in imposing unexpected 
rulings of extra duties, their deep-going interventions into per-
sonal life, the command-like relocations and the forceful move-
ment of people into new positions, the pointless but inescap-
able forced measures of all kinds destroyed on a daily basis the 
relationships of togetherness that otherwise would have been 
essential for the healthy development of society. at the same 
time, while these practices of multi-sided coercion precluded 
the remnants of the reserves of trust and of a sense of security, 
they diminished self-confidence on the personal and social lev-
els as well. The spreading of the feelings of insecurity gave rise 
to a behaviour of permanent readiness to attack others and to 
be prepared for self-defence against others’ attacks – and this 
behaviour soon became the norm. instead of being built on well-
founded self-awareness and personal strength, the heralded 
strategies of self-defence were moulded of smartness in counter-
attacks and in often cruel assaults.
at a general level all these experiences were coupled with the 
enduring state of troubled national self-respect and confusions 
in sensing the nation as the united community of shared histori-
cal values. as the respective passages of the work of Zoltán Szabó 
convincingly demonstrate, with the exception of a few, short-
lived revolutionary moments like those in 1848 and 1956, ‘be-
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ing hungarian’ never could become the source of integration. 
instead, claims on national identity repeatedly turned into gen-
erating deep divisions with far-reaching and severe historical 
consequences (Szabó 1999). The accumulated negative experi-
ences seriously damaged the integrative power of the state as 
the embodiment of the uniting institutions of society. instead of 
strengthening cohesion, the institutions of state-power were re-
currently caught by sharp economic and political fights among 
the various competing lobbies. Such a state of permanent strug-
gles continuously weakened – and weakens till date – the poten-
tials of the state’s institutions in contributing to the elaboration 
and consolidation of an order that would be based on coopera-
tion and solidarity. 
The only aim to evoke this sketchy picture was to emphasise 
that one cannot consider the dramatic spreading of distrust in 
our days as a brand new phenomenon having no antecedents in 
history. it is important to sort out what can be accounted for as 
the revival of old reflexes as distinct from those occurrences that 
are owed to the work of new structural and behavioural ten-
sions in the background. Such a separation of the factors is only 
a theoretical possibility. Maybe this is the reason why the scales 
which measure the trust-content of different relationships (in-
cluding the indices for measuring economic prospects) exclude 
the historical dimension and reflect only on the contemporary 
issues of trust and distrust. 
Despite all the involved difficulties, it seems essential to us 
to make a selection between the old and the new layers of dis-
trust. our main reason for this is to seek explanations for the 
spectacular amplitudes of trust and distrust during the three 
decades that are covered by our interviews. The initial recovery 
of confidence in personal and business relations and in politics 
was followed by a gradual decline and later by rapid deteriora-
tion. as we try to demonstrate in what follows, the tacit general 
agreement about the necessity to get rid of the old order (that 
embraced the majority of society) and the broad consensus on 
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the peaceful way of the transition were remarkable sources of 
enhancing trust and cohesion. at the same time, widespread 
disappointment over the later developments and the feeling 
of losses among broad social groups provided inspirations for 
scapegoating. The first step on this way was the pulling out of 
trust in the righteous conduct of selected subjects – among oth-
ers, of the main actors of our book, namely the hungarian large 
and medium-size entrepreneurs. in order to take a closer look 
at these turns, it seems rewarding to go back to the second half 
of the 1980s and to also consider the developments of the first 
years of the systemic changes. 
as we documented in detail in our earlier book, there were 
significant changes in the life- and career paths of the investigat-
ed entrepreneurs in the second half of the 1980s. These were the 
years when our ‘old’ interviewees made the first important steps 
towards a yet vaguely perceived change that later proved the 
turning point of their new entrepreneurial career. These steps 
pointed towards private business: on the one hand, by found-
ing small independent units called corporate economic associa-
tions or by launching small cooperatives they took the lead in 
marketisation within the socialist sector. on the other hand, by 
launching family businesses, the bravest among them became 
private market players in an open form. (True, simultaneously, 
most kept their jobs in the state sector as well.) The radical re-
structuring of the relationships between the managers and the 
employees and the development of trustful cooperation were of 
vital importance for stabilising mainly those new enterprises 
that came into being through privatisation or via the buy-out of 
former socialist firms.
By rendering meaningful work and good income for people 
in different positions of the corporate hierarchy (also including 
the workers), the new owners – primarily managers from the old 
regime – simultaneously played the roles of the employer and 
the protector of workers’ interests. in the bargains with the rep-
resentatives of the ministries or the company’s management they 
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never represented only themselves but stood up on behalf of the 
entire community. The successful bargains were acknowledged 
by the employees’ trust, by unconditional recognition of their 
performance, and by the declaration of a new loyalty that the col-
lective was not reluctant to express in straightforward and open 
forms. These novel contents of their new-sprung leading role 
helped them to forget about some earlier critiques and doubts. 
if the new owner-manager successfully navigated the collective, 
it did not really matter why years or decades ago s/he joined the 
Communist Party and even that one once fulfilled the role of 
party secretary became forgettable. 
in the case of those large and medium-size entrepreneurs 
who had started their business as private entrepreneurs it was 
less confidence than recognition and respect that dominated 
the firm’s internal relations. The collectives considered the new 
leaders and their businesses as some kind of flagship corpora-
tions and they tried to cultivate the existing relationships with 
the faint hope of the option to follow the owners on their route.  
Nevertheless, the demonstrated confidence in both forms 
unified these two groups of the owner-managers that otherwise 
differed in many respects: nobody questioned their leading role 
in the transformation. But this assessment and the involved sup-
port would not last for long.
after the short-lived years of a consensual positive assess-
ment and an unconditional support of the new capitalists, aver-
sions and attacks that had been hoped to vanish forever began 
to dominate the scenes of public life. in the accelerating current 
of privatisation in the 1990s, the new owners and co-owners 
came mainly from among those who as the one-time organisers 
of firm-based economic associations or small cooperatives had 
acted as the key figures in the earlier process of quasi-marketi-
sation (their leading role in economic transformation was dis-
cussed above). in many of the cases, their sincerity associated 
with their leading role was now questioned in retrospect. They 
clearly sensed the deterioration of the climate and the headway 
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of the suspicious – sometimes hostile – attitudes. one of them 
expressed this change in the following way: 
one of the problems, one of the massive social problems is that 
there were and are prejudices and jealousy concerning the large 
entrepreneurs. The situation has deteriorated in this regard. This 
is one of the greatest problems of hungary, i think: jealousy 
is huge here. and the other is that the public servants are not 
business-friendly at all. [29]
increasing anti-entrepreneurial sentiments were signalled by 
the subsequent surveys of TáRki at the end of the 1990s as well. 
The trend that emerged from the data of different investigations 
was characterised by an analyst who summarised the main 
results in the following way: 
When impoverishment became a mass phenomenon, enrich-
ment of a few evoked rage: richness heavily irritated the masses 
and became the main source of jealousy. The intensity of jeal-
ousy has somewhat eased by now because people accommo-
dated to the new structure and the prevailing inequalities. The 
representation of the successful entrepreneur as a dishonest 
person is in fact a social psychological phenomenon. Those who 
became the losers of the transition reason their hatred this way: 
»i am someone who has worked with great intensity and honesty 
in the past five years but i still experienced failure in bringing 
home an income that paralleled the one years before. in light of 
this, it is simply unimaginable that others who became rich fol-
lowed honourable paths. i am sure they stole, cheated and lied, 
because if the acquisition of wealth was dependent on personal 
ambitions and qualities, then i as a hard-working person should 
be able to make big money.« given that the environment does 
not change and he is unable to break out from his unwanted 
position in the passing years, this idea becomes his belief and 
his world-view. This attitude has its impact on the new rich, of 
course. every second among the large entrepreneurs feels that 
the public relates to him with a good deal of hostility. Four out of 
ten entrepreneurs stated that they were definitely influenced by 
 147
the way the men of the street think about them… it is surprising 
that, in addition to counting with the discontent of the masses as 
eroding comfort, one quarter of the large capitalists count with 
this factor as something that undermines the security of their 
business. (kovács 1999)
according to the ever more popular accusations, the emerging 
large entrepreneurs never did anything else but pursue their 
own private gains. The conversions from the small coopera-
tives or firm-based economic associations were retrospectively 
revalued through the prism of the new positions in private 
business and the arising criticism became filled with allegations 
about the new owners’ malicious calculations. This process was 
accompanied by ambivalence, indeed. For the employees who 
were able to keep their jobs acknowledged the performance of 
the new entrepreneurs who became their employers through 
privatisation (and who were their bosses before); at the same 
time they felt bitterness over being excluded from the process 
of the great redistribution of wealth and fortune. The feelings 
of ambivalence were spreading. opinion surveys in the ’90-ies 
revealed as a general and overriding judgement that the transi-
tion was full of fraud: people held that “there are no honest ways 
to get access to wealth and property.” (Tóth 2009)
The negative attitudes towards the new owners were coupled 
with public outrage against the emerging injustices: on the one 
hand, the foundations of income and wealth inequalities were 
questioned on broad grounds, on the other hand, general anger 
accompanied the apparent postponement (if not suspension) of 
political impeachment for past misconducts. Because of their 
deep involvement in the old regime, the grand entrepreneurs 
yet again could become potential targets. Many of them were 
members if not right away activists of the Communist Party, 
hence they were often criticised that they got into their new 
owner positions actually through mobilising their preserved 
political connections. Such attacks looked painfully unfair from 
the standpoint of the involved entrepreneurs. our interview 
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partners evaluated references to their old party connections as 
expressions of ingratitude on the part of those whose entire col-
lective enjoyed the benefits and the safety that they provided 
by their massive investments into performing privatisation and 
managing the new private company. hence, it is not the web of 
their old connections, but their inventive and intense working 
that mattered in getting ahead; and taken from this perspective, 
their personal gains are just but one of the aspects that can be 
taken on board. Not their former connections but their inten-
sive and inventive activity was the source of achievements and 
their personal benefit was only one of the respectable segments. 
Furthermore, the anti-entrepreneurial attitude of the public 
warned them that they could even lose their property (or what 
they assigned as their property): while they betted everything 
on that horse, the lacking legitimacy of entrepreneurship may 
rush into danger the whole private economy. and in the course 
of profound questioning the past could be drawn on stage from 
another angle. it is then no surprise that the past ten-fifteen 
years were accompanied with outright fears for many among 
our ‘old’ partners. Their fears were sometimes irrationally exag-
gerated: “One acts on forced tracks… But this needs trust at the top 
level. And it is important to live without threats. Threats go along the 
whole structure nowadays. Fear is present everywhere, anybody could 
be imprisoned.”[11]
in some other cases it was the intangible forces of politics that 
came to the fore:
in the days of the change and after, i was never denunciated 
as a communist. But i was a bit afraid of that. i was not afraid 
of people in my close environment but i was afraid of politics. 
i was sure that none of my staff members would come to me to 
say: »you are a dammed communist.« i was not afraid of this 
because my duties were settled. But i was afraid of politics. i 
feared that the political currents take a direction to force one to 
apologise and nobody knows what could be the conclusion of 
such a turn. [22]
 149
it seemed that the forthcoming change of government also 
developed some fearful revaluations of the personal expecta-
tions: 
one is optimistic until finding out what is going on behind the 
doors. i belong to those who do not worry. Sure enough that 
there will be a systemic change in politics in hungary. a new 
door will be opened. We ought to give confidence in all of such 
cases. and later, when we will enter we will see whether what 
happens is really what should happen. [5] 
The quoted sentences clearly show that the fears and anxieties 
point back to the past, more precisely to the relationships with 
the past regime. Perhaps all this could have been localised if 
the spreading suspicions and political allegations were not 
impregnated with old and new economic contents that became 
the sources of institutional differences. But distrust was spread-
ing fast. The new political fragmentation, the relationship to 
the state (more precisely to the central and local governments), 
the uncertainties of the banking sector instigated a permanent 
state of defence against attacks that one could expect from a 
great variety of directions. in line with the old traditions, the 
safest – though short-term – way of self-protection was to seek 
good relations with those in power and then to consolidate the 
new contacts. if one could demonstrate such a shield of protec-
tion, then even the ruination of the business by the competitors 
proved to be nothing else but a temporary and fast recoverable 
unfortunate episode: 
i have only one relationship to politics… i am in a fortunate 
position because of being a fellow of the political state-secre-
tary at the Ministry of Finance. and this is not negligible in 
present-day hungary. We used to play football together in our 
childhood. To have common football reminiscences with a state-
secretary is a rather trustful connection. Well, this is indirectly 
but undeniably a political type of connection. in July, 1998 the
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minister of finance – evidently on the proposition of Mihály 
varga – asked me to become member of the Supervisory Board at 
the hungarian export Credit insurance Company. it was clearly 
a request driven by trust, hence i undertook it. [1]
Sometimes political support comes from the top: 
in 2006 when the elections took place, i was asked to find ways 
to help a businessman into the position of becoming the mayor 
of the town Nagykáta. With this in mind, i invited the business-
men. i could mention here that viktor orbán visited me and 
formulated his critique that we were not able to make it to help 
the right-wing parties or an entrepreneur to win in the course 
of the subsequent local elections. i responded by promising him 
that i would do my best to change this situation. That’s why i 
invited the entrepreneurs of Nagykáta to a dinner party and 
asked them to search for a person who would be competent 
enough to become the first man of the town. one of the invitees 
took the floor and said that the proper candidate would be me. 
and i had no choice but to undertake the role. i figured out this 
game – i should play it over! [18]
one can continue with innumerable citations that all point to 
the same direction by demonstrating that building up trust or 
regaining it requires above all the careful treating of one’s per-
sonal relationships. These relationships matter in a great num-
ber of situations that range from the acknowledgement of the 
necessity of taking up certain political functions and then prac-
tice them to establishing good contacts with the bank in order 
to get favourable special loans for the yet somewhat immature 
business and to the thoughtful shaping of the internal relations 
of the firm by silencing the voices of dissatisfaction and by work-
ing out the opportunities for upward move within the hierarchy. 
The spectacular importance of the personal relationships 
signals two meaningful associations at the same time. on the 
one hand, these relationships demonstrate the commonality of 
a web of shared contents of the recent past and among these 
call attention to the outstanding role of youthful friendships 
 151
that often date back to the high school years. Those who have 
such relationships can feel safe and protected against a variety 
of attacks. knowing this inspires many among our interview-
ees to cultivate such friendships with special care and to pre-
serve their precious intimate contents. on the other hand, the 
dominance of the personal relationships points to the weak-
nesses of the institutions and the institutionalised procedures 
that are meant to regulate the business proceedings. No rou-
tines have yet been developed to govern the emerging market 
relations, market players do not understand the exact meaning 
of bankruptcy, the basic conditions of mergers or disunions of 
companies are unclear and the position of the employees in the 
ranking of compensations remains indecipherable for most of 
them. all these uncertainties may navigate the company into 
the direction of total cessation or may inspire the management 
to take unlawful steps that later invoke investigations. hence, 
all the personal attachments carry outstanding importance on 
the shaky foundations of the business. Driven from such a situ-
ation, there is a huge pressure on the shoulder of entrepreneurs 
to render rightful ranks and positions in their business to all 
those from whom they would hope to get effective protection. 
however, this way the deeply internalised old paternalistic pat-
terns become revitalised and are surrounded by the patronising 
system of favours and personal goodwill. We can state that the 
preserved two interwoven characteristics of hungarian capital-
ism get new impetus in the contemporary relations. Based on 
the archaic functioning of the interpersonal relations and the 
weak institutions, the development of the new market institu-
tions driven by impersonal regulations becomes slowed down 
and their growing to a general state remains painfully hindered. 
These indications of malfunctioning importantly impact the 
ownership structure, too. in the given surrounding it proves ef-
ficient to decrease distrust, fears, and anxieties by pulling out 
all what one has from the reach of public visibility and criticism. 
hence, the grand entrepreneurs are highly motivated to split 
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their property into small units and run the business in the form 
of a network of small enterprises part of which are managed by 
their family members. 
Before turning to a more detailed discussion of these devel-
opments it seems useful to introduce the ways members of the 
‘new’ group relate to the issue of trust, briefly. one of the un-
expected results of our research was to discover that a genera-
tion gap was in place in this regard. While distrust, suspicion, 
and blaming for past engagements or fearing such occurrences 
occupied a central place in the views and business conducts of 
the ‘old’ entrepreneurs, similar motives were practically missing 
from the interviews with their ‘new’ peers. if the topic came up 
at all, it was mentioned within the limited framework of daily 
management: our interview partners gave account about the 
steps that were taken to increase the bank’s trust towards their 
business. From the point of view of the ‘new’ entrepreneurs 
trust is one of the necessary conditions of making the business 
prosperous and manageable. it is assumed that as one acquires 
the methods of purchasing and operating the machines that are 
needed, one can learn in the same way the techniques of build-
ing trustful relations. in these interviews there is no mention 
of political accusations and fruitful political relations are very 
rarely referred to as well. Likewise, personal experiences of trust 
or mistrust and opinions about these issues are outside of the 
picture. Trust is perceived as a technocratically defined constitu-
ent of the business that is safeguarded by appropriate institu-
tions and regulations. 
These developments carry multiple meanings. Perhaps the 
most important among these is the difference in the foundations 
of the business. While in cases of company restructuring the ‘old’ 
entrepreneurs are hesitantly striving towards the family-owned 
formation as the one best guaranteeing trustful corporate rela-
tions, many among their ‘new’ peers make their start without 
hesitation in such a framework and do so without feelings of 
uncertainties. in the latter case, the family-based structures of 
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decision-making and cooperation appear as given and they are 
definitely convinced about its strong potential of trust. Moreo-
ver, their attitudes and business policy are clearly characterised 
by viewing the family’s enterprise as part of a strictly confined 
and undivided entity. it follows that the members of the ‘new’ 
group wish to shape the external relationships of this entity 
solely according to the rules of functionality.
There are several factors at play in the depersonalised percep-
tion of the company’s outer relations. on the one hand, the im-
portance of institutional contacts is on the increase; on the other 
hand, the relatively large number of foreign partners makes a 
distanced attitude the prime rule in navigating in the business 
world. in parallel with this, the experiences about the institu-
tional backgrounds are markedly different in the two groups of 
our interviewees. By the time the ‘new’ entrepreneurs started 
their businesses the institutions of the market and the necessary 
financial and legal arrangements of safe conduct were already in 
place. at the same time, as we can recall, it was exactly the lack 
of the respective institutions and the prevailing uncertainties in 
the working of the existing ones that led to growing reliance 
on the personal relations in the case of the members of the ‘old’ 
group. The differing business paths of the two groups are very 
important in this regard. While entries of the ‘old’ businessmen 
into the international market remained limited and the steps of 
expansion were taken by great caution (further, their attempts 
were restricted to the less developed markets of Central and 
eastern europe), their ‘new’ peers made all efforts to exploit the 
advantages of hungary’s accession to the european union and 
they strove for establishing efficient multiple business networks 
in Western europe.
it follows from these differences that the ‘old’ entrepreneurs 
faced the disadvantages of weak institutionalisation and the 
experienced increased vulnerability in their foreign relations, 
hence they did not really see the advantages of hungary’s new 
eu membership. at the same time, it was exactly the eu access-
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ion that made the life of the ‘new’ group a lot easier. in this circle, 
most of the interviews gave voice to appreciating the improved 
domestic market regulations and the elevated standards of the 
economic and legal institutions that now observe the norms of 
the eu, further, they acknowledged the beneficial depersonali-
sation of the prevailing economic relations. Their pragmatic and 
business-oriented attitudes also helped them in making good 
use of the advantages of the protective new institutional ar-
rangements. Seen from this angle, they owed less significance to 
the personal relations that they assessed as transient and muta-
ble and as such they argued for restricting them solely into the 
confinements of the private domain. With these considerations 
in mind, it is easy to understand why the issue of confidence 
as a precondition of the successful business did not come up 
for closer discussion. The ‘new’ entrepreneurs’ put the empha-
sis elsewhere: they think in terms of encompassing structures 
and rationalised procedures. Taken from this perspective, the 
personal relationships do not enjoy any preferred roles, instead, 
these are counted as one among the several factors that serve the 
proper upkeep of the everyday routines in the company’s life.
There is an unexpected but important lesson that follows 
from the above: this is the growing significance of the varied 
formations of family-run businesses. Whether we look at these 
formations from the angle of the defensive strategies of the ‘old’ 
entrepreneurs or consider their advantages in letting to grow 
the businesses of their ‘new’ peers, it seems that the family busi-
ness as a form of property-at-work provides panacea to the prob-
lems that the owners of the once privatised or directly acquired 
big companies face. as it seems, this is the very form of economic 
activity that gives the most efficient tool into the hands of the 
entrepreneurs to regain confidence and to protect the socio-
economic status that they achieved. Furthermore, this frame-
work of company management offers good conditions for safe 
growth and expansion. additionally, it is the family businesses 
that provide the most favourable conditions for a rational distri-
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bution of wealth and also for its best intergenerational transmis-
sion. on top of all these, due to the fast headway of this business 
type, hungarian economy gives evidence of its flexible adaptiv-
ity. The hungarian trend fits well with the company structure 
of the developed world in which the family-owned companies 
have gained astonishing dominance in every size groups in the 
last decades. in sum, these multifaceted developments encour-
age us to take a closer look at this fast spreading form and try to 
bring up the motives and driving forces that work in the back-
ground of its spectacular domestic expansion.
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aBouT The FaMiLy-oWNeD BuSiNeSSeS
in reflection of the fast expansion of the family-owned busi-
nesses, studying this form has become one of the most dynamic 
fields of company research in recent years. The large interna-
tional publishing houses have launched new scientific journals 
with exclusive focus on the subject and they have followed the 
new trend also by publishing a great number of books that 
are dedicated to the topic. They place great emphasis on the 
publication of studies that supplement the presentation of the 
new research results with useful practical guidance. Based on 
this policy, a significant market turnover is expected in higher 
education as well as in the course trainings that are run by the 
newly established advocacy organisations of the family-owned 
large- and medium-size companies. Thus, research of the new 
business formation and its backing by a stream of advice has cre-
ated the space for the development of a range of new academic 
disciplines. This tendency is emphatically demonstrated by the 
growing presence of the distinct fields of study dealing with the 
organisation, the management, the market policy, and the inner 
structure of the family-owned businesses that underscore their 
importance by launching new university departments and call-
ing forth new communication for their purposes.41
41 This is confirmed by a glimpse at the long list of the international journals 
that focus on the family-owned businesses. Those who are interested in 
publishing on the subject can choose from a substantial range of periodicals 
with newly acquired academic prestige. it is enough to mention here the most 
prestigious ones: Journal of Family Business Strategy, Family Business Review, 
Journal of Family Business Management, Electronic Journal of Family Business Studies.
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as was mentioned before, the hungarian large- and medium-
size entrepreneurs do not deviate from the mainstream. as our 
interviews demonstrate, the form of the family-owned company 
as a purposeful framing of the business enjoys great popularity 
in both groups of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ entrepreneurs.42 how-
ever, there are important differences behind the similarities that 
appear on the surface, moreover, these differences sharply di-
vide the two generations. as said above, these differences turn 
up mostly in the motivations behind engaging in this particular 
form but we can observe them in the everyday operations of the 
new family-run companies as well. 
according to the literature on the subject, the rise of interest 
in the family-owned businesses is in close association with two 
important trends of the past two decades. The first among these 
trends is an observable change in public opinion: from the be-
ginning of the ’80-ies, intensifying criticism has turned against 
the large corporations for their role in bringing to life vast bu-
reaucracies and new independent centres of power. The wave of 
anti-bureaucratic sentiments reached everyday business as well. 
The sluggish and less and less transparent decision-making 
mechanisms of the various organisational units of large compa-
nies (company councils and supervisory boards) became subject 
to sharp and extensive criticisms. Those who tried to find ways 
out from the disappointments over bureaucratisation and the 
lack of transparency and those who strove for reconstructing 
social control identified the family-owned business formation as 
the potential framework for developing new and flexible modes 
of operation (Colli 2003). 
The second complex of factors behind the growing popularity 
of the family-owned businesses is in close connection with the 
recent changes in the sociological status of the family. in this 
42 in addition to the interviews, it would be desirable to present data from 
the national statistics. But as we mentioned earlier, the collection on business 
organisations in hungary does not render any breakdowns about the family 
business as a distinct formation.
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context, one may recognise the impact of the feminist critiques 
that conceptualise the family as a political unit of mediating the 
social structure: this new current of thoughts has turned atten-
tion to the division of labour within the family that had been a 
peripheral area of the economy for a long time (Waring 1988, 
Barlett 1997). By focusing attention on the inequalities of power 
and wealth within the family, an ever larger group of business 
advisers and experts with influence on shaping macro-level eco-
nomic policy began to argue that the internal conflicts of the 
family can be successfully tackled by developing new gender 
and generational balances through the family-owned business-
es, furthermore, the shared cultural grounds of the participants 
may generate new opportunities for stimulating economic de-
velopment (Mullholland 2003). By taking the latter context, the 
arguments in support of the family-owned business formation 
became impregnated with important political contents of sug-
gesting convenient and promising responses to the tensions that 
have accompanied the processes of change in Western societies 
during the past decades.
For the most part, the reasons behind the domestic popularity 
of the family-owned businesses are different. as it was already 
mentioned, the increased need for this business formation is in 
close association with the remarkable weakening of the rela-
tions of trust and the erosion of the support that the traditional 
contacts could provide – at least, this is the case in the ‘old’ group 
of entrepreneurs. at the same time, while trust is an important 
constituent of the build-up of their family businesses, the ‘new’ 
entrepreneurs choose this formation partly as a continuation of 
the family’s tradition and partly as a flexible and efficient way of 
adjusting to the new market niches. it follows from these pecu-
liar motivations that one can trace a range of conservative traits 
and defensive elements in the everyday practice of the compa-
nies while the deliberate limiting of size and the avoidance of 
too speedy growth are also among their distinctive features. 
however, there is a long list of further factors and important 
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considerations in the background of this broad-brush picture. it 
seems worth taking a closer look at them. 
although it rarely came up in the interviews as a topic for 
open discussion, the deep worries about the safe functioning 
of their property played an important role when our entrepre-
neurs chose the formation of family ownership for running 
their business. Primarily those members of the ‘old’ group who 
acquired their property mainly through privatisation buy-outs 
are the ones who feel that the legitimacy of their acquisition can 
be undermined any time. Their anxieties are flowed by the per-
manent suspicion of the public, the recurrent waves of intensi-
fied mass revulsion against the large entrepreneurs, and the re-
vived strong criticisms of the ‘conversion’ of their old power. in 
this atmosphere of attacks it seems a real danger that one as an 
alleged perpetrator of ‘serious abuses’ may even be put on trial. 
The experiences of the past 15–20 years of reshuffling the corpo-
rate structure definitely deepen these fears in many of the cases: 
it occurred several times that old friends turned against each 
other in the course of mutual buy-outs. amidst the conflicts that 
accompanied the new redistribution of property, many of our 
interview partners repeatedly experienced the questioning of 
their honesty and good faith. it is then a rational reaction on 
their part to look for new alternative ways that offer more secure 
solutions than the impersonal forms of corporate trusts or hold-
ing companies.
Since family ownership is considered with strong positive 
contents in the hungarian social tradition, the family form 
arises as a natural way of seeking safety and security. our ‘old’ 
entrepreneurs feel – and not without reason – that by turning 
to the formation of family ownership the differences in size and 
wealth can be pushed into the background. This way their busi-
ness would be only one among the hundreds of thousands of 
private endeavours that are characterised by tight kinship rela-
tions as the source of accumulation and growth and that cannot 
be questioned for this very reason. one cannot exclude that the 
16 0  
business conversions of our ‘old’ interview partners are driven 
by their self-protective pursuits towards a faceless mingling 
with the crowd. By disconnecting the company group into small 
family-owned units they adapt to the small family businesses. 
Thus they may hope that by virtue of their adaptation they 
would enjoy the acceptance and silent support that surround 
this formation.
another rarely mentioned motive that nonetheless clearly 
works in the background is the issue of inheritance. By getting 
older, the question of how to preserve personal control over the 
capital and the accumulated wealth is increasingly on the mind 
of our ‘old’ interview partners. No doubt a significant part of the 
members of this group look at the business in terms of function-
ality; therefore it fits into their thinking and mentality that they 
may transmit the business to an outside owner who potentially 
shows excellence in operating it. however, the issues of succes-
sion and continuity remain prime questions for the majority of 
the group. The best path of securing uninterrupted personal au-
thority is to draw one’s children into the business and then to 
gradually extend the ownership rights with their involvement: 
this way the structural conditions of continuation are created. 
however, such parental aspirations are not always successful. 
Many of the children of our ‘old’ partners had different prefer-
ences and they regarded the parental business as a completed 
one-time endeavour. having no other choice, the parents usu-
ally accept the reasoning and the departing options of their chil-
dren. Nevertheless, their words reflect feelings of uncertainty 
because of the unsettled matter of continuation and also some 
worries emerge due to the alternative choice of the children: 
My son took part in the business, worked and helped here. he 
came to clean here. as necessary, he bought a corporate uniform 
but he does not want become part of the business. he worked 
here in the summertime but for a while it looked as if he wanted 
to launch his own firm… My daughter is now employed by a 
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bank. however, she wanted to do something else. She always 
wanted to deal with sick children and i hope that she would do 
this again. i think that both of my children got a taste of my busi-
ness, but my daughter was not competent enough because she 
was not good in systematic thinking. She was able to hold a job 
in the bank and this is very important. My son turned towards 
a political career… at any rate, my children do not want to work 
with me. My son keeps saying that he has no business sense and 
he lacks the capacities to overview a firm. he would be unable 
to manage it. [11]
The most powerful argument that our ‘old’ interview partners 
brought up in favour of the family-owned enterprise regarded 
the good potential of this business formation for assisting 
upward mobility. They raised a number of reasons for backing 
their view. on the one had, they consider themselves autodi-
dactic businessmen and sense a range of disadvantages of this 
status. among these, the lack of knowledge of languages and 
the imperfect practising of the small behavioural norms and 
gestures that make one look competent came up with high 
frequency. But the list was continued: in describing their weak-
nesses several of them mentioned their sometimes bookish 
knowledge and the related awkward dealings as well as all those 
other uncertainties that come up in insurmountable difficulties 
and hinder the truly appropriate running of the business. 
These experiences deeply impregnated the conceptions of 
our ‘old’ partners of their children’s further education. Not by 
chance, language learning in a broad cultural sense took the 
lead among their motivations. By spending vast energy and 
sizeable amounts of money in accordance with their prime as-
piration, the majority sent their children to the best (and most 
acknowledged) american or West european universities where-
by they expected to provide their offspring with the comfort in 
practicing a Western-like lifestyle and the adjunct distinguished 
patterns of behaviour and conduct. of course, our partners an-
ticipated a reasonable return on this huge investment. in many 
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of the cases they make all efforts to translate the acquired and 
broadly meant bourgeois culture of their children into also 
transforming the businesses into highly civilised institutions. 
often this is the reason why the young successors get into some 
high-level position in their fathers’ firms in just one or two years 
after leaving studentship behind. according to the parental 
views, they should climb further and further upward and ulti-
mately take over the management of the entire business. Such 
paths of indoor upward mobility would not be guaranteed in 
the impersonal and fragmented system of ownership. But the 
family-owned business offers the way of organic development. 
in association with the clear improvement of efficiency and pro-
fessionalism, the takeover of the business by the offspring brings 
about an increase of the profits and a concurrent fulfilment of 
the imagined aspirations for an intergenerational advancement 
in the family’s social position. if this twofold project succeeds, 
the parents are justly proud of their performance: “Our business 
is a one hundred per cent family-owned entity. I have to underscore 
that it is managed by my son. His brain is the engine of the firm and he 
contracted very clever people of whom he successfully built a team.” [9] 
in the family-owned firms embodying paths for upward mo-
bility the high positions rendered for the children have some 
additional implications. The new generation brings in new con-
nections: friends or acquaintances whom they met in the course 
of foreign studies often become their new business partners or 
reliable lenders. By a smart combination of the local knowledge 
and professional and political connections of the parents with 
the broad international relationships of the children entering 
the business, remarkable increase can be experienced in the safe 
embeddedness of the company while its stability is also improv-
ing in a sometimes unexpected degree. The potentials of such 
combinations often carry substantial comparative advantage 
over other business formations. 
Finally, concerning the ‘old’ entrepreneurs as founders of the 
business, their driving for an unmistakable brand design with 
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rich symbolic meanings occupies an important place among 
the motivations for supporting the family-owned formation. 
Similar aspirations are among the important motives of the 
Western family businesses as well: the visualisation of togeth-
erness and the clear representation of the business initiations 
with direct relating to the name of the family have been essen-
tial elements of the spreading of this fashionable business form 
from the beginning. indeed, the differences are appearing in 
the time horizon for realising these aspirations. as long as the 
current representatives of Rothschilds, Fords and Philips in top 
positions care primarily about the cultivation of the traditions 
and the preservation of the invested standard of the brand that 
they inherited from the preceding generations, the task of their 
hungarian fellows as the first generation of the post-transition 
grand entrepreneurs was and still is to lay the foundations of the 
hoped future traditions. it is not by chance that there have been 
certain experimentations to figure out the clear distinguishing 
features (logos, advertisement stiles, company faces, etc.) and it 
is a development only of the most recent years that some of the 
unmissable visualisations of the established traditions and firm-
specific representations have appeared on the scene. at any rate, 
many among our ‘old’ partners put great emphasis on all these 
issues of appearance and they regard it a shared responsibility 
of the family collective to take part in the visualisation and the 
adequate representation of the company as a unique ‘creation’. 
This is a shared responsibility, indeed: 
as i have mentioned, our children grew up in an attentive 
milieu. even if we are a little overwhelmed with the problems 
that we unwittingly bring home from work, we try to practice 
some self-restraint and avoid dealing with the problems of the 
company at home. This is usually more or less achieved but you 
cannot exclude the expectations and the responsibility that you 
bring with you if you are an owner and you have built up some-
thing. Right, the high reputation of my late father and the vast 
acknowledgement of the Béres drops obviously motivate me. We
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do everything to make the company live long and we expect the 
same from our children, even if they do not work with us. We 
expect them to be able to think responsibly and be able to take 
care of this business. [2]
By summarising the above, we can report a gradual re-inter-
pretation of the family ownership in the company histories of 
the ‘old’ entrepreneurs. While there were deliberate defensive 
strategies in the background of dismantling and restructuring 
the original large units into a network of family-owned busi-
nesses, our partners soon recognised the additional advantages 
of this formation. in addition to the attempts for securing profit 
making, they shortly figured out ways to make the new family-
owned business the solid foundation of broader social and eco-
nomic strivings. one is inclined to assume the impact of the 
small-entrepreneurial traditions in these developments. For the 
accumulated individual and social-level experiences in the small 
enterprises as the typical formations of small-scale organisation, 
management and cooperation importantly helped to carry out 
the conversion into the family business without remarkable 
transformation losses. Despite the occurring fragmentation 
that accompanied the process, the deep-seated experiences 
also facilitated the preservation of the unity of wealth and the 
turning into growth of the family-run property. Because of 
these developments some originally defensive steps became 
the starting conditions of a productive transformation and the 
emerging new units began to eradicate the equitation between 
‘family-ownership’ and ‘smallness’ whereby new ‘Western-like’ 
arrangements started to grow that added new colours to the 
spectrum of hungarian business-formations. 
By considering their yearly turnover and net income, most 
of the transformed family-owned enterprises provide a suit-
able framework for the operation of the large business, although 
this is realised by an intensified management of the masterly 
interlocked small units. This means that the new formation still 
did not get rid of some defensive contents. in the accounts of 
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our ‘old’ interview partners we rarely met with the brave act of 
unifying their companies or corporate bushes into a single large 
family-owned company. Based on their narratives it seems that 
the typical paths were instead the already mentioned fragment-
ing of the original large firm or the attempts at combining the 
family-owned and the traditionally managed company parts. 
These occurrences convey some transiency and point to the in-
sufficiently elaborated routines of operation. hence, the family-
owned companies of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs bear the marks of 
birth and prematurity, while they also testify the impressive 
performance of flexible adaptation. 
as in several other aspects, the histories of the company for-
mation of the ‘new’ entrepreneurs, who usually represent the 
second generation on the top of these businesses, differ in a num-
ber of points of that of their ‘old’ peers. The first and most impor-
tant difference follows from the earlier discussed generational 
departures. Since the ‘new’ owners had no direct experiences 
about the realignment of interpersonal relationships after the 
transition and they did not suffer the erosion of confidence that 
caused particular concerns for those who became the converted 
entrepreneurs of the one-time managerial stratum of the state-
owned large socialist corporations, seeking protection against 
the decline in trust is essentially missing from their motivations. 
it was rather their parents who faced such problems at the time 
of establishing the family’s business. instead, the members of the 
‘new’ group give account of other strivings. as the background 
of the start-up, they mention intentions to innovate the produc-
tion, their dedication to the renewal and modernisation of the 
company (or the entire company network), or the discovery of 
new market challenges – and of course the desire for emancipa-
tion. Regardless of the actual motives, it is, however, a shared 
characteristic in this circle of second-generation owners that all 
who belong here were socialised in the given and established 
framework of the family-owned business that thus provided a 
natural path of schooling for them. This important process of 
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schooling started early and provided important learning. as it 
already came up in a different context, many among the ‘new’ 
owners started to work and collect experiences in one or another 
plant or shop of the family’s business as early as at the age of 
10–12 years. Then growing older they tried out themselves in 
more than one spot and in more than one role, while ultimately 
the collected experiences provided the primary basis of their at-
tempts at gaining independence. 
There are many specific developments associated with this 
organic way of acquiring knowledge and routines. The most im-
portant aspect is the sense of familiarity that seems particularly 
striking if compared to the frequent estrangement and uncer-
tainty of the ‘old’ businessmen. This is an important product of 
early socialization: with its technical details, the applied tech-
nologies and the clarity of the personal relations in their func-
tioning, the family-owned business proves as familiar and as 
warmly inhabited as the family home. The masters, the older 
confidants and the friends all come from here and the unques-
tionable safety conditions of these relationships often match all 
what private socialisation in the parental house is able to pro-
vide. it indicates smart navigation and the wise and attentive 
way of parenting that, despite the close ties, these early relation-
ships do not create obstacles for a later distancing and do not 
hinder the autonomous invention of the adult career.
as it seems, children’s education and making them prepared 
to acquire the necessary experience are no less important in the 
families of this group than in the case of their ‘old’ fellows. how-
ever, as the interviews indicate, given the backing of the safe 
conditions, the parents of our ‘new’ interviewees offer greater 
freedom of choice and independence to their children in choos-
ing the concrete forms and paths of learning than it is custom-
ary in the ‘old’ group. This malleable attitude manifests itself 
in yet another development, namely that the children – our in-
terviewed ‘new’ entrepreneurs – often relatively easily leave be-
hind the education system after graduation. in this phase of life, 
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the experience that one can collect (more abroad than at home) 
looks more important for these young owner-candidates than to 
go along the path of continued regular schooling. True, the ma-
jority of them later catches up: they obtain a degree in evening 
or correspondence courses. But the degree as such is less impor-
tant for them than the knowledge and the experience that one 
can accumulate while engaging in the lifestyle of the one-time 
journeyman by spending months or even years abroad. 
The years spent abroad bring about manifold advantages. 
The first is, as we have seen above, the confident command of a 
foreign language that one best acquires through the permanent 
presence in the given language environment. Likewise, the ac-
cumulation of professional practice is also of great use. often 
starting their career at the bottom and then gradually rising 
higher and higher, these young people gain a special perspective 
in understanding the operation of the enterprise and its, some-
time hidden, vulnerabilities. This knowledge can be converted 
into a new and important skill: the capacity for perceiving the 
company as an organic entity and building the future design 
accordingly. a further benefit of the stay abroad is the accumu-
lation of an extensive social capital. as it was presented above, 
there are several cases that demonstrate that the acquaintances 
and professional friendships that were born abroad at young 
age later become the starting points of cross-border cooperation 
and business collaborations – even if this new turn often comes 
about after many years of suspension in the communication. 
however, the shorter or longer periods abroad and the foreign 
experiences often induce some hindrances or even breaks into 
the life of the home company. The returning young professional 
cannot be directed into his earlier subordinate position. hence, 
the creation of his new placement becomes subject to sensitive 
family bargaining and an often difficult search of the appropri-
ate arrangement. The interviews reveal a variety of solutions. 
in families that are based on traditional, paternal authority the 
division of the property between father and son is hardly con-
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ceivable, therefore the young returnees are inclined to establish 
a new business. But they do this by observing the interests of 
the family’s business: well prepared forms of cooperation and 
coordinated marketing strategies guarantee coherence. 
in other cases the return of the young family-member pro-
vides an opportunity for modifying the structure of family 
ownership that has been on the agenda anyway. By dividing the 
property rights of parts of the business (very rarely the whole of 
it) a new framework emerges for the continued operation of the 
company that remains in the hands of the family even after the 
reshuffle. 
in the third part of the cases the new business of the young 
owner is launched with a brand new profile and the parents of-
ten help the start-up with considerable financial support. as the 
new endeavour comes in operation, the family determines the 
share of its members in order to hold together the capital and the 
wealth of the company as an organic entity. 
however, despite the above variations, there is a common ele-
ment in the recollections: the challenges around the return of 
the young ‘journeyman’ seem to generate conflicts that are hard 
to circumvent. at the same time, a striking feature of the conflict 
management is the unconditional priority that is given to busi-
ness rationality and the long-term sustainability of the family 
enterprise over the sometimes passionate and heated emotions 
that rule the private sphere. one can say that the readiness for 
strictly separating the family as a private domain and the busi-
ness as a field of activity has become a routinely applied skill of 
the ‘new’ generation of entrepreneurs. This development per-
haps can be interpreted as a sign of the ‘westernisation’ of the 
family-owned businesses. 
it is a further implication of the ‘westernisation’ process that 
the purely business-centred understanding of the company pro-
vides but restricted opportunities for the fulfilment of parents’ 
and children’s desires for upward mobility. Personal advance-
ment and the success of the business cannot be separated, and 
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thus a relatively narrow passage is appearing for the upward-
striving careers. Mobility is achieved through the positions 
within the company, hence those who are thinking about a ca-
reer change or a new job have to step out from the given frames. 
according to the emerging values success is tied to the entrepre-
neurial career that our interview partners see impregnated with 
rich contents for providing appropriate paths for their personal 
ambitions. These developments also signal a certain immunity 
of the ‘new’ generation to the recurrently intensifying anti-en-
trepreneurial waves of the public discourse. Compared to their 
‘old’ peers who often attach great importance to this phenom-
enon, the ‘new’ entrepreneurs are better inclined to listen to the 
discourses that support them in their chosen entrepreneurial 
career. hence, they are open to the arguments about entrepre-
neurial creativity and the national economic importance of what 
they are doing while they are ready to emphasise the necessary 
re-strengthening of hungary’s position in europe. The compos-
ite of these values makes up a dominant part of the self-image 
of the ‘new’ generation. By looking through this prism they 
consider with some pride and confidence the well performing 
business of the family and their own work contributing to the 
successful operation of the company. 
The comparison of the two groups brings up some further 
distinguished characteristics of the ‘new’ entrepreneurs that 
are in connection with the comfort that they feel of the consoli-
dated state of their companies. it seems that the above picture 
of the ‘new’ generation as being relatively less disturbed by the 
conflicts and the involved personal risks that accompany the 
general decline of trust has to be refined at this point. as our 
interviews suggest, due to the elaborated and meticulously fine-
tuned routines of negotiation and decision-making that already 
were in place at the time of starting their entrepreneurial career, 
the ‘new’ entrants found the family-owned business in a state of 
successful absorption and internalisation of the processes and 
guarantees that safeguard the maintenance of trust. our “new” 
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interview partners are convinced that the internal institutions 
and rules of family-based planning, decision-making and coop-
eration should be designed in a way that allows for the open dis-
cussion of the arising attitudinal differences and conflicting in-
terests. in their view such internal institutions and mechanisms 
are the only guarantees for arriving at workable compromises 
that, in turn, best warrant the agreed external representation 
and the well-founded agency of the company. 
of course, the actual regulatory processes and the related 
structural elements differ from one case to the next. at the same 
time, there is an important common feature that these cases 
share: the strong striving for unity. indeed, the players make all 
efforts to represent the entrepreneurial family as an entity with-
out internal divisions and use this representation for surround-
ing themselves with a powerful protective shield that does not 
leave room or surface for the divisive attacks from outside. The 
visualisation of the family as a shatter-proof unity obviates split-
ting along the lines of distinct interests of some parts of the fam-
ily: it helps to prevent independent striving for entering the mar-
ket with a specific strategy apart from the rest of the family. ap-
parently, observance of the family’s unity requires self-restraint 
from each family member. at the same time, unity makes the 
family-owned business a strong bulwark against attacks from 
the outside world. This gains particular significance in cases of 
fending off buyouts or strengthening the bargaining positions 
of the business on markets abroad. The foundation of making 
unity work is the permanent strengthening of coherence and 
the unconditional trust between the members of the family that 
serve, in turn, successful conflict management and an efficient 
resolving of the emerging internal frictions. in order to take care 
of the sources of trust and coherence, mutual understanding, 
empathy, and ongoing efforts are needed from all parties: 
My father did not want to support the idea but my mother told 
me to go ahead, let me try it and do it. and in retrospect separa-
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tion from my father was a good decision. When i became sepa-
rated from my father, i told him, »i don’t want to make a big 
company like yours«, because about 60 people were employed 
there… and ultimately the decision about my separation was 
made by the family. My father was not happy about it, but he 
also consented… and i devoted the longer part of 1989 to build 
a small workshop from my saved money. The family had a small 
slot on P. street in Sopron, and i started the construction there. 
i did not have too much to spend, but when i ran out of my 
reserves my father helped a little with a loan and it was really 
important that i had someone to turn to for support. actually i 
started a truly small private business. i did not want to become a 
competitor of my father by producing mirrors, hence, we began 
to produce insulating glass. [44]
in sum, the comparison of the family-owned businesses of the 
‘old’ and the ‘new’ entrepreneurs drew up the trends of gradual 
refinement and the prevalence of ever more routinised institu-
tional operations. While maintaining the above characterisation 
of this business form by emphasising its potential to provide 
protection and opportunities for the withdrawal of the ‘old’ 
entrepreneurs and to back their attempts for finding ways out 
of the pervasive distrust in hungarian society and economy, we 
have to make a complementary remark here about the transience 
of such a state of affairs that is reflected in the speedy realign-
ment of the goals and functions that took place within a very 
short time. 
in the eyes of the ‘new’ generation, it is the market advantages 
of the family-owned business form and it involved opportuni-
ties for assisting their individual career paths that lead the rank-
ing of the motivations – and it is the ‘Western-like’ professional 
traits that they develop in order to best explore these rewarding 
aspects. however, the protective elements of the formation are 
important for them as well. as we have seen, the transparent 
separation of the family positions and the continuous mainte-
nance of the internal relationships of trust are of great concern 
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for them. one can add that these aspects are decisive elements 
of the business operation that importantly contribute to pre-
serve the characteristics of small entrepreneurship even in the 
conditions of fast growth. This latter inclination is shared by 
the two groups of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ entrepreneurs. Deliberate 
limitation of the company’s growth and strategic decisions and 
conscious actions for asserting stagnation through the frequent 
modification of the structure of the business are warning signs 
of the discontinuities that indicate blocking and marginalisation 
of a remarkable part of the hungarian grand entrepreneurs and 
that signal their troubled post-crisis state in the first decade of 
the new century. From this perspective, the domestic spreading 
of the family-owned businesses does not help to stimulate the 
economy but supports an opposite trend: it indicates the diffu-
sion of defensive business behaviour and the fixation of inward-
looking endeavours. 
Both generations of the grand entrepreneurs are obviously 
fully aware of the involved costs and risks of self-restraint. how-
ever, they perceive the risks of rapid advancing and out-break-
ing by leaving others behind even greater. The recurrent fail-
ures and slowdowns in the course of the business career often 
could be owed to earlier over-optimistic expectations and too 
positive outlooks. What is more, in several of the cases the same 
biased sensing provoked those attacks that ultimately ended up 
in bankruptcy and liquidation and that forced the businessmen 
to restart from scratch. it followed that they learned the lesson: if 
they want to act and move on the domestic terrain, the required 
main personal orientation is thorough observation of the rule 
of alignment. The smaller family-owned units that came into 
being after the splitting of the big companies fit well into the 
usual plant size of the socially accepted formation of small en-
terprises, while the cautious attitudes of the owners with regard 
to growth indicates the acquiring and perfect internalisation of 
the ideas that the small entrepreneurs always had.
But becoming fully accepted requires more from the large 
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entrepreneurs: it calls for the adaptation of their world-view 
and political ideas to the mainstream and urges them to clearly 
(re)define their position in this frame. Furthermore, given the 
deep politicisation of the economy, a thorough rethinking of 
the prevailing broader political, social and ideological relations 
and attempts at defining one’s own position amid these rela-
tions make up perhaps the most important non-economic pre-
condition of an undisturbed running of the business. 
at this point of the discussion it seems important to ask the 
question: what does it mean to be a ‘hungarian grand entrepre-
neur’? in seeking an answer to this question one cannot disre-
gard the group’s position in the larger european space, further, 
a closer examination of the relationship between its members’ 
economic roles and patriotic orientations is also needed. as will 
be shown, beyond pervading our partners’ approaches to the 
business, the daily pressures for clarifying their personal posi-
tion deeply impregnate the ways and the dilemmas of search-
ing for their identity as well. hence, their personal ‘policy of be-
ing hungarian’ can be a buoyant factor as much as a paralysing 
force. Nonetheless, the often hidden but still prominent role of 
the ideological and political orientations have to be taken into 
account whether one wants to interpret the withdrawals and the 
business conversions of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs or understand 
the often markedly different company policies of their ‘new’ 
peers.
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eNTRePReNeuRS aBouT TheMSeLveS iN The 
ChaNgiNg iDeoLogiCaL-PoLiTiCaL SPaCe
it was one of the great promises and hopes of the years of tran-
sition that as the market takes over regulation of the economy, 
politics would be drawn out of this domain. it was expected 
that economic performance would be measured by the play of 
demand and supply, furthermore, the expanding international 
relations would make it meaningless and impossible to intervene 
into their functioning for political reasons. however, it became 
clear in a relatively short while that these hopes were illusory: 
instead of being expelled, the world of political interests has 
been inextricably absorbed by the working of hungarian capi-
talism. it can be recalled that the first act of uninvited interven-
tion was the politically impregnated process of privatisation 
that provoked lasting anger and bitter emotions that are still in 
place. Since, apart from the new political elites, it was mainly 
the well-set upper managers of the one-time socialist companies 
whom the process rendered the truly advantageous positions, 
the initiation of the new stratum of owners was perceived by 
the public as driven by those old positions that had been inher-
ently politicised by the very nature of state-socialism. The actual 
performance of the new owners proved marginal in this regard: 
the public considered – and still considers – the involved initial 
inequalities.43
however, the accusations claiming the interlocking of politics 
and business seemed to fade away by the end of the first dec-
43 a marked presentation of this point of view can be found in Szalai (2009). 
For the criticisms of privatisation and their lasting impact, see Mihályi (2010).
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ade of the post-socialist transition. in regard to the fact that the 
number one winners of privatisation were the buyout-thriving 
foreigners (and above all, the rapidly settling multinationals), 
the anger of the public against the domestic large owners was 
on the decline, though distrust and suspicion towards them did 
not cease. The basis of continuous allegations was provided by 
those journalists and interested political figures who closely ob-
served each case of the manifestations of old interlocking and 
brought up these with an intended uncovering of the truth. 
Business transactions between ‘old comrades’ or the old politi-
cal ties in the background of large state procurements hardly 
ever remained secret: actions against corruption and in favour 
of making justice directed public attention primarily to these 
types of associations. 
The repeated waves of distrust became tightly intertwined 
with political strivings of the day. in the campaign periods pre-
ceding the elections the disclosure of the dubious affairs of the 
political opponents (be they the members of right- or left-wing 
parties) was considered as efficient tool of the political struggle. 
There was not a single political force that remained intact and 
the economic actors in their proximity were regularly pilloried 
with them.44 These currents carried a general message: by at-
taining success in the business, one has to face the politically 
driven questioning of his performance and also of his personal 
honesty. hence, independence from politics – or at least the ef-
ficient dissembling of one’s political ties – became a matter of life 
and death in the circles of grand entrepreneurs while emphasis-
ing the distance turned out to be an indispensable precondition 
for them in assuming legitimacy and personal acceptance.
it is hardly surprising against this background that our in-
44 The most comprehensive analysis of the occurrence of corruption cases 
was presented by the Corruption Research Centre of the institute of Sociology 
and Social Research at the Corvinus university Budapest. The researchers 
processed some 3500 press material that identified 444 cases. The content 
analysis of these documents justifies the above discussion (Szántó-Tóth-Sz.
varga 2009).
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terview partners told us very little about their direct political 
ties and avoided to discuss those aspects of their business ac-
tivities that were most probably in close association with these 
ties. obviously the situation was similar ten years earlier when 
we first interviewed our ‘old’ partners but the thickness of si-
lence seems to have grown by now. Nevertheless, the issue of 
political-ideological orientation remained among the important 
themes of the interviews because it simply could not be omitted 
from the accounts about the efforts for adaptation and the dif-
ficulties that had to be faced. True, our partners rarely provided 
detailed stories to illustrate their political orientation and there 
were very few words about their personal connections to the 
political parties or to certain politicians. instead, the profile of 
one’s general attitude and the important political values were 
discussed.  and after all, this was an advantageous turn. For 
the rather abstract analytical framework helped us to describe 
the changes in our interviewees’ relating to politics and also to 
reveal the reflections of these changes in the shaping of their 
business philosophy.
among the constituents of the change, perhaps the most 
important is the significant shift in what our interviewees in-
tended to emphasise. More precisely: in parallel to the rise of 
the right-wing political forces, the issue of hungarian identity 
came to the forefront. as part of this shift, our ‘old’ partners 
who initially had been liberals and West-oriented in their values 
turned as much towards the new questions of national identity 
as those members of the ‘new’ generation whose conservative 
socialisation rendered a safer backing for adapting to the new 
trends. adaptation takes place through barely visible, gradual 
shifts. While efforts for distancing from the field of politics are 
clear, politics becomes more important than ever. The business-
es absorb the air of the new times: emphasising the specifically 
‘hungarian’ traits of their products and striving for acquiring 
the honouring title of ‘hungarian distinguishedness’ for their 
goods and services become important aspects of the entrepre-
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neurs’ representation strategies and their business policy. They 
do not expect any upward turn from these steps but hope for 
some political protection. in the general atmosphere of distrust 
and suspicion the underscored ‘hungarian quality’ of their per-
formance serves as a protective shield and proves their identity 
and patriotism as well. in such wider sense, any pursuit of po-
litical independence is an illusion. The expected orientation and 
its proper expression are simply the preconditions of keeping 
afloat. The political-ideological orientation of the owner-man-
ager has become an irreducible constituent and a half-hidden 
organising principle of the domestic large- and medium-size en-
terprises that importantly influences the development and the 
present state of the business. 
in this context it seems worth taking a closer look at the strate-
gies of adaptation and changes.
although they largely remained silent on the subject, there 
were several among the ‘old’ entrepreneurs who made mention-
ing of friends and mentors among the politicians at the time of 
the first interviews, i.e. around the turn of the Millennium. Back 
then, the accounts were usually accompanied with some pride 
and a hint of familiarity. We did not and could not learn from 
them whether these relationships yielded gains for the business. 
Mentioning rather served as an indicator of one’s status and as a 
proof of importance and acceptance. Furthermore, the contacts 
were understood to justify one’s political involvement and to 
express strong ties and dedication to the local community. our 
interview partners talked with pleasure about their roles in the 
local representative bodies and the achievements that they at-
tained as mayors. all of these were brought up to underscore 
that they were not simply money-making businessmen but citi-
zens with commitments to act for the benefit of the public. in 
this context, politics was not considered as the devil’s terrain 
and the field of ungentle relations, rather it was perceived as the 
framework of the strengthening potentials of civil self-organisa-
tion and its growing power to control the affairs of public life. in 
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this sense, participation in politics appeared as an honourable 
activity and one’s leading role in such activities seemed to justify 
a useful contribution to the common good. 
Ten years after, practically nothing has remained from this 
confident and promising interpretation of politics. in parallel 
with the adoption of suspicions and allegations in the public 
discourse and with the spreading of a hostile orientation to-
wards politics, there has been a profound shift also in the at-
titudes of the entrepreneurs. if there are politicians among their 
acquaintances and friends, today these relationships remain 
strictly confined to the private domain. our interview partners 
were eager to emphasise their efforts to keep away from poli-
tics in their personal and familial relations. Those of the ‘old’ 
group who used to be involved in local politics gave up acting 
as mayors and they left behind membership in the local repre-
sentative bodies as well. increasing weariness with ageing pro-
vides only a partial explanation: the changes in public orienta-
tion are more important in this regard. The entrepreneurs often 
feel that, instead of acceptance and support, their earlier public 
engagements provoked accusations – and they drew the lessons 
once and for all. if they retained something from the old roles 
these were memberships in the bodies of professional organi-
sations or, now and then, presidential and secretarial positions 
in the management of professional associations. however, our 
partners describe these bodies and associations as increasingly 
marginalised organisations that keep them involved less for the 
hope of some rewards than for maintaining a degree of loyalty. 
While the civic roles of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs have faded 
away and became emptied for the most part, the ‘new’ business-
men started their careers with a priori indifference and detach-
ment to similar involvements. By the time they appeared on the 
stage, the buoyant force and widespread attraction of the short-
lived civil and public engagements of the immediate years of the 
systemic changes had evaporated. For their part public activi-
ties are considered waste of time. When we asked them about 
 179
the frames of participation, our interviewees drew up sharp 
boundaries to let us see the exclusively private nature of one’s 
civil activities. The accounts make clear the close to non-existent 
occurrence of civil engagements in this group. The public space 
in which they are manoeuvring is organised around other ac-
tivities: whether it is hunting, some sport activities or the annual 
yacht tour, the involved relationships are formed along famil-
ial contacts and friendships that share a lot in common but that 
certainly miss any relating to the broader community. however, 
such private confinements do not imply disinterest in politics. 
as it will be shown below, members of the ‘new’ group do not 
lag behind their ‘old’ peers in forming strong opinions about the 
performance of the subsequent governments, neither are they 
short of forward-looking ideas about the desirable reorientation 
of the country’s development. 
at the same time, it is a striking feature of the ‘new’ entrepre-
neurs’ orientation that they never bind their public ideas and 
engagements to events or currents of the daily politics. in their 
eyes, the proper formation of one’s own personal political pro-
file carries much greater importance. however, the contents of 
such a profile are distanced from the immediate realm of pol-
itics: they originate in moral values, the translation of certain 
principles of identity politics, and the practical transplantation 
of the chosen world-view into one’s personal conduct. 
No doubt, distancing from politics (in the case of the ‘old’ en-
trepreneurs) and the continuous and accentual declaration of 
keeping away from it (in the case of the ‘new’ group) are clear 
reflections of the erosion of public respect for making politics. 
in the atmosphere of discontent and suspicions that surround 
politics, the prestige and reputation of the initial years of the 
transition that some enjoyed for past involvement in the dissi-
dent movement or in the work of the one-time reform circles 
have vanished. of course, there is no reason to assume that the 
retreat from public engagements led to the concurrent termina-
tion of the valuable political relationships. Nevertheless, as if 
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accommodating to a tacit agreement, the narratives uniformly 
remained silent about the business implications of these connec-
tions. But if the political relationships are not transparent then 
their content cannot be controlled. Therefore, the general silence 
can as much function as the cover-up of rampant corruption as 
indicating the genuine decline of the role of politics in the busi-
ness life. Both interpretations look plausible in simultaneity. it 
is probable that changeability of the political power and the re-
peated waves of post-election reorganisations make the advan-
tages of one’s political contacts transient and easily reversible. it 
follows that it is rather the general spirit of politics than the per-
sonal network of political relationships that matters in orienting 
the public opinion and the attempts at business adaptation alike. 
in light of the above, perhaps it is not overstated to argue that 
by the turn of the Millennium, the relationships to the politi-
cal parties and institutions and the involved personal ties have 
lost much of their significance in the adaptation strategies of the 
entrepreneurs.
however, in simultaneity with the decline of political im-
pregnation of the business the significance of politics has been 
on the rise. Relating to politics in a depersonalised way became 
the primary framework of self-assertion and the formulation of 
one’s personal ambitions. in this sense the declaration of one’s 
political creed grew to one of the fundamental constituents of 
the evolving new entrepreneurial ethos. Put it differently, while 
personal presence and active participation in politics has lost 
importance, the inescapable currents of all-influential politics 
made the owner’s ideological-political confession a most deci-
sive factor of the conduct and success of the business. The di-
mensions of the discourse have shifted in this restructuring. 
The earlier widely discussed ideas about competition, the equal-
ity of opportunities or the question of catching up to europe 
became neglected while two new-old themes took over their 
place. The two issues that gain new dominance these days are 
related: one of them is the question of individual relating to the 
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so called ‘hungarian substances’, and the other is the protection 
of national independence.
one may say that there is little cause for surprise in this shift. 
For the reorientation of the political discourse has gone along 
almost naturally with the domestic crisis of liberalism and its 
taking a defensive turn that was accompanied by the speedy 
rise of the popularity of ideas on the specific national values 
and the tight affiliation that these embody. of course, the en-
trepreneurs are no exception: they cannot pull themselves out 
of the effects of the new currents. however, while this is true, 
the situation is not that simple. Claiming permeability of the 
borders segmenting politics follows from the freedom of enter-
prise. This claim is, however, principally incompatible with the 
stressing of peculiar hungarian substances and missions that 
implies, in turn, the strong manifestation of these borders as 
points of orientation. 
Furthermore, respecting competition on the market and 
equal opportunities for participation goes against demanding 
any personal favours and exceptions. Due to their inherent 
liberal interests, one would expect that, in comparison to oth-
er social groups, the entrepreneurs have a weaker predisposi-
tion to accept the nationalist ideas that call for the strengthen-
ing of the state. however, the facts refute such expectations. 
Driven by their proudly underscored national civic self-defi-
nition and by strong pragmatic restrictions on their one-time 
liberal attitudes, the majority of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ entre-
preneurs support the new values and the new line of poli-
tics founded on them. By accommodating to the general new 
trend, they are important actors of elaborating the particular 
‘hungarian contents’ and of representing the claims on the 
protection of these contents – in economic terms, the national 
market – that they expect to be provided by the state with 
increased potency. 
at the same time, the sharp ideological-political realign-
ment renders some hope for finding remedies against the 
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frustrations that have arisen due to the long-term deteriora-
tion of business performance. By conceptualising the state as 
the guardian of national values, our interview partners ex-
pect it to efficiently counterbalance the ‘unfavourable’ market 
developments and external effects and to provide a protective 
shield for the domestic entrepreneurs and their businesses 
against the ‘power’ of the multinational companies. in this 
sense the recent shifts of the ideological-political values have 
allowed for some room for certain pragmatic efforts as well 
and thus may be regarded as crystallising points of a new po-
litical consensus of broad interest groups. as of today it is yet 
only the bidder’s side that can be identified. But the bidders 
can be sure that their new political-ideological credo will be 
resonated in the wider public: due especially to the pressure 
of the enduring crisis, the idea of the ‘interest protecting state’ 
has gained substantial popularity. Thus, a broad consensus is 
emerging. The foundation of the consensus is the general ac-
ceptance of the primary importance of the question of ‘what 
is the essence of hungarian peculiarity’. Since responses to 
this question are the starting points of political demands to-
wards the state (or more precisely, towards the government), 
our interview partners – driven by different inner and exter-
nal expectations – consider it important to formulate their 
own understandings of ‘hungarian peculiarity’. however, 
taken their personal views, the responses are greatly diversi-
fied. it can be stated with some exaggeration that there are 
as many variations of the outlined images as the number of 
those whom we asked. Concerning the content of the images, 
there is but limited weight of the generational differences be-
tween the entrepreneurs, while the departures prove signifi-
cant with regard to familial socialisation and the experiences 
that one gained about ‘hungarian identity’.
Personal identity is tied to deep-rooted family and community 
values. The terrain of experienced ‘hungarian peculiarity’ is the 
family and in many cases the religious community. however, 
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the evolving identities are understood in their broader national 
and social contexts. after the years when the necessary values 
and the required attainments of hungary’s successful accession 
to the european union had dominated the public discourse, the 
mixed experiences of successes and failures that have accom-
panied the process came to the fore. The arising ambivalences 
provide a new prism to recallibrate the values of ‘hungarian pe-
culiarity’ as the content of identity that should be preserved at 
all costs: 
in the first place, i represent the family values and the approach 
and the vision that members of our family share. We have not 
only profit- or value-maximising ambitions but we have others, 
too. Credibility, observance of the law, loyalty to the national val-
ues are top priorities for us and we make all efforts to preserve 
these. Together with our experts, we try to navigate the company 
in a way that allows for successful business but that leaves room 
to live up to our other commitments as well. [2]
By relegating the preservation of values into the private domain, 
claims on the active engagement of the state in some kinds of 
protectionist or reformist policies are given up. The reason-
ing is tinted with pragmatic liberal values. The state as the 
depository of power should not provide advantages but it also 
should refrain from inhibiting the healthy functioning of the 
entrepreneurial world. it is derogatory and hurtful for the 
domestic businessmen if advantages or exceptional treatments 
are offered to foreigners. But it is equally undesirable to support 
hungarians just because they are hungarians. Put it simply: 
the relationship between the state and the economy should 
be built on mutual independence and public policy should be 
driven by respecting competition as a guarantee of neutrality. 
however, as the lines of reasoning of our entrepreneurs show, 
these requirements hold only within the narrowly defined 
scope of the economy: 
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Concerning the state or the government one would expect sta-
bility and accountability in the first place… apart from the facts 
that we are a member of the eu, there is a single market and 
there are no customs frontiers, and there is free flow of the ideas, 
the capital and the goods, we have our own home as well. and 
as i see life in this home i would say that if i am not helped then 
i should not be hindered either. [2]
others are of a different opinion: they expect patriotic atti-
tudes and actions from the hungarian state. This idea would 
require the exact defining of the border between what has to 
be considered as ‘hungarian’ and what would be described as 
‘non-hungarian’. But such attempts would lead one to slippery 
areas where there is a high risk of arriving at historically and 
politically loaded faulty conclusions. in order to avoid such an 
outcome, the borders remain in the dark and we may only guess 
that for the interviewee it is togetherness along with economic 
cooperation that designates the contours of hungarian unity: 
oh well, considering the hungarian market, the hungarian 
businesses should be supported here. of course, it is a question 
who is a hungarian entrepreneur? an enterprise is not made 
hungarian by his owner wearing a cockade on his shirt. instead, 
it is hungarian because it is registered in hungary and because it 
produces and sells its products in hungary. and here is another 
question: what makes one hungarian? Does the person have to 
be born here or does he have to live here? however, these are 
ideological questions that i would like to avoid discussing. [5]
Whether issues of hungarian identity at the private level are 
emphasised or the reduction of national unity to the economic 
domain is discussed, it is not difficult to reveal the work of some 
ambivalent experiences in the background. Due to their embar-
rassment of the anti-entrepreneurial currents and also driven 
by the bitterness of experiencing the power of the market in 
forcing one nearly to the brink of ruins, a substantial part of the 
‘old’ entrepreneurs is of the opinion that hungarians are held 
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together only by the negative characteristics of jealousy, the 
lack of solidarity, depression, and the inclination to step down. 
as they argue, each of these characteristics is devastating, but 
taken in their interplay these forcefully undermine the spirit of 
combating against the difficulties and deprive from the ability 
and the pleasure of innovation. and generalisations are not 
missing of course: 
… nine years have passed in the meantime. During this time, the 
interest rate climbed to 40 percent and i have paid 8.5 million 
Forints for a share in a business that otherwise had a corporate 
value of 3.5 million. So much about the hungarian courts… i 
am not accusing anyone of fraud but someone cheated here. 
Who, why and how? after such experiences you come to the 
conclusion that the only thing that you want attained is a com-
promise. There is no real jurisdiction here, there is no justice… 
No comment. [4]
The key source of the problems is the lack of efficient protec-
tion: 
i have the feeling that we were sold out in the trade sector. 
Nobody protects us and nobody protected us in the past. Now 
they are beginning to talk about the hungarian products and 
about the hungarian goods. and claims are heard that the hun-
garian-owned supermarket chains should be supported for what 
the NPhMo45 has done earlier. it was given a free hand by hit-
ting companies. extremely high requirements were imposed on 
the construction of slaughterhouses and on the reconstruction of 
shops. Similar requirements are not even prescribed for Western 
europe. These authorities were exceedingly perfectionist. [18]
These traditional complaints call forth traditional responses. 
The longing for state paternalism is almost inevitable, because a 
central provider of truth needs to be somewhere: 
45 National Public health and Medical officer Service.
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oh yes it would be perfect if the state was helping entrepre-
neurs like us. When one’s opinion is asked, i keep saying that 
people are not equal in this country. each month i am paying a 
good amount of taxes and contributions but i do not really get a 
similar gift from the other side… i keep saying that it would be 
nice if the offering was a bit more equitable. But this… was not 
the case in the past and it is not so today, this is how i see it. [7]
There are two ways out from the revived tradition of complain-
ing. The first approach involves the historical widening and 
the ideological lifting of the troubles. Failures and the state of 
dependency are ills that have characterised hungarian history 
for several hundred years; one has to look at the ‘catastrophe’ of 
accessing the european union simply as an extension of these 
historical trends. it was the strong representation of our hungar-
ian identity that protected us against the storms of history even 
in times of the greatest shocks. Consequently, the programme 
is the filling and validation of the national character with new 
contemporary contents and to protect it at all costs. out of the 
several formulations of this idea, let us present here one that – 
while applying some rather schematic arguments in support of 
the pragmatic considerations – makes clear the constituents of 
the desired protection: 
as i see it, these politicians who contributed to the destruction of 
hungary are not committed hungarians. We are always looking 
for capital and since the time of king Matthias we have sold the 
country to the West. We were regularly on the side where we 
should not have been. unfortunately, this is how things hap-
pened. it would be useful to look around and recognise that 
there remained a stratum of hungarian craftsmen on whom 
one should count… For sure, we ought to change the attitudes 
because the problem with the politicians is their orientation that 
they are constantly looking outwards, while the West has no 
interest in helping hungary. We could have found out during 
the past hundred years that no one wants to help us. We should 
perhaps make a turn and we should look inwards and not in 
that direction. [34]
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Those who represent the other direction have certain effi-
cient individual responses on their minds. The programme is 
the active observance of values with collective contents. a turn 
has to be made towards the values that have remained in place 
through the entire course of hungarian history and, after elabo-
rating the concept of a culturally perceived nationhood, clear 
patriotic responses have to be formulated. The most important 
domains of these responses should be the fields of high-level 
knowledge: the worlds of arts and science. The argument goes 
as follows: 
There are excellent hungarian teachers and the hungarian guest 
lecturers also come home. i would like to sell hungarians and i 
tell you why. if somebody is buying software it is not the nation 
that matters… it is not the country of origin of the software 
which counts. one would like to buy an architect-software and 
it is of a secondary importance where it was produced. it matters 
a little, but just a little. however, when one applies to a univer-
sity abroad then it is first of all the country that one chooses. it 
follows that i have to sell first hungary… We are very good in 
adaptation, we can very quickly adapt to the changing circum-
stances. if one wants to learn how to adapt to the diversity of the 
environment then this knowledge can much better be acquired 
in hungary than in France, Japan or germany. [3]
in spite of their differences and of the diversities in the value 
contents, the lines of thought point in the same direction. 
Despite their personal success, enrichment and truly astonish-
ing performance in their business careers, the entrepreneurs 
feel a degree of discomfort in experiencing that the past decades 
of systemic transformation have brought breaches in society’s 
value system. They owe it to the general atmosphere – that many 
call an outright value crisis – that they did not receive recogni-
tion, neither were they protected by the successive governments. 
and their feelings of uncertainty are accentuated when thinking 
about the future of their businesses or the personal prospects of 
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their children. The need to reformulate the hungarian values 
arises largely from these uncertainties and ambivalent emo-
tions and its contents are essentially defensive in nature. our 
interviews make clear the lack of a common ground. The iden-
tity concepts range from the stressing of one’s private world to 
the emphasis given to the inescapably negative tendencies of 
hungarians’ common fate, but in one way or another, all the 
reasoning remain defensive in their essence. at the levels of ide-
ology and world-view, this orientation complements in a natural 
way what has been said above about the business strategies of 
retreat and withdrawal or the strivings for invisible assimilation 
through seeking ‘niche positions’ on the market. 
however, the revealed variants of the national self-image 
complement the above characterisations in two important ways. 
on the one hand, the emergence of a new national identity 
that is built on the ‘hungarian peculiarities’ points towards the 
shaping of an ideologically perceived new community. When 
above we characterised the ‘old’ group of the hungarian entre-
preneurs by a cultural orientation that centres on the values of 
liberalism, freedom, and independence, only part of the truth 
was revealed that requires an important addition at this stage: 
this orientation proved short-lived and has vanished by today. 
in our follow-up interviews, at most the mentions of neutrality 
and the claims for the equality of opportunity recall the traces 
of the earlier liberal entrepreneurial thinking. Moreover, the 
liberal values come through only in the rhetoric. if they earlier 
formed the bases of committed civil actions and generous sup-
ports then nowadays the references come into play mostly as 
dispirited remembrances or causes for nostalgia. in these cir-
cles, the marginalisation of the liberal values does not mean, of 
course, the spreading of anti-liberal views. The growing popu-
larity of the ‘non-intervening’ state rather suggests that in eco-
nomic terms the businessmen would welcome the de-politicisa-
tion of the state and its turning towards professional servicing 
by observing neutrality. at the same time, when the ideological 
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and political aspects are considered, they would expect the state 
to render the marked representation of national togetherness. 
The inward-looking orientation, the fearing of the West, and the 
accentuating of the critiques regarding the european union that 
accompany these ideas together indicate that the entrepreneurs’ 
ideal would be the protectionist state in the 18th century sense 
of the term. however, such a construction hardly would provide 
protection against an inescapable marginalisation in the current 
globalised world. at the same time, given the processes of wide 
migration, striving for such an arrangement can give rise to se-
vere ruptures of social cohesion and it can generate new exclu-
sions.
The other important novelty follows from the tensions be-
tween the searches for identity and the actual conduct of per-
sonal lives. especially our interviews with the ‘new’ entrepre-
neurs indicate that there is a strong propensity to underscore 
the common deficiencies as the fate of hungarians and to pro-
ject the ambivalences of their hungarian identity backward in 
history. Little trust in the institutions is a logical consequence 
of such projections: “the state is working badly because it used 
to work badly for centuries.” given this reasoning, there is only 
one desirable way out: this is to deepen the distance from the in-
stitutions and to strengthen the individual choices as one’s only 
reliable resources. although some partial ideas emerge to make 
public politics more efficient, the formulation of these thoughts 
has a technocratic nature. Their mentions are barely accompa-
nied by any hope that things would be moving in the right direc-
tion any time. Neutrality sometimes leaning towards cynicism 
follows from this attitude: it is necessary to cultivate good rela-
tions with the governments – be they right- or left-wing –, but 
this has to be done from sufficient distance and only with the 
minimal involvement that is needed to keep the company alive. 
however, this attitude of resignation goes hand in hand with a 
vivid searching for a way out that turns towards the accentuated 
importance of identity. Since it is rooted in personalised cultural 
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contents and individualised needs, the formulation of one’s own 
ideal national identity is a deeply personal matter that gives rise 
to a great diversity of focal values and patterns. This is the way 
how outstanding entrepreneurial performance or one’s widely 
admired business success became the foundations and the dis-
tinguished contents of identity formation. however, even these 
publicly recognised contents and values are primarily assessed 
from the individuals’ perspective: those opting for such person-
al strategies of identity formation allow at best for a receptive 
role of politics: 
of course, i have an opinion about politics and the public life 
but i hope our mineral water will remain party-neutral. The Sze-
ntkirályi mineral water is offered to all consumers in hungary. 
earlier i already suggested to the politicians to make a survey 
about those hungarian businessmen who were able to survive, 
and let us jointly rebuild the country because no one else would 
help us… i have to note that it is not a gesture on my part to the 
conservative side that i put the holy Crown on the label of the 
Szentkirályi mineral water. i was the first in the food industry 
who built on the national values, but i did not do so because of 
some party sympathy, since i did not want to express my com-
mitment to one of the political blocks. i cleaned all the foreign 
texts from our label, and i gave a clearly national foundation to 
the marketing while the brand was formed by emphasising the 
hungarian food character. (Balogh 2011, pp.131–137)
in the highly individualised search for identity, exploring and 
representing the specific hungarian contents is relegated to the 
private domain and thus the process allows for great differences 
in other walks of life. as if it was a religious faith, devotion 
to the national idea is a ‘church’ for the young entrepreneurs 
where they enter on holidays while their everyday scenes are 
elsewhere, i.e. in some other countries with markedly different 
cultures. it is one of the interesting characteristics of the ‘new’ 
entrepreneurs that their easy-going presence in the Western 
world – a distinguished feature in comparison to their ‘old’ 
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peers – has not inspired cosmopolitan orientations and has not 
brought about a european extension of their self-identities. in 
this respect their strategy is no less defensive than that of the 
‘old’ generation: their hungarian identity serves as a protective 
shield against the growing competition. it is a different mat-
ter that they relate with even less illusions and less collective 
expectations to this protective shield than members of the ‘old’ 
generation do. if some ideas embracing the larger collective still 
exist then these focus on the cultural domain – and this is cer-
tainly not incidental. as we have seen above, many of the ‘new’ 
entrepreneurs consider it as much a drive of personal develop-
ment as an expression of national commitment to contribute 
to the development and dissemination of the high-value prod-
ucts of science and arts. as an expression of their mission, they 
engage in meaningful development programmes: some establish 
training centres, others open new art galleries and yet others 
build new concert halls. although such cultural missions often 
earn broader recognition than one’s business performance the 
entrepreneurs would not think for a second of unifying the two 
areas of activities. Just to the contrary: they strictly separate the 
terrains of their dual identities of running a business and engag-
ing in cultural mediation and express with emphatic gestures 
the distinct contents of self-respect and national mission in the 
two areas. at the same time, they thoughtfully care for their new 
cultural institutions and make all efforts to protect them from 
the unexpected fluctuations that hit business with risky bumps. 
all what has been said so far about the identities and self-
images of the entrepreneurs seem worth reconsidering from the 
repeatedly emerging perspective of the spreading of bourgeois 
mentality and values. The picture seems troubled. as it appears 
the stratum of grand entrepreneurs has given up its previous 
aspirations for becoming the civilian elite of hungarian society 
that would proudly provide role models and patterns of behav-
iour and conduct. Contemporary history seems to have taken 
an opposite trend. The lasting crisis of the country wore out the 
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nascent citizens’ initiatives and deprived the arising new civil 
movements of their developmental potentials. The trends of an 
anti-civilian turn can be most clearly seen in the ever stronger 
attempts at redefining the leading values and the contents of 
community cohesion. By sensitively following the re-focusing of 
the public spirit, the hungarian large and medium-size entre-
preneurs became the apostles of inward-turning patterns and a 
critical relating to the general european values while in practical 
terms they advocate with some etatist attitudes the strengthen-
ing of collective self-protection by the national state. True, when 
the daily business is considered, one can detect some remnants 
of the one-time liberal thinking and cosmopolitan openness in 
the entrepreneurial behaviour and the business contacts. how-
ever, the entrepreneurs do not see any chance for representing 
these values in a collective way: in their view, breaking out can 
at best be an individual programme. in this way the discrepancy 
between thinking about the larger collective and one’s personal 
engagements instigate for giving up the elite roles and motivate 
for ‘privatising’ one’s own personhood. The pulling effects still 
work: the withdrawal and increasingly defensive attitude of the 
entrepreneurs serve as norms for others, for sure. however, the 
societal-political impulse of these norms is the abandonment of 
the aspirations for becoming integrated into the broader euro-
pean culture and value system that implies, in turn, a resigned 
acceptance of the irreversible second rank-position of the coun-
try. one does not need to paint in details the dangers of such a 
turn. 
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CoNCLuSioNS
as the discussions of this book demonstrated, the dynamism of 
a remarkable part of those large and medium-size companies 
in the hands of the ‘old’ owner-managers that had grown fast 
in the first decade after the systemic change, has lost impetus 
and stopped growing in the years after the Millennium. (it is 
worth repeatedly emphasising that the turn clearly occurred 
before the world economic crisis of 2008.) The slowing rise of 
the number of firms and the pessimistic prospects of an increas-
ing part of the businesses indicate that the loss of dynamism 
was not an isolated phenomenon in the hungarian economy in 
the first decade of the new century. however, it cannot be said 
that the recession hit everyone – this was not the case even in 
our limited sample. in fact, in this small sample of companies 
important exceptions could be identified like the fast growing 
businesses of the ‘new’ entrepreneurs that started after the year 
2000 or the invariably successful firms of those ‘old’ business-
men who maintained growth and expansion by a smart business 
policy that was complemented by focusing on innovations and 
fast responsiveness. Moreover, one has to add to the series of 
exceptions a whole range of further examples of those success 
stories of the hungarian business society that became known 
from the media.
The wide array and the simultaneity of successes and failures 
indicates that the macro-processes of the national economy do 
not provide enough explanatory power for satisfactorily de-
scribing and interpreting the phenomena of retreat, shrinkage, 
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and the loss of impulse. our interview-based study revealed 
an extensive scope of interpretations regarding the impacts of 
the macro-level environment while it also gave insights into the 
varying attempts at accommodation or break-through and the 
colourful patterns of the personal-entrepreneurial aspirations. 
The interview-based micro-level analysis and the exploring and 
accurate describing of the inside structuring of the cases im-
proved the potentials of disclosing the reasons, the drivers, and 
the economic and non- economic factors at play in influencing 
rise or decline.
Table 9 
Factors influencing the similarities and differences between the two 
groups of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ entrepreneurs and their businesses
Processes and features explaining 
the performance differences
Processes and features with 
limited or no explanatory 
power regarding the 
performance differences
entrepreneurs’
– age
– knowledge accumulation in the 
school system
– knowledge and skills 
accumulated out of the school 
system
entrepreneurs’
– basic socio-demographic 
indicators (educational 
attainment, sex, residence)
Businesses
– market behaviour
– competition and market 
distribution
Businesses
– industry, branch
– innovative performance
– state subsidies, public 
procurement
 
Table 9 summarises the most important constituents of the per-
sonal and company histories. The classification grew out of ex-
periencing differences in the explanatory power of the similari-
ties and the departures. While the similarities between the two 
groups of the entrepreneurs and their businesses provide lim-
ited insights, the departures prove much stronger in revealing 
the background forces of performance differences in the first 
decade of the new century. Summing up and comparing the 
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similarities and the differences also helps us to understand why 
the members of the ‘old’ group were successful in mobilising 
their accumulated human, cultural, and network capital mainly 
in the 1990s while their ‘new’ peers built on the respective forms 
of capital in the first years after the Millennium. 
The two groups are similar in their socio-demographic pro-
files: men with a degree of higher education and living in ur-
ban areas, furthermore, those coming from middle-class back-
grounds represent the decisive majority among the ‘old’ as well 
as among the ‘new’ entrepreneurs. Based on these similarities it 
was found that the hard indicators of sex, place of living, fam-
ily background, and the level of education do not explain the 
performance differences of the two groups. Regularity of the 
group features in the subsequent generations of the grand en-
trepreneurs rather turns one’s attention to the closed nature of 
this stratum while it also underscores the fact that the given 
combination of the factors makes probable entry to the business 
life but it has no explanatory power with regard to long-term 
involvement. 
at the same time, the significant difference in age between 
the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ businessmen turns out to be a power-
ful explanatory factor of the performance differences of the past 
decade. The proportion of those who were considering a retreat 
from the business or who gave up their entrepreneurial activity 
was much higher in the ‘old’ group than among their dominant-
ly young ‘new’ peers. in other words, their declining ambitions 
and restrained business plans also might have contributed to 
the worsening performances of the ageing ‘old’ entrepreneurs. 
Nonetheless, the presented cases of some successful ‘old’ and 
failing ‘new’ entrepreneurs and their businesses show that age 
on its own does not explain the departures in performance. 
however, differences in the life courses, the contents of knowl-
edge and skills as acquired in- and outside of formal education 
and also in the established contacts powerfully contributed to 
the experienced divergences in the two groups’ entrepreneurial 
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careers in the first decade of the new century. in comparison to 
the ‘old’ group, the numbers of those who systematically learned 
subjects dealing with the functioning of the market economy 
and who acquired such useful knowledge abroad were higher 
among the ‘new’ entrepreneurs. 
Differences in performance were influenced by the distinct 
spaces of out-of-school learning as well. Members of the ‘old’ 
group mostly accumulated their managerial experiences and 
business contacts at the large state-owned companies and coop-
eratives or in the illegal and legal private sectors of the socialist 
system. at the same time, the ‘new’ businessmen learned in a 
large number in the different terrains of the new private econo-
my and expanded their knowledge primarily in the businesses 
of their parents or at foreign-owned companies. The collected 
experiences were enriched by working abroad prior to starting 
their business: even if such employment episodes did not take 
place in their future field, the would-be ‘new’ entrepreneurs got 
acquainted with the business culture and the mode of operation 
of the companies of the advanced market economies.
as to the characteristics of the enterprises, it was found that 
the specificities of the products and services do not explain the 
performance differences of the companies of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
entrepreneurs: the distributions according to the profiles (i.e., by 
branches and industries) were much similar in the two groups, 
furthermore, the respective firms worked as much in the declin-
ing as in the booming industries.46 Furthermore, we could not 
find remarkable differences in the innovative performances of 
the companies of the ‘old and ‘new’ entrepreneurs either: we 
met a few examples of rather weak innovative activity in both 
groups that did not distinguish them from the mainstream of 
the hungarian economy. The revealed exceptions – huge invest-
ments to modernise a certain part of the production chain – fo-
cused mainly on complementary activities (marketing, advertis-
46 although the similarities in profiles partly follow from our sampling 
methods, still the phenomenon deserves recognition.
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ing) and served rather the survival than attempts at increasing 
the market share of the company or entering to new market 
segments. The attitudes of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ businessmen 
seemed equally conservative in this respect. 
Considering the economic relationships to the state – the fre-
quency of the state subsidies and preferences, the share of state 
procurements –, the two groups proved similar in this regard as 
well. More precisely: from the standpoint of the daily operations 
of their companies, there were no differences in the presence 
of connections to the state. however, rather important depar-
tures characterised the start-up conditions: members of the ‘old’ 
group – especially those who were involved in the privatisation 
process – took out preferential loans from the state with higher 
frequency than their ‘new’ peers who, in turn, tended to use 
their families’ capital to launch their businesses. But these dif-
ferences in business start-ups did not play any significant role 
at the later stages. after hungary’s accession to the european 
union the roles and functions of the direct state subsidies and 
loans were taken over by a new system of grants financed from 
the european structural funds. as it turns out from our post-
accession interviews with the two groups, the new-style grants 
are frequently applied for by both and, for the most part, a com-
bination of bank loans and project-financed contributions has 
become an ordinary constituent of the daily operations. at the 
same time, our study revealed very little about state procure-
ments. This was a very sensitive issue already ten years before. 
however, the fading relations of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs to the 
local governments and the declining importance of the profes-
sional bodies in their eyes indicate that the state as a serious 
player on the market has lost a good deal of its significance. at 
the same time, members of the ‘new’ group were always more 
interested in private economic contacts and in the opportunities 
for occupying the niches of the markets under the control of the 
multinationals – hence, the state as an important partner never 
appeared on their horizon. 
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So far this concluding chapter focused on the similarities be-
tween the two groups of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ entrepreneurs. 
however, our study also revealed important differences between 
the two groups that manifest themselves primarily in the depart-
ing forms of business behaviour. a range of group-specific char-
acteristics could be identified in the ways of entering the market 
and selecting the accessible markets and market niches as well as 
in applying certain tactics in the competition. Starting their en-
trepreneurial career in the 1990s, the ‘old’ businessmen entered 
the markets of the exiting firms (often their bankrupted predeces-
sors) and they expanded their turnover and share on these, often 
shrinking, markets. at the same time, the members of the ‘new’ 
group, who started their businesses around the Millennium, tried 
to expand their turnover primarily by the purposeful adjusting 
of the composition of their products and services and by a careful 
selection of the approachable market niches. 
The two different strategies needed different tools and tactics 
and the consequences were different as well. a remarkable part 
of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs overestimated the scope and the endur-
ance of the unique and unrepeatable expansion of markets in the 
first years of transition. Due to such miscalculations, they were 
forced to engage in an unplanned change in the markets in the 
first years after the Millennium. Many of them tried to counter-
balance the shrinking turnover and market share by selling or 
leasing a part of their real assets. however, the saturation of the 
real estate market and the exhaustion of the construction boom 
remarkably reduced the efficiency of this tactic within a few years. 
Similar attempts at market restructuring could not be found 
in the business arsenal of the ‘new’ entrepreneurs who expand-
ed the assets of their companies by relying exclusively on their 
income. Contrary to their ‘old ‘peers who were often shocked 
by the compelling changes, the new businessmen planned their 
steps years in advance and proceeded along the envisioned ac-
tions and stages. These important differences carry long-term 
implications on the entrepreneurial policies. While the ‘old’ 
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businessmen often engage in improvised sales of parts of the 
company’s assets and/or apply ad hoc reductions of their work-
force, their ‘new’ peers focus with particular emphasis on the 
balance among the different segments of the company policy 
and implement a moderate gradualism in all of their actions. 
in our view, these differences of the market behaviours have 
considerable explanatory power. although the departures do 
not provide exhaustive explanations for the group-specific oc-
currences of successes and failures, they draw attention to the 
importance of the longer-term processes of company history 
and the related gradual adjustment of business behaviour and 
call for a dynamic interpretation of these factors.
in sum, in the analysis that focused on the economic factors 
behind the decline of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs and the simulta-
neous rise and relative advantages of their ‘new’ peers we ap-
plied a multifactoral approach. Such a multifactoral explanation 
is contrasting the popular interpretations of the falling of the 
entrepreneurial impulse. The majority of the public turn with 
resentments against the capitalists, the large property owners 
and especially against the group of those new entrepreneurs 
who came from earlier managerial positions in the large state-
owned companies (Bakonyi 2010). according to the public opin-
ion surveys, this majority is convinced that the entrepreneurs 
in question first artfully grabbed their properties (and often 
turned to tricky and unlawful solutions in doing so), but due 
to their incompetence they were unable to successfully manage 
their new companies. although aversions to the large properties 
and suspicions about their acquisition are general in hungarian 
society, the ‘new’ stratum of the grand entrepreneurs seems to 
enjoy somewhat more acceptance. on the one hand, the main 
source of their emergence and later growth is the family-owned 
business47 that is seen by a certain degree of toleration. 
47 Because of the lack of comprehensive statistics we have to be cautious in 
our formulation. This statement is clear in the circles of our interview partners 
but it is not more than a hypothetical induction on the entirety of the large 
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on the other hand, the firm take-over and the gradual 
growth of these businesses evidence competence and know-
led ge.48 however, the findings of our earlier research already 
questioned the validity of the popular opinions about the 
incompetence of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs – and primarily of 
those who acquired property by privatisation. it was found 
that the acquisition mattered less: the group in question owed 
their successes primarily to the ways it was able to adapt to 
the new conditions and how it could smartly capitalise on 
earlier acquired contacts and knowledge and skills. our new 
study reinforced the conclusions that we drew ten years ear-
lier: bankruptcies and shrinkages of the last two decades took 
place at companies owned by the ‘old’ capitalists coming from 
the state-owned companies as well as at businesses owned by 
those coming from the second (private) economy of the social-
ist system. The great majority of those in the ‘new’ group start-
ed their successful businesses after the end of the privatisation 
process. This means that in the majority of the cases the events 
of bankruptcy or slow-down were not caused by the dissipa-
tion of the undeservedly acquired property. 
But, having said all the above, we cannot avoid the usual 
methodological difficulties of multifactorial analyses. When 
searching explanations to the factors and causes behind the 
business slowdown, how should one organise the interdepend-
ent processes that often strengthen each other’s impact into a 
meaningful ordering? how to evaluate the skills and know-
led ge of the entrepreneurs in these processes? how should one 
measure the importance or weight of the different factors?
instead of ranking or weighing, we tried to get closer to the 
explanation of the differences concerning the market strate-
and middle-size entrepreneurs who started a business after the turn of the 
Millennium.
48 The sensing of differences in competence to the advantage of the 
‘new’ businessmen accentuates the negative assessment of the ‘old’ group 
by depriving its members of any comparative qualities and making them 
responsible for their own decline.
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gies, business behaviour and representation of the two groups 
by describing those social processes of the past decades that 
meaningfully influenced the performance and business con-
ducts of the domestic big and medium-size entrepreneurs. it 
was one of the important findings of the follow-up phase of our 
research that the successes of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs whom we 
revisited were owed to their smartness in purposefully utilising 
the know led g e, skills and contacts that they had accumulated 
in the shortage economy under socialism. They built up their 
new companies on the foundations of earlier gained expertise 
in managing the large socialist firms or the informal networks 
of businesses and deliberately capitalised on the network capital 
that had been developed in mobilising the manpower and also in 
the actions of mutual bailouts. in the earlier stage of our research, 
it was mainly the positive returns of these skills, knowledge, and 
networks that we assessed as playing primary roles in the main-
tained market developments. 
Ten years after one can better see the drawbacks of these de-
velopments. in a retrospect, one can identify the negative returns 
of the hereditary endowment: the risks of an excessive operation 
of those skills, knowledge, and networks that had been accumu-
lated in the period of socialism. We tried to demonstrate that the 
failures and setbacks were not caused only by the depreciation 
and obsolescence of this ‘heritage’. The study revealed particu-
lar cases of entrapped enclosures and typical situations of slow 
and inadequate adaptation. The very sources of the fast growth 
in the first years of transition – the abundantly available stock of 
buildings and machines after privatisation, the markets inher-
ited or received from the collapsed state-owned companies, the 
consciously developed familiarity of the workplaces – became 
the barriers of the successful further development. The ‘old’ en-
trepreneurs reluctantly engaged in the lay-off of the surplus la-
bour force (even of the part who were inefficient and incapable 
of learning), they postponed technological modernisation and 
took off the agendas of the necessary market changes due to ex-
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cess demand and saturation that seemed unexpected novelties 
in their eyes.
as we saw, most of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs started their busi-
nesses through privatisation, while the majority of their ‘new’ 
peers acquired the initial capital and gained experiences in the 
family businesses of their parents. it follows that those who start-
ed the business by relying on the familial relations do not share 
the impressions that bound the ‘old’ group to the large compa-
nies. at the same time, the ‘new’ entrepreneurs have important 
experiences about how organic development takes place and also 
about gradualness in growing from small to a middle-size com-
pany and then further transforming the latter into a large busi-
ness. it may follow from these differences that while the most 
important indicator of success is fast growth for the ‘old’ group, 
expansion is but only one of the options for the ‘new’ business-
men who regard gradualness the most important precondition 
of their success. Furthermore, the ‘old’ businessmen consider the 
foreign owned companies as dangerous competitors while their 
‘new’ peers see them as business partners in developing the mar-
ket niches for their expansion, though they carefully avoid get-
ting into competitive relations with these giants. 
Personal experiences play an important role in the differ-
ing assessments of the multinationals and the foreign-owned 
banks. The multinationals – that were earlier known from a dis-
tance as foreign trade partners – appeared in the business world 
of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs in the mid-1990s. in comparison, the 
world of the foreign-owned companies is a natural environment 
and a terrain of learning and networking for the ‘new’ business-
men. This difference partly follows from the relative advantages 
of the latter group in their command of foreign languages and 
their early experiences of enduring employment in the Western 
market economies (often including working at one of the mul-
tinationals). The management practices that the ‘new’ entrepre-
neurs acquired at the multinational companies, the caring but 
rational relationship between the employer and the employees 
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also proves more efficient than the prevailing patterns in the 
firms of their ‘old’ peers that are mostly shaped by paternalistic 
traditions and that often centre on the emotionally driven un-
derscoring of shared endangerment.
The advantages that the ‘new’ entrepreneurs enjoyed in the 
early years of the new century did not only follow from lacking 
the burdens of the socialist heritage but these were also founded 
by their knowledge of the working of the market economy that 
was more sophisticated and deeper than what the ‘old’ entrepre-
neurs could acquire about the subject. 
a large share of the discussions in the earlier chapters was de-
voted to the problem of trust deficit that is a traditional ailment 
of hungarian history and that dangerously expanded during 
socialism and turned on a rise after the systemic changes. This 
negative factor of development that continuously has restrained 
the performance of hungarian society has differently impacted 
the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ entrepreneurs. 
The deficit in trust that, apart from the most personal rela-
tions, penetrates all social contacts and that recurrently under-
mines the legitimacy of the initiatives from above is an important 
constituent of the socialist heritage that has become intensified 
by the negative public perception of the privatisation process. 
Due to the latter development, the lack of trust occupies a cen-
tral position in the way how the ‘old’ entrepreneurs think about 
society and also in the shaping of their daily business. Similar 
orientations practically do not manifest themselves in the world 
of the ‘new’ businessmen. in their perceptions, trust is one of 
the necessary conditions of making a business successful and 
manageable and as such it can be created by applying the appro-
priate technologies much like to procure the needed machines 
or equipment. 
While it expresses congruence to the trends in the developed 
world, the attraction of the ‘new’ entrepreneurs to the family-
owned business formation is the source of further advantages. 
First of all, this formation provides an efficient counterweight to 
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the decline of trust in the broader environment while it also ren-
ders the necessary conditions of a balanced growth and expan-
sion. Moreover, this form of ownership offers the most advan-
tageous qualities of a rational and effective distribution of the 
wealth and the intergenerational transmission of it. For sure, the 
‘old’ businessmen are equally aware of these useful properties 
of family ownership. however, they often face insurmountable 
difficulties in their attempts at creating this formation and meet 
the resistance of their children or the open turning away from 
the entrepreneurial track that the next generation does not find 
attractive enough. The ‘new’ businessmen come from another 
group of the young generation. Developing the company in the 
hands of the family or starting an independent business on a 
part of it seem appealing and promising options for the majority 
of them and they consider it a great advantage to be furnished 
by the necessary conditions through inheritance. 
For the most part, the experienced differences in the politi-
cal connections and the forms of political participation are also 
linked to the divergences in the two groups’ relating to the issue 
of trust. 
Ten years earlier, one recognised a sort of careful distancing 
in the ways how the ‘old’ entrepreneurs looked at the sphere 
of politics and how they considered political engagements. al-
though the interviews did not reveal their political affiliation, 
they were open to discuss their political values and shared their 
opinion about the concurrent political events. The then emerg-
ing left-liberal orientation of the group (the approval of the 
welfare state and the acceptance of the notion of the regulated 
market competition that is not disturbed by any skewing state 
interventions) has become outdated: it does not fit into the po-
litical changes of the past ten years and it is especially in contrast 
to the most recent currents. The emptying and fading away of 
their personal ties to certain left-wing or liberal politicians also 
did not improve the market positions of the ‘old’ group – those 
producing for the state got into truly troubled situations. These 
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changes and the dominance of the political right first in the lo-
cal governments then in the central administration justify the 
retreat of the ‘old’ businessmen form any direct involvement in 
politics and also explains their resignation from the leading po-
sitions of the professional organisations.
an overview of the respective orientations and relationships 
of the ‘new’ entrepreneurs highlighted some further aspects of 
these developments. 
given their withdrawal to the closed circles of the family, 
the enterprise, and their private relations, members of the lat-
ter group also retreat from assuming political roles. as we have 
seen, they have a more or less neutral and ‘technocratic’ relation-
ship to the political life. in their eyes, the political power and the 
prevailing laws, orders, and regulations belong as much to the 
given of the business and management as do the conditions of 
the market demand or the potential cooperative relations. how-
ever, in comparison to their ‘old’ peers, the ‘new’ businessmen 
are better sensing the increased competition on the global or, 
at least, on the european markets, and therefore they are more 
receptive to the political discourses that claim the protection of 
the national capital and that emphatically refer to the varying 
dangers of globalisation. The ‘new’ entrepreneurs try to under-
score their technocratic and neutral attitudes but they very well 
know and excellently use the conservative right-wing vocabu-
lary and the symbols of national self-defence and openly declare 
their loyalty to these values. in contrast to the general trends, 
there are exceptional figures in this group who, instead of keep-
ing distance, emphasise their political identifications: a smaller 
subgroup is strongly committed to the so-called national side 
and the most dedicated ones are political actors. all in all, the 
‘new’ entrepreneurs better inhabit and more efficiently use the 
political arena than their retreating ‘old’ peers with the obvious 
deficiencies in speaking the new discourse and sharing the half-
heartedly internalised new values. 
The overview of the selected three key aspects of the socio-
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historical profile of the domestic grand entrepreneurs (the 
group-specific forms of the historical heritage, the relations of 
trust and the issues of political loyalty) renders some further 
important lessons: viewed in this broad social embedding, the 
directly discernible social and economic characteristics emphat-
ically show the differences between the two groups – the two 
‘generations’ – of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ entrepreneurs while they 
also help to understand the institutionalisation of these differ-
ences.
This means that the answer to our initial and repeatedly 
formulated question of whether the hungarian grand entre-
preneurs of the day are citizens or businessmen cannot be as 
optimistic as our assessment on the last pages of our previous 
book was. First of all, our recent research highlighted a range 
of multi- dimensional deep differences between the ‘old’ and 
the ‘new’ entrepreneurs: it appears as if these two groups did 
not belong to the same social stratum or they represented two 
distinct status-groups. This in turn implies that the patterns of-
fered by the ‘old’ group are not followed: their ‘new’ peers are 
differently moving in different spaces, they conduct their busi-
nesses according to different norms and rules, and they also dif-
fer in their aspirations and values. however, for the business-
men fulfilling the roles of an elite the values, aspirations and 
behavioural patterns of the two groups should converge and go 
through a joint fine-tuning. 
at the same time, there are some further obstacles that hin-
der the crystallisation of the norms of a (grand)bourgeoisie. as 
we have seen, the defensive attitudes of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs 
involved their distancing form the public spheres and the ter-
rains of political participation and inspired them to an emphatic 
retreat into the private domain. The members of the ‘new’ group 
applied a more limited perspective from the beginning and their 
focus was and remained the strengthening of the family frame-
works. in this sense the (grand)bourgeois attitude of wishing to 
have a say in the affairs of the country has remained without rep-
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resentation in the circles of middle-size and large entrepreneurs: 
the norms of the citoyen who is ready to act for and on behalf of 
the community have vanished. in close association with this de-
velopment, the ideological orientations became more ‘swampy’: 
the frequent use of the indicative contents, phrases and expres-
sions of the nationalist rhetoric in the follow-up interviews with 
the ‘old’ businessmen demonstrates their efforts to tightly adapt 
to the restructuring of the ideological-political currents of the 
public discourse. one may say that the act of confessing one’s 
ideological-political commitment has become externalised and 
easily commutable on demand. however, the dissemination of 
the (grand)bourgeois norms and values would need a robust 
and unmissable language. The retreat from the construction and 
fine-tuning of such a language signals the spreading of a be-
havioural ethos that celebrates withdrawal to the private sphere 
and that claims responsibilities exclusively within this domain. 
in other words, the new trend demonstrates the abandoning of 
the ideals of the bourgeois-citoyen development from yet another 
perspective. 
in an overview of the barriers of such a development we have 
to consider at last the deepened controversies of the relations ‘to 
the rest of the world’. as if they adapted to the newest wave of 
xenophobia that overwhelms the country today (Sík 2012), eu-
rope has ceased to be the desired point of reference and the de-
pository of freedom and well-being for the interviewed middle-
size and grand entrepreneurs who see it instead as the source 
of unpleasant burdens. our interview partners strongly criticise 
the over-bureaucratised working and the pointlessly qualified 
rules of the european union and continue their argumentation 
with a range of complaints about the unequal distribution of the 
european benefits among the member states. Furthermore, the 
multinationals that represent the outer world on domestic soil 
often appear in their accounts as the initiators of the person-
al entrepreneurial failures. in this highly emotional narrative 
there remains limited scope for the countervailing advantages: 
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the potentials of acquiring a culture of production, a know-how 
of organisation and management and a balanced manpower 
policy are mentioned at best with second-order importance. 
at the same time, both groups of our interviewees rely on the 
foreigners in a multitude of their activities. as was demonstrat-
ed, they make full use of the freedom of movement and travel-
ling: not to mention the economic advantages, they extensively 
enjoy the learning opportunities, recreational and cultural en-
gagements that are on offer abroad. however, it is important 
to see that the pragmatic mentioning of these advantages is as-
sociated with a strong demand of national isolation. Freedom 
becomes a ‘private good’ but in the aspects of public interests 
the outer world is very often the source of disappointment and 
hindrances. This attitude renounces the former desire of adapt-
ing to the european standards and it gives up the conception 
that hungarians as european citizens would create their new 
identity.
The current aspiration is the opposite: the new focus is the 
claim of national self-defence. in this programme our common 
tragedies and the new forms of our ‘oppression’ represent the 
leitmotivs. in the spirit of this programme our interview part-
ners position themselves by stressing their ‘plebeian’ qualities. 
They do not want to be distinguished and they refuse to become 
the leaders of any all-embracing modernisation projects. how-
ever, this orientation undermines their own lead in moulding 
the desirable patterns of adaptation: by their capitulation the 
entrepreneurs implicitly accept the provincial marginalisation 
of the country – and together with it, of the national commu-
nity – and agree to the endurance of the peripheral positioning 
of hungarian society. Based on these conditions, there is little 
hope for the emergence of a new elite that is able to provide dy-
namism to the country’s modernisation. 
The once promising initiatives of the forming of an elite 
from the stratum of the grand entrepreneurs have evaporated 
by now. it seems to us that the trend is irreversible. however, a 
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pragmatic social-political reform programme cannot be achieved 
without the strengthening of the value-setting elites: lacking 
such a leadership involves the endurance of the country’s en-
trapped situation. The task of drafting the alternatives towards 
a positive turn is beyond the scope of our study. Nevertheless, 
it can be stated with some certainty that it is hard to imagine 
a halt to the country’s marginalisation in the european space 
and to find the path of modernisation without the self-assured 
middle-size and grand entrepreneurs who have enough en-
ergy and faith to once again take on the lead by inspiring and 
shaping development to the benefit of society in its entirety. 
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aPPeNDiX
Some characteristics of our interview partners
Below the reader finds a brief portrayal of our ‘old’ and ‘new’ interview 
partners by the following characteristics:
– the age of the entrepreneur at the time of the completion of the data 
collection 
– gender 
– the highest level of education 
– some basic information about the company/companies owned by 
the entrepreneur (in the case of the ‘old’ entrepreneurs: before and 
after the Millennium; in the case of the ‘new’ entrepreneurs: in the 
period before 2008)
– the registered office and place of business of the company (lead 
company) 
The identification numbers in brackets are used for referencing in 
the body-text of the book.
The ‘old’ entrepreneurs
 1. 45-year-old man; university degree in economics; before 2000: 
a large company in the food industry that went bankrupt; after 
2000: owner-manager of a stagnating tax-consulting small com-
pany; the company’s registered office and place of business are in 
Budapest.
 2. 61-year-old man; chemical engineer; before and after 2000: owner- 
manager of a growing large pharmaceutical company; registered 
office in Budapest, places of businesses in Budapest and in large 
villages.
 3. 60-year-old man; physicist, PhD; before 2000: owner-manager of 
a growing computer company; after 2000; he sold his earlier busi-
ness and operates a newly established small real estate company; the 
company’s registered office and place of business are in Budapest.
 4. 56-year-old man; vocational training school; before 2000: owner-
manager of a growing large company with agricultural and con-
 217
struction profiles; after 2000: owner-manager of a large company 
with highly fluctuating performance in agriculture and construc-
tion; the company’s registered office and place of business are in a 
large village.
 5. 51-year-old man; trade and catering college; his fast grown foreign 
trade company went bankrupt at the end of the 1990s; after 2000: 
minority owner of a slowly growing small business in the energy 
industry; registered office and place of the business are unidenti-
fied.
 6. 61-year-old man; university degree in law; his fast growing secu-
rity company went bankrupt at the end of the 1990s; after 2000: 
owner of an expanding law firm; the company’s registered office 
and place of business are in a large town in the countryside.
 7. 61-year-old man; chemical engineer; before 2000: owner-manager 
of a fast growing large baking company; after 2000: after his com-
pany went bankrupt and its part were sold, he started a chain of 
small electronic trade companies; the company’s registered office 
(headquarter) is in a large town in the countryside; places of busi-
nesses are in a large town in the countryside and in Romania and 
Slovakia.
 8. 68-year-old man; mechanical engineer; before 2000: owner-man-
ager of a growing engineering company; after 2000: owner-man-
ager of a shrinking engineering company with additional profiles 
in real estate marketing and trade; the company’s registered office 
and place of business are in Budapest.
 9. 64-year-old man; PhD in mathematics; before 2000: owner-man-
ager of a growing food company; after 2000 he sold the company 
and started a fast growing real estate development company. The 
company’s registered office and place of business are in Budapest.
10. 54-year-old woman; agrarian engineer; before 2000: owner-man-
ager of a growing service company; after 2000: owner of a shrink-
ing small service company; the company’s registered office and 
place of business are in Budapest.
11. 62-years-old woman; agrarian engineer, journalist, business ad-
ministrator; before 2000: owner-manager of a growing large com-
pany manufacturing furniture and providing service in interior 
architecture; after 2000: after the company went bankrupt she es-
tablished a new small business providing services and advising in 
interior architecture; the company’s registered office and place of 
business are in Budapest.
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12. 74-year-old man; college degre in engineering; before 2000: own-
er-manager of a growing stove and iron foundry products com-
pany; after 2000: due to financial difficulties, he sold some parts 
of the business; the new owner has successfully consolidated the 
company; the company’s registered office and place of business are 
in a large town in the countryside.
13. 63-year-old man; university degree in economics; before 2000: 
owner-manager of a growing medium-size company in safety 
equipment manufacturing and distribution; after 2000: director-
owner of a newly established company that was founded on the 
basis of the earlier bankrupt business; the company’s registered of-
fice and place of business are in Budapest.
14. 50-year-old man; technical college degree; before 2000: owner-
manager of a slowly growing medium-size construction company; 
after 2000: owner of a shrinking construction and real estate mar-
keting company; the company’s registered office and place of busi-
ness are in Budapest.
15. 60-year-old man; technical college; before 2000: owner-manager 
of a fast growing medium-size plastic processing company; after 
2000: owner-manager of a fast growing large plastic processing 
company; the company’s registered office: small town; place of 
businesses: towns in hungary, Romania and Slovakia.
16. 64-year-old male; technical university degree; before 2000: own-
er-manager of a growing electrical company; after 2000: owner-
manager of a declining electrical company under liquidation in the 
weeks of the interview; the company’s registered office and place 
of business are in Budapest. 
17. 63-year-old man; chemical engineer; before 2000: owner-manager 
of a fast growing medium-size computer hardware provider com-
pany; after 2000: owner-president of a fast growing large computer 
hardware providing company; the company’s registered office and 
place of business are in Budapest.
18. 60-year-old man; food commercial vocational training school; be-
fore 2000: owner-manager of a group of companies that includes a 
growing firm in the meat industry, a hotel, and an equestrian park, 
after 2000: further expanding large company in the meat indus-
try, a hotel and an equestrian park; the company’s registered office 
and places of businesses are in a small town.
19. 49-year-old man; university degree in economics; before 2000: 
owner-manager of a growing medium-size financial services com-
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pany; after 2000: owner-manager of the further growing financial 
services company; the company’s registered office and place of 
business are in Budapest.
20. 58-year-old man; university degree in engineering; before 2000: 
owner-manager of a growing medium-size engineering design 
and mechanic company; after 2000: owner-manager of a shrink-
ing small engineering design company; the company’s registered 
office and place of business are in Budapest.
21. 45-year-old man; agronomist; before and after 2000: owner-man-
ager of a growing agricultural company; the company’s registered 
office and place of business are in a large town in the countryside.
22. 67-year-old man; college degree in agriculture; owner-manager of 
a medium-size agricultural company which grew before and stag-
nated after 2000; the company’s registered office and place of busi-
ness are in a large town in the countryside.
23. 57-year-old man; university degree in construction engineering; 
owner-manager of a medium-size construction company which 
grew before and stagnated after 2000; the company’s registered 
office and place of business are in a large town in the countryside.
24. 64-year-old man; technical college degree; owner-manager of a 
medium-size automotive wholesale company that grew before and 
after 2000; the company’s registered office and place of business 
are in Budapest.
25. 61-year-old man; mechanical technician; before 2000: owner-man-
ager of a medium size ventilation equipment manufacturing com-
pany; after 2000: after the bankruptcy and reorganisation of the 
company he became adviser of the now stagnating small company; 
the company’s registered office and place of business are in Buda-
pest.
26. 51-year-old man; mechanical technician; owner-manager of a 
large office and communication engineering company that grew 
before and after 2000; the company’s registered office and place of 
business are in Budapest.
27. 55-year-old man; business college degree; before 2000: owner-
manager of a growing large precision engineering company; after 
2000: owner-manager of the now stagnating precision engineering 
company. the company’s registered office is in Budapest; places of 
business are in Budapest and towns in the countryside.
28. 58-years-old man; university degree in mechanical engineering; 
before and after 2000: owner-manager of a growing large meat 
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company. the company’s registered office is in Budapest; place of 
business are in Budapest and small towns in the countryside.
29. 60-year-old man; university degree in construction engineering; 
before and after 2000: owner-manager of a growing large con-
struction company; the company’s registered office is in Budapest; 
places of business: over the country.
30. 59-year-old woman; university degree in economics; before 2000: 
owner-manager of a growing large clothing company; after 2000: 
owner-manager of a shrinking medium-size clothing company; the 
company’s registered office and place of business are in Budapest.
31. 57-year-old woman; university degree in art history; before and 
after 2000: owner-manager of a growing medium-size company 
dealing with art trade; the company’s registered office and place of 
business are in Budapest.
32. 60-year-old man, university degree; before 2000: owner-manag-
er of a medium- size growing construction company; after 2000: 
owner-manager of the now shrinking construction company; the 
company’s registered office and place of business are in Budapest.
33. 62-year-old man; university degree in engineering; before 2000: 
owner-manager of a growing medium-size precision engineering 
company; after 2000: owner-manager of the further growing pre-
cision engineering company; the company’s registered office is in 
Budapest; places of business are in Budapest and a small town in 
the countryside.
The ‘new’ entrepreneurs
 34. 49-year-old man; university degree in economics; owner-manager 
of a fast growing large food company; the company’s registered 
office and place of business are in a small town in the Central-hun-
garian region.
35. 47-year-old man; technical college degree; owner-manager of a fast 
growing large company in the paper industry; the company’s reg-
istered office and place of business are in a small town in Western 
hungary.
36. 44-year-old man; university degree in medical doctoring; owner-
manager of a fast growing automobile trading company that went 
bankrupt in 2009. 
37. 39-year-old man; university degree in chemistry; owner-manager 
of a fast growing medium-size glass company; the company’s reg-
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istered office and place of business are in a large town in Western 
hungary.
38. 61-year-old woman; college degree in foreign trade; owner-man-
ager of a medium-size tourism company with highly fluctuating 
performance; the company’s registered office and place of business 
are in a large village in Western hungary.
39. 32-year-old man; university degree in law; owner-manager of a 
fast growing medium-size computer and information technologi-
cal company; the company’s registered office and places of busi-
ness are in Budapest, New york and Tokyo.
40. 40-year-old man; university degree in economics; owner-manager 
of a fast growing large engineering company; the company’s regis-
tered office and places of business are in Budapest and New york.
41. 54-year-old man; technical university degree; co-owner-manager 
of a fast growing large metallurgical company; the company’s reg-
istered office is a large town in the hungarian countryside; place 
of business is a metropolis in the united States.
42. 44-year-old man; high-school diploma; owner-manager of a fast 
growing large machinery and components trading company; the 
company’s registered office and place of business are in a small 
town in the Central-hungarian region.
43. 54-year-old man; graduation in a technical institute; owner-man-
ager of a fast growing medium-size glass company; the company’s 
registered office and place of business are in a large town in West-
ern hungary. 
44. 45-year-old man; high-school diploma; owner-manager of a fast 
growing medium-size glass company; the company’s registered 
office and place of business are in a large town in Western hun-
gary.
45. 49-year-old man; high-school diploma; owner-manager of a fast 
growing medium-size baking company; the company’s registered 
office and place of business are in a small town in Western hungary.
46. 45-year-old man; college degree in pedagogy; owner-manager of a 
medium-size company providing service in organisation develop-
ment; the company’s registered office and place of business are in 
Budapest.
47. 63-year-old man; university degree in economics; owner of a me-
dium-size banking and investment company; the company’s regis-
tered office and place of business are in Budapest.
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48. 66-year-old woman; university degree in law; owner of a stagnat-
ing business consisting of a chain of lawyers’ offices and units pro-
viding investment advisory services; the company’s registered of-
fice (headquarter) and places of businesses are in Budapest.
49. 40-year-old man; university degree in economics; owner-manager 
of a fast growing large engineering company; the company’s reg-
istered office and place of business are in a large town in the coun-
tryside.
50. 33-year-old man; high-school diploma; owner-manager of a fast 
growing medium-size construction company; the company’s reg-
istered office and place of business are in Budapest.
51. 32-year-old man; college degree in agriculture; owner-manager of 
a fast growing medium-size company in real estate brokerage and 
leasing; the company’s registered office and place of business are 
in Budapest.
52. 32-year-old man; university degree in liberal arts; owner-manager 
of a fast growing medium-size food trading company; the com-
pany’s registered office and place of business are in Budapest.
53. 44-year-old man; high-school diploma; prior to career change at 
the time of the interview: owner-manager of a growing medium-
size stationery and art trading company; the company’s registered 
office and place of business are in a large town in the countryside.
54. 44-year-old man; university degree in economics and agriculture, 
respectively; owner-manager of a fast growing medium-size in-
vestment company; the company’s registered office and place of 
business are in Budapest.
55. 33 and 34-year-old brothers; university degree in economics and 
natural sciences, respectively; owner-managers of a gradually 
growing medium-size company with profiles in trade information 
technology and management consultancy; the company’s regis-
tered office is in a medium- size town in the countryside; place of 
business in the vicinity of Budapest.
56. 46-year-old man; university degrees in economics and engineer-
ing, respectively; owner-manager of a fast growing medium-size 
transportation and logistics company; the company’s registered 
office and place of business are in Budapest.
57. 60-year-old woman; university degree in economics; owner-man-
ager of a fast growing medium-size company producing construc-
tion and supplemental materials; the company’s registered office is 
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in Budapest; places of business are in Budapest and large towns in 
the countryside.
58. 41-year-old man; university degree in economics; owner-manager 
of a moderately growing medium-size company network that pro-
vides services in informatics and financial consulting; the compa-
ny’s registered office and place of business are in Budapest.
59. 35-year-old man; economic and business college degree; owner-
manager of a fast growing large company producing construction 
materials; the company’s registered office and place of business are 
in a village in Western hungary.
60. 46-year-old man; commercial vocational school training; owner-
manager of a fast growing large bakery and trading company; the 
company’s registered office is in a village in Western hungary; 
places of business are in Budapest and large towns in the country-
side.
61. 56-year-old woman; university degree in economics; owner-man-
ager of a slowly growing large waste processing company; the 
company’s registered office and place of business are in Budapest.
62. 45-year-old woman; college degree in special education; owner-
manager of a moderately growing medium-size company provid-
ing services in recruitment and management consulting; the com-
pany’s registered office and place of business are in Budapest.
63. 35-year-old man; college degree in engineering; owner-manager 
of a growing small metal and plastic processing company; the com-
pany’s registered office and place of business are in a small town in 
the Central-hungarian region.
64. 41-year-old man; college degree in financing; owner-manager of 
a fast growing small beverage company; the company’s registered 
office and place of business are in a small town in the east-hungar-
ian region.
